[liberationtech] XMPP object encryption at IETF about to die...
Doc Searls
dsearls at cyber.law.harvard.edu
Wed Nov 12 06:41:40 PST 2014
Speaking of XMPP, it might be worth checking out telehash, a work in progress led by Jeremie Miller and most of the same team who gave us XMPP, back in the last millennium:
http://telehash.org
Doesn't (and shouldn't) cover everything, but it comes from good motivations and hackers.
Doc
> On Nov 12, 2014, at 5:40 AM, carlo von lynX <lynX at time.to.get.psyced.org> wrote:
>
> Oh great, now I have friends pointing me at libtech postings
> inciting me to reply to them because they're excited to see
> what I will have to say...
>
> At least I hope to surprise them a bit. Let's see...
>
> On Tue, Nov 11, 2014 at 02:18:49PM -1000, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
>> I'm here at IETF 91 hanging with all the protocol nerds. I was talking
>> to someone about OTR and they pointed out that the object-encryption
>> standard for XMPP that has been put forward is about to die due to
>> lack of interest and engagement:
>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e
>
> Yes, Matt Miller presented that at the IETF before and although
> Snowden was in the air no client dev came forward to say YES!
> Let's do this. It was so sad, I even refrained from bashing
> XMPP too loud that it is the wrong and broken protocol for the
> job anyhow.
>
>> Has anyone seen this and thinks it could be a good thing to
>> standardize? I realize it's a subset of what OTR provides but I'm
>> wondering if this could be something we as a community might want to
>> work with in this kind of standards body.
>
> Subset? The proper integration of E2E and PFS removing most of the
> trouble we have with OTR desyncing and throwing errors in our face
> would be a great improvement of the XMPP experience, given you
> want to keep XMPP. And it also applies to other XMPP packets like
> profile look-ups etc - things that people *expect* to be secure
> when using OTR while they actually aren't. So I don't really see
> what you mean by subset here. I have the impression it does more.
> Is it missing socialist millionaire? That would be a problem. Do
> you mean that by subset? Haven't looked at the draft recently.
> It's kind-of been around in the XMPP standards discussion for
> about a decade now, ever since OTR came up.
>
>> Any e2e-has-a-posse folks have an interest here or is standardization
>> not an interest or desire?
>
> Standardization is not the problem. You need at least one dev
> who cares enough to implement all the lot of code into one of the
> too many badly implemented XMPP clients. It's awful how only few
> XMPP clients currently offer the full up to date OTR protocol.
> I have a feeling the majority of OTR conversations are not
> properly being authenticated because of things like socialist
> millionaire (aka shared secrets) not being implemented everywhere.
>
> No wait, I correct myself. Standardization IS the problem. It
> leads to every spare time code writer doing his own client brew
> and none of them being solid enough for humanity's needs (given
> that XMPP wasn't a bad choice in the first place). What we need
> is everyone working on a single solid codebase, possibly
> ChatSecure, and have that available for ALL platforms, with
> professional usability and no glitches.
>
> But then again maybe it's time to kiss federation good-bye.
> XMPP comes not only with a lot of problems of its own that you
> can read about at http://about.psyc.eu/XMPP - it also shares
> the fundamental architecture problem with PSYC being the
> federation of servers. When we designed those protocols we
> made the fatally wrong assumption that servers are neat, cool,
> sweet and most of all SAFE. Also back in the 90s we didn't
> have DHTs yet. Fifteen years later it is overdue to admit that
> XMPP, SMTP and other federation protocols were designed to a
> paradigm which no longer is recommendable. We should improve
> those technologies that provide not only end-to-end encrypted
> messaging, but also metadata protection and defense against
> attacks on single points of failure like jabber.ccc.de.
>
> http://secushare.org/comparison lists a few platforms that are
> heading in the right direction. I need to add blockchain
> apps to that soonish, as Bitmessage seems to function and I'm
> no longer sure it can't scale. Maybe it actually could. Please
> let's get off XMPP+OTR soon and not invest huge amounts of
> energy just to get rid of the bugs.
>
> And let's stop talking about open standards for free software.
> Open standards are only important when we HAVE to deal with
> some company dominating the field with its proprietary tool.
> As long as we do not need to interact with any proprietary
> thing, we can avoid impeding development by standardization.
>
> Just think how useful it would have been to spread cat gifs
> over XMPP if XMPP weren't so impractical for binary data.
> Instead it sucks, so nobody does it.
>
> It's crazy for our civil liberties and the foundations of
> democracy to be using either Facebook or Google for personal
> conversations, so we should not work on an open standard that
> includes those platforms. So we don't need to focus on an open
> standard. We just need running AGPL code, which implies a free
> protocol by definition.
>
> --
> http://youbroketheinternet.org
> ircs://psyced.org/youbroketheinternet
> --
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