[liberationtech] Strength of Political Action, In The Era of COVID-19... More Theatrics & Side-Shows.

[msunet]

Thanks. Lots of stuff to read there.

Also, this is on HN right now:

https://insinuator.net/2020/04/cve-2020-0022-an-android-8-0-9-0-bluetooth-zero-click-rce-bluefrag/

On April 24, 2020 1:28:52 PM PDT, David Stodolsky <dss at socialinformatics.org> wrote:
>
>
>> On 24 Apr 2020, at 20:29, msunet <msunet at shellblade.net> wrote:
>> 
>> There was some talk about this at the Flatten the Curve Summit. At
>first, I thought this technology would be interesting, but now I have
>doubts about it. It doesn't seem very useful to trace people if you
>can't test them, first of all.
>
>If traces are not already being collected, then the test result can’t
>be transmitted to likely exposed persons.
>
>> I also wonder how the random numbers are generated -- will they use
>your device or advertising ID? How can you tell when they embed this
>technology in their proprietary, secret OSes anyway? I also haven't
>seen what the authentication layer is -- will you need a google
>account? -- or more generally, how they plan to protect the system from
>attackers. It's also not clear to me who owns the data, where it is
>stored, how much of it, or for how long. And when does the tracing end?
>
>Apple/Google anouncement covers this.
>
>
>> They also have not solved fundamental problems about this tech, like
>signals going through walls.
>
>Sound can also be used.
>
>Here are my links:
>
>conflict between France and Apple/Google, because the privacy of the
>French app is weaker than that permitted by the Apple/Google approach:
>
>https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52366129
><https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52366129>
>
>https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-strengths-weaknesses/
><https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-strengths-weaknesses/>
>
>UK app also conflicts:
>
>https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/16/nhs-in-standoff-with-apple-and-google-over-coronavirus-tracing
><https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/16/nhs-in-standoff-with-apple-and-google-over-coronavirus-tracing>
>
>These conflicting approaches are dangerous and will not work:
>
>https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/coronavirus-digital-contact-tracing-will-fail-unless-privacy-is-respected-experts-warn
><https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/coronavirus-digital-contact-tracing-will-fail-unless-privacy-is-respected-experts-warn>
>
>
>Credential solution for low resource areas:
>
>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3totKQ_BnBc
><https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3totKQ_BnBc>
>
>https://medium.com/coviid/our-vision-for-covi-id-3ee2a1fe3049
><https://medium.com/coviid/our-vision-for-covi-id-3ee2a1fe3049>
>
>
>The rights issue:
>
>https://exposurealerting.org/ <https://exposurealerting.org/>
>
>
>Audio to increase accuracy:
>
>https://www.novid.org/ <https://www.novid.org/>
>
>This addresses privacy issues with audio as a way of with stopping the
>through-the-wall Bluetooth contact errors:
>
>https://www.wired.com/2016/11/block-ultrasonic-signals-didnt-know-tracking/
><https://www.wired.com/2016/11/block-ultrasonic-signals-didnt-know-tracking/>
>
>
>One way to self-generate credentials, while protecting privacy
>
>https://blog.openmined.org/ckks-homomorphic-encryption-pytorch-pysyft-seal/
><https://blog.openmined.org/ckks-homomorphic-encryption-pytorch-pysyft-seal/>
>
>https://blog.openmined.org/pysyft-pytorch-intel-sgx/
><https://blog.openmined.org/pysyft-pytorch-intel-sgx/>
>
>
>Objections:
>
>https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-wont-stop-covid-alone/
><https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-wont-stop-covid-alone/>
>
>A not that clear objection to Apple/Google standard:
>
>https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/the-flawed-world-of-contact-tracing-wheres-carol-the-tester-3939ac92488a
><https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/the-flawed-world-of-contact-tracing-wheres-carol-the-tester-3939ac92488a>
>
>
>
>dss
>
>
>David Stodolsky, PhD                   Institute for Social Informatics
>Tornskadestien 2, st. th., DK-2400 Copenhagen NV, Denmark
>dss at socialinformatics.org          Tel./Signal: +45 3095 4070

-- Sent from /e/ Mail.
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