[liberationtech] TrueCrypt Alternatives?

[Greg]

On Oct 2, 2014, at 1:51 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:

> You have failed to demonstrate this in any way, other than by brute force assertion

I demonstrated it by logic.

You have only yourself to blame for _choosing_ to ignore the other side's argument:

> > Have you read everything in the reddit r/security link I sent you?
> 
> Of course not.

End of discussion.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

On Oct 2, 2014, at 1:51 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:

> Signed PGP part
> On 2014.10.02 21.37, Greg wrote:
> > Have you read everything in the reddit r/security link I sent you?
> 
> Of course not.  It turns out I have other things to do than read
> voluminous ramblings by folks on Reddit who don't actually do field
> work.  I'll add it to my queue for when I've got a slow Sunday.
> 
> > You have two possible defensible stances based on everything you
> > have said so far:
> >
> > 1. Activists shouldn't encrypt any data whatsoever.
> 
> > 2. Activists should use Espionage-style PD if they are going to
> > choose to use encryption.
> 
> You have failed to demonstrate this in any way, other than by brute
> force assertion, appear to have no field experience, and frankly, it's
> not clear if you ever even had a real security audit or cryptographic
> review.  Brute assertion for commercial products, in particular, tends
> to be indicative of a failure to understand real-world deployment
> constraints.  As does naming something "Espionage", but that's largely
> irrelevant.
> 
> I'm going to stop responding to this thread from this point on,
> because it's clear to me that no further useful discussion will occur
> here.
> 
> Everyone else, hopefully this exchange has been educational as far as
> the kinds of testing we should be seeing tools go through.
> 
> E.
> 
> --
> Ideas are my favorite toys.
> 
> --
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