[liberationtech] Interesting Nanog thread on the Iran government's decision to cut 95% of its Internet traffic

[Yosem Companys]

Posted on the The North American Network Operators' Group's mailing list at
https://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog. -- YC

Forwarded Conversation
Subject: Iran cuts 95% of Internet traffic
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From: Sean Donelan <sean at donelan.com>
Date: Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 7:11 AM

Its very practical for a country to cut 95%+ of its Internet connectivity.
Its not a complete cut-off, there is some limited connectivity. But for
most ordinary individuals, their communication channels are cut-off.

https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1196366347938271232

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From: Wayne Bouchard <web at typo.org>
Date: Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 7:32 AM
To: Sean Donelan <sean at donelan.com>

Though Iran's situation is hardly a new advent, it reminds me that
more and more countries seem to be going for the centralized
filter/control/kill option and what a sad development that is. It sure
seems like this is going to vastly change how inter-nation traffic (or
at least intercontinental) is exchanged between providers and even
how bandwidth is sold. It feels to me like it won't be too much longer
before such things start to become somewhat less a matter of business
and more a matter of treaty.

-Wayne ---
Wayne Bouchard
web at typo.org
Network Dude
http://www.typo.org/~web/

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From: Scott Weeks <surfer at mauigateway.com>
Date: Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 9:30 AM

Does anyone know the network mechanics of how this happens?  For
example, do all fiber connections go through a government choke
point for suppression?  If so, what's to stop ubiquity-style
microwave over the border to sympathetic folks on the other side?

scott

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From: Matt Harris <matt at netfire.net>
Date: Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 9:42 AM

Implementation specifics vary. Most rely on state control of consumer ISPs
and implement a variety of systems at that layer. Many also have
chokepoints for international connectivity as well.

Penalties for evading the censorship regime? I don't know specifically what
those entail, but probably at the very least fines and confiscation of
equipment, possibly imprisonment, or even worse in some places? Scanning
for RF emissions on common communications frequencies isn't particularly
difficult, nor is police just looking around their jurisdictions for such
antennas on the exterior of buildings.

Of course, there will always be ways around these sorts of things for
people who have the means/resources/technical capability to do so, and some
will be much harder to get caught with than others. But the 0.01% of people
who have the means and resources aren't the real target anyway, as many
people with the means are people who already have a lot to lose and hence
tend to remain loyal to the state to begin with. The 0.01% who have the
technical capability to do something like build a unidirectional
transceiver from parts and deploy it in a way that it won't easily be
detected are a small enough group that they can be written off. It's the
other 99.8% whom they're worried about and against whom censorship regimes
have the best overall efficacy.
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