[liberationtech] Strength of Political Action, In The Era of COVID-19... More Theatrics & Side-Shows.

[msunet]

There was some talk about this at the Flatten the Curve Summit. At first, I thought this technology would be interesting, but now I have doubts about it. It doesn't seem very useful to trace people if you can't test them, first of all. I also wonder how the random numbers are generated -- will they use your device or advertising ID? How can you tell when they embed this technology in their proprietary, secret OSes anyway? I also haven't seen what the authentication layer is -- will you need a google account? -- or more generally, how they plan to protect the system from attackers. It's also not clear to me who owns the data, where it is  stored, how much of it, or for how long. And when does the tracing end? They also have not solved fundamental problems about this tech, like signals going through walls.

Unless these and other questions are answered (maybe they have and I haven't caught up), this just seems to me like an attempt by corporations to use the situation as an excuse to creep in more into people's lives. It never hurts to remember that they are powered by profit, not good will.

On April 23, 2020 7:01:37 PM PDT, "Robert Mathews (OSIA)" <mathews at hawaii.edu> wrote:
>
>On 4/23/20 5:26 AM, David Stodolsky wrote:
>
>> This appears to be virtue signaling. France is asking that the
>> Apple/Google tracing security be relaxed.
>>>
>https://apple.slashdot.org/story/20/04/21/2019202/france-says-apple-bluetooth-policy-is-blocking-virus-tracker#comments
>> It appears that France has developed a slightly less secure tracing
>> method than the coming Apple/Google API/OS built-in. The current
>> limitation is that Apple doesn’t allow Bluetooth to run on the
>iPhone,
>> if the app is in the background and the data leaves the phone. This
>> has crippled TraceTogether, etc., since it makes tracing impractical
>> with the iPhone.
>>
>> dss
>>
>> David Stodolsky, PhD                   Institute for Social
>Informatics
>> Tornskadestien 2, st. th., DK-2400 Copenhagen NV, Denmark
>> dss at socialinformatics.org <mailto:dss at socialinformatics.org>       
>>   Tel./Signal: +45 3095 4070
>
>Notions of *'contact tracing'* must be considered in broader
>'technical'
>and 'technological' terms.   For instance, consider this following
>headline, which I have been discussing with my team since its
>publication.
>
>*"2 billion phones cannot use Google and Apple contact-tracing tech
>System developed by Silicon Valley relies on technology missing from
>older handsets."*
>TIM BRADSHAW, FT.COM - 4/20/2020, 12:29 PM
>*arsTECHNICA*
>https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/04/2-billion-phones-cannot-use-google-and-apple-contract-tracing-tech/
> 
>MANY such subscriber-linked mobile handsets in-service are located
>within *the Continent of Africa*, and the *Indian Sub-Continent.*  And,
>they are MOSTLY NOT - iPhone 10s.
>
>Of this, I shared the following sentiment with my staff and extended
>teams....
>
>    //This story SHOULD teach us that, no matter how LARGE any "tech"
>    company may be, if those human beings WITHIN are NOT disposed to
>    understanding "SYSTEMS" more wholistically (a widely abused term),
>    products born out of this lack of understanding cannot be expected
>   to meet basic aspects of //////functional//ity////.  ///It also goes
>    without saying that SYSTEMS so constructed can also 'not' be
>    expected to 'INTEROPERATE reliably' with OTHER systems of a LIKE,
>    and/or UNLIKE construction too./
>
>In this respect at least, and more importantly, taking note of the
>UNIVERSALITY of COVID-19, backward operational compatibility and
>INCLUSIVITY should have been critical 'usability' considerations.
>-- 
>/Dr. Robert Mathews, D.Phil.
>Principal Technologist &
>//Distinguished Senior Research Scholar//
>//Office of Scientific Inquiry & Applications (OSIA)//
>//University of Hawai'i/

-- Sent from /e/ Mail.
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