[liberationtech] /. ITU Approves Deep Packet Inspection

[Christian Fuchs]

If this approval by the ITU is true - then it is no surprise at all, but 
what one would expect. What else has the ITU in the past ever been than 
an instrument that supports capitalist interests and commodification of 
the ICT and telecommunications industries?

DPI can advance large-scale monitoring of citizens by the state-capital 
complex that is connected by a right-wing state ideology of fighting 
crime and terror by massive use of surveillance technologies and a 
neoliberal ideology of capitalist organisations that want to make a 
profit out of surveillance and want to hinder the undermining of 
intellectual property rights.
See this:
Christian Fuchs: Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Internet 
Surveillance for Society. 
http://www.projectpact.eu/documents-1/%231_Privacy_and_Security_Research_Paper_Series.pdf

Best, CF

Am 12/5/12 7:11 PM, schrieb Nicholas Judd:
> Hi list, Nick from techPresident here. If I could tap into your hive-mind intelligence for a moment to help me be more precise about explaining why this is an issue, I would appreciate it ...
>
> Governments, intelligence organizations and assorted nogoodniks already use deep-packet inspection, so the declaration of a standard for DPI comes off as vaguely Orwellian but not news. I'm searching for a way to explain the privacy-advocate position on this is both accurately and concisely.
>
> The sense I get from CDT's blog post is that there are three reasons why this is more than just creepy in principle:
>
> 1. The standard outlines ways that, in the ITU's view, ISPs should structure their operations so that highly invasive surveillance can function;
> 2. Under current governance, this standard could be as widely ignored as the <blink> tag, but ISPs could be forced to comply if the ITU becomes a must-follow standards-making body for the Internet — meaning all traffic in every ITU member state, in this extreme example, would be vulnerable by design;
> 3. On principle, IETF and W3C don't address standards for surveillance, highlighting another way the ITU is ideologically removed from the way the Internet is now governed.
>
> Am I on target here?
>
> On Dec 5, 2012, at 12:41 PM, Cynthia Wong wrote:
>
>> The final version of the standard should show up here... eventually:
>>
>> http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/publications/Pages/latest.aspx
>>
>> http://www.itu.int/dms_pages/itu-t/rec/T-REC-RSS.xml
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu [mailto:liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Asher Wolf
>> Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2012 7:38 AM
>> To: liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] /. ITU Approves Deep Packet Inspection
>>
>>  From http://committee.tta.or.kr :
>> Revision of Y.2770 Requirements for #DPI in Next Generation Networks http://bit.ly/Yx0Sya (via @BetweenMyths)
>>
>> On 5/12/12 9:25 PM, Andre Rebentisch wrote:
>>> Am 05.12.2012 10:27, schrieb Eugen Leitl:
>>>> http://yro.slashdot.org/story/12/12/05/0115214/itu-approves-deep-pack
>>>> et-inspection
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ITU Approves Deep Packet Inspection
>>>>
>>>> Posted by Soulskill on Tuesday December 04, @08:19PM
>>>>
>>>> from the inspect-my-encryption-all-you'd-like dept.
>>>>
>>>> dsinc sends this quote from Techdirt about the International
>>>> Telecommunications Union's ongoing conference in Dubai that will have
>>>> an effect on the internet everywhere:
>>> The WCIT is a "diplomatic conference" for the rules governing the ITU,
>>> the ITRs. It seems wrong to mix that with ongoing specific
>>> standardisation work of the ITU.
>>>
>>> Anyway, interesting discussions over at circleid.com:
>>> http://www.circleid.com/posts/20121203_wcit_off_to_a_flying_start/
>>> Apparently ITU fellows are disgruntled that they cannot control the
>>> media coverage and complain about all the "misinformation".
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> André
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>
>> --
>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>> --
>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>