[liberationtech] Mapping the Canadian Government’s Telecommunications Surveillance

[Walid AL-SAQAF]

Thanks Ron for this report.

Those are fascinating findings and I hope the Cyber Dialogue Conference
could help shed more light on them, particularly if representatives of the
agencies or ISPs attend.

Sincerely,

Walid Al-Saqaf
On Mar 28, 2014 7:11 AM, "Ronald Deibert" <r.deibert at utoronto.ca> wrote:

> Dera LibTech
>
> Further to an earlier posting about the state of the Canadian Telco
> surveillance situation, I am posting an analysis of recent data
> by Citizen Lab Post Doc Christopher Parsons.
>
>
> https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/
>
> Cheers
> Ron
>
>
>
> Mapping the Canadian Government’s Telecommunications Surveillance
>
> *March 27, 2014*
>
> Tagged: Canada <https://citizenlab.org/tag/canada/>, Privacy<https://citizenlab.org/tag/privacy/>
> , Surveillance <https://citizenlab.org/tag/surveillance/>
> Categories: Articles<https://citizenlab.org/category/research-news/articles/>
> , Research News <https://citizenlab.org/category/research-news/>
>
> The issue of lawful access has repeatedly arisen on the Canadian federal
> agenda. Every time that the legislation has been introduced Canadians have
> opposed the notion of authorities gaining warrantless access to subscriber
> data, to the point where the most recent version of the lawful access
> legislation dropped this provision. It would seem, however, that the real
> motivation for dropping the provision may follow from the facts on the
> ground: Canadian authorities already routinely and massively collect
> subscriber data without significant pushback by Canada’s service providers.
> And whereas the prior iteration of the lawful access legislation (i.e.
> C–30) would have required authorities to report on their access to this
> data the current iteration of the legislation (i.e. C–13) lacks this
> accountability safeguard.
>
> In March 2014, MP Charmaine Borg received responses from federal agencies
> (.pdf)<http://www.christopher-parsons.com/Main/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/8555-412-233.pdf> concerning
> the agencies’ requests for subscriber-related information from
> telecommunications service providers (TSPs). Those responses demonstrate
> extensive and unaccountable federal government surveillance of Canadians. I
> begin this post by discussing the political significance of MP Borg’s
> questions and then proceed to granularly identify major findings from the
> federal agencies’ respective responses. After providing these empirical
> details and discussing their significance, I conclude by arguing that the
> ‘subscriber information loophole’ urgently needs to be closed and that
> federal agencies must be made accountable to their masters, the Canadian
> public.
> MP Borg’s Questions
>
> In January 2014 I, along with a series of other academics and civil
> liberties groups, issued a set of letters to Canada’s largest
> telecommunications service providers<http://www.christopher-parsons.com/towards-transparency-in-canadian-telecommunications/>.
> We asked how, why, and how often government authorities requested access to
> information about the providers’ subscribers. Shortly after we published
> our letters MP Charmaine Borg placed a series of questions on the Order
> Paper<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6391359&File=11>.
> MP Borg’s questions complemented those those that were sent to service
> providers; she asked the federal government to disclose how, why, and how
> often federal agencies accessed telecommunications data pertaining to
> Canadians. Moreover, these institutions were legally compelled to provide
> her with responses.
>
> The questions that she asked are of critical importance. They represent
> the first time that a Member of Parliament has so comprehensively and
> publicly requested detailed procedural and technical information concerning
> the scope of federal government surveillance. Importantly, many of the
> kinds of surveillance activities she requested information about are
> *outside* of statutory reporting requirements: as a result, government
> agencies are not typically required to report many of these surveillance
> activities to the public. By directing her questions to the government it
> should now be easier for Parliamentary and independent policy
> analysts/researchers to triangulate subsequent investigations: we now know
> which agencies to target with access to information requests, the kinds of
> specific (additional) data that would be helpful, and so forth.
>
> Perhaps most importantly, MP Borg’s questions demonstrate a genuine
> interest in the details of the federal government’s surveillance practices,
> and she has elicited responses from agencies that are traditionally silent
> about their warrant-based and warrantless access to telecommunications
> data. We also learn, in detail, that some federal agencies are unwilling to
> provide her with basic information either on the basis that they cannot
> (because they lack a sufficient internal accountability culture) or because
> they will not (perhaps because revealing even partial data would indicate
> the massive and warrantless collection of Canadians’ personal information,
> or because they believe Parliamentarians need not be replied to). Each of
> these rationales is deeply concerning because each suggests a lack of
> agency accountability to Parliament and Canadians alike.
>
> Of note, while MP Borg directed her questions at only four federal
> agencies – CBSA, CSIS, CSEC, and the RCMP – the government provided
> responses from a significantly wider range of agencies. The result is that
> there are a number of agencies that indicate they never request access to
> telecommunications service provider data, some that simply stated they did
> not make requests during the period of time MP Borg inquired about, and
> others that do regularly request information from telecommunications
> service providers.
> Major Findings
>
> The government’s responses to MP Borg’s questions were returned on March
> 24, 2014. In what follows I identify the major findings from these
> responses. I first discuss the Communications Security Establishment Canada
> (CSEC), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Royal Canadian
> Mounted Police (RCMP), and Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA). These
> agencies provided particularly valuable information in response to MP
> Borg’s questions. I then move to discuss some of the ‘minor findings’
> related to the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA), Competition Bureau,
> Statistics Canada, and the Transportation Safety Board (TSB).
> Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
>
> CSEC stated that it is prohibited from targeting Canadians but that, as
> part of its mandate to provide assistance to domestic authorities (under
> its ‘mandate (c)’ ) it is authorized to, upon request, “lawfully assist and
> act as an agent of a federal law enforcement or security agency as part of
> its mandate and, when doing so, is subject to the legal restrictions,
> instructions, and direction placed on the requesting agency, such as a
> court warrant.” In the course of providing such assistance it is possible
> that CSEC may request access to subscriber data or other telecommunications
> data pertaining to Canadians.
>
> Based on documents previously received through Access to Information, we
> can infer that historically CSEC would conduct actions under its foreign
> intelligence mandate (mandate (a) ) to collect information about Canadians;
> today, the nature of this collection process has been inhibited in some
> manner (the full restrictions are redacted).[1]<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/1> It
> seems as though the shift was principally in which mandate was used to
> justify the collection of Canadians’ information; Craig Forcese writes
> that<http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/2013/10/16/a-tale-of-two-controversies-thoughts-on-csecs-headline-acts.html>
> :
>
> we don’t know is what exactly CSEC did under Mandate A that should have
> been done (in the commissioner’s eyes) under Mandate C. One suspects that
> if the Commissioner concluded that Mandate A was inapplicable, this was not
> about collection of foreign intelligence. And so did this cooperation
> involve direct intercepts of Canadian targets – something that CSEC can do
> as a proxy for RCMP or CSIS? If it did, did an RCMP or CSIS warrant
> undergird that collection? If not, is it because even when it comes to
> domestic metadata collection, the government’s lawyers take the view that
> no warrant is required? Extrapolating from prior government positions on
> lawful access reform, warrantless intercept of domestic metadata would not
> be an uncharacteristic position for the government to take. These are
> questions of enormous public interest – and hardly the stuff that deserves
> the heady protection of secrecy law.
>
> What Forcese and other commentators have picked up on is the relative
> ambiguity concerning CSEC’s collection of information about Canadians.
> CSEC’s response to MP Borg’s questions largely consists of the
> Establishment’s well-known talking points. As a result, the full range of
> what CSEC ‘assistance’ entails remains unclear, which means we cannot know
> the extent to which CSEC deliberately accesses Canadians telecommunications
> information, how long it retains such information, whether it enjoys close
> co-operation with Canada’s telecommunications service providers, how it
> handles information it collects about Canadians, or whether it pays
> telecommunications companies for access to such information.
> Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
>
> CSIS largely declined to respond to MP Borg’s very specific questions on
> the grounds that the Service is legally prohibited from disclosing
> information about its actions. Specifically, CSIS based its refusals on
> Section 19 of the CSIS Act. Section 19(1) and 19(2) state that:
>
>
>    1. (1) Information obtained in the performance of the duties and
>    functions of the Service under this Act shall not be disclosed by the
>    Service except in accordance with this section.
>    2. (2) The Service may disclose information referred to in subsection
>    (1) for the purposes of the performance of its duties and functions under
>    this Act or the administration or enforcement of this Act *or as
>    required by any other law* and may also disclose such information.
>    (emphasis added)
>
> In making its argument against disclosure of information, the Service is
> asserting that questions set on the Order Paper by Parliamentarians fall
> outside of scope of 19.(2), despite federal agencies being legally
> compelled to respond to such questions. This leaves open the question of
> how, specifically, CSIS differentiates between different legal requirements
> to respond: if a Parliamentarian’s questions do not need to be answered,
> then what specific laws might compel the Service to explain and rationalize
> the information it collects in the performance of its duties and functions?
>
> Despite CSIS’s unwillingness to broadly respond to the MP’s questions, we
> did learn that the Service contributes to the development of “technical
> solutions” that facilitate the Service’s wiretap capabilities. Left
> unstated are the extents to which CSIS partners with telecommunications
> service providers, international standards bodies, router or telephone
> vendors, or other parties to develop these solutions. Moreover, while CSIS
> ‘contributes’ to the development of these tools we do not know if it
> absorbs the full costs of these technical innovations or whether Canadian
> TSPs must also shoulder a portion of the costs.
> Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
>
> Despite law enforcement groups such as the Canadian Association of Chiefs
> of Police<http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/924897/cacp-appeals-to-canadians-the-lens-of-law-enforcement-why-we-are-asking-for-lawful-access>
>  and RCMP<http://www.canada.com/saskatoonstarphoenix/news/national/story.html?id=1d424ebe-2fe9-4e79-bab5-8fd67fd1b441> historically
> stating that lawful access legislation is needed, and despite pressure to
> aggregate statistics<http://business.financialpost.com/2012/01/18/police-scrambling-to-justify-lawful-access-laws/?__lsa=a540-a326> indicating
> a low rate of compliance by telecommunications service providers in
> responding to authorities’ requests for information, the RCMP persistently
> failed to respond to MP Borg’s questions. The Mounties rationalized their
> non-responses on grounds that they do “not maintain a centralized data
> repository that would allow it to determine the total number of requests to
> telecommunications service providers for customers’ usage of communications
> devices and services.” Moreover, while some of this information is
> collected “when requested to do so, through Access to Information Requests,
> the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, the federal Minister of Public
> Safety, and provincial authorities such as attorneys-general” the RCMP
>  failed to provide such information to the Member of Parliament. This is
> particularly disappointing given that, as of 2010, the RCMP claimed to have
> a reporting tool meant to capture subscriber data requests. Based on an
> ATIP in 2011, we know that the RCMP made at least 28,143 request for basic
> subscriber information in 2010 but, apparently, could not provide
> equivalent information to the MP.[2]<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/2>
>
> We also learn that the RCMP cannot explain the kinds of data fields that
> are disclosed by telecommunications or Internet service providers on the
> basis that the fields vary “from request to request based on several
> factors, such as the specific information requested via judicial
> authorization, or the information held by the provider.” It should be noted
> that the MP asked the RCMP to specifically identify the kinds of fields
> disclosed for unique kinds of access requests: the RCMP, instead of
> providing her with a clear and direct response, refused to differentiate
> and respond to her questions in the manner she outlined.
>
> Unsurprisingly, the RCMP did collect ‘basic subscriber information’ during
> the period that MP Borg inquired about. The RCMP “does not notify persons
> impacted” unless “through the Crown’s obligation to disclose when the
> investigation results in prosecution.” Despite collecting subscriber
> records, however, the RCMP only reports on the number of wiretaps it
> conducts each year. The Mounties decline to provide such information
> concerning surveillance activities beyond those it is statutorily required
> to report on. Given that partial numbers from 2010 revealed 28,143 requests
> for such subscriber information it’s a reasonable inference that tens and
> tens of thousands of Canadians are having their information disclosed to
> the RCMP each year without Canadians ever realizing they have somehow
> fallen under the RCMP’s suspicion.
>
> Curiously, the RCMP maintains that “[t]here is no set maximum number of
> subscribers that service providers are required to monitor.” Documents that
> were received under Access to Information reveal that the government
> previously planned to establish global maximums on the number of
> communications that a service provider would have to be able to intercept
> at any given time.[3]<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/3>In
> contrast with the RCMP’s statements, it is unclear whether such regulations
> that followed from the passage of lawful access legislation would
> *restrict* the number of intercepts or if it is already widely understood
> that regardless of what is described in regulations, there will practically
> be an unfettered ability to activate a limitless number of wiretaps in
> Canada.
>
> The final major finding is that there is a common cost schedule for
> accessing basic subscriber information: such information costs $1.00–3.00
> per request. However, for all other kinds of requests for information there
> is “no standard payment schedule” because “compensation may vary from
> provider to provider based on a number of factors such as the complexity of
> the request and the service providers’ network architecture.” This does
> suggest that the RCMP is paying for TSPs to conduct other forms of
> surveillance and indicates that more information might be disclosed by
> ATIPs that ask each RCMP division how much they are respectively paying
> TSPs for surveillance services. Ultimately, however, the RCMP does not keep
> a central repository – or, it would seem, have the ability to contact its
> various provincial divisions using telecommunications services – that would
> capture how much it is paying service providers to conduct surveillance on
> Canadians.
> Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA)
>
> Of all of the responsive agencies, CBSA provided the most detail
> concerning their access to Canadians’ information that is held by
> telecommunications service providers. The Agency made a total of 18,849
> requests for information; none were for real-time access to data and thus
> would not be reported in a government wiretap report. Only 25 requests were
> denied on the basis of the phone numbers no longer being active or having
> been ported to another TSP, on the basis that the number was forwarded, or
> on the basis of ‘other reasons’. Moreover, of the total number of requests,
> 18,729 were for ‘basic subscriber information’. The full numbers and
> definitions of these kinds of data are outlined below:
>
> [image: Screenshot_2014-03-27,_1_37_PM]<http://www.christopher-parsons.com/Main/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Screenshot_2014-03-27_1_37_PM.png>
>
> Like all other respondents, the CBSA does not proactively notify
> individuals who have had their information accessed unless legally required
> to do so. As a result, “an individual may become aware” that a TSP has
> disclosed their information to CBSA “if enforcement action is taken against
> that person and data provided by the TSP is used as evidence in support of
> charges.” Of the 18,729 individuals who had their information accessed by
> CBSA only 17 were notified.
>
> When requesting subscriber information, TSPs generally provide responses
> to CBSA within 2–3 days and at a cost of $1.00-$3.00 a record. Exigent
> requests for this information can cost between $1.00-$10.00 a record.
> Refusals to provide this information manifest if the subscriber does not
> publicly list their telephone number(s); in such cases, CBSA may seek a
> warrant to compel the disclosure of the information. The CBSA did not
> indicate whether it pays for access to non-subscriber information data.
> Minor Findings
>
> There were four other federal agencies of note that access
> telecommunications subscriber data: the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA),
> Statistics Canada, Competition Bureau, and the Transportation Safety Board
> (TSB). The *CRA* stated that:
>
> If there have been any instances where such requests [for
> telecommunications subscriber data] have been made, the CRA does not track
> this activity in its systems, such that a response could be provided in the
> manner outlined in the question. To provide a detailed response in the
> manner requested would require a manual search of a significant amount of
> data that could not be completed in the time allotted for the provision of
> responses under Standing Order (39(5)(*a).[2]<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/2>
>
> In effect, this response suggests that CRA might access Canadians’
> telecommunications data through warrantless or court-ordered processes, but
> that the Agency cannot reveal its actions to the Parliamentarian. It
> remains unclear whether the “significant amount of data” refers to a
> general breadth of information that is held by the federal agency or
> whether, instead, it indicates that CRA so prolifically accesses Canadians’
> telecommunications data that parsing it would be an overly onerous task.
>
> In the case of *Statistics Canada*, the agency collects information about
> how Canadians use telecommunications services; there were 208 requests for
> aggregated information between April 1, 2012 and March 31, 2013. Beyond
> aggregated subscriber information (e.g. number of residential subscribers,
> long distance minutes, mobile minutes used) the agency also collects
> information about telecommunications service providers’ networks and
> businesses. This latter kind of information included operating revenues by
> type of service, details of the makeup of revenues, operating expenses and
> salaries and wages, fixed assets and capital expenditures, as well as
> information about plans and phone use. Canada’s service providers fulfilled
> requests for aggregated information 190 times and failed to do so 18 times.
>
> When it came to the *Competition Bureau*, we learn that it does not
> access telecommunications service provider data in any of the ways outlined
> in MP Borg’s questions. Instead, the Bureau seems to have solely accessed
> “the Bell Canada Law Enforcement Database twenty times in the fiscal year
> 2012–13.” It is unclear what constitutes an ‘access’, how many subscribers
> might have been affected, what data fields are accessible, whether data is
> retained by the Competition Bureau, or the conditions Bell Canada places
> upon access to this database. Of note, no other federal agency that
> responded to MP Borg’s questions referenced the Bell Law Enforcement
> Database, or the database of any other major telecommunications service
> provider. It’s not clear whether the Competition Bureau simply named the
> Bell database whereas other agencies provided information derived from
> accessing the Bell or corresponding other industry law enforcement
> databases, or whether the Competition Bureau has access to a unique kind of
> portal.
>
> In contrast to the CRA and Competition Bureau, more expansive responses
> were issued by the *Transportation Safety Board* (TSB). The TSB estimates
> that it makes 8–12 requests for telecommunications data each year and that
> such requests may include information about device geolocation history,
> call detail records, text message content, voicemail, subscriber
> information, transmission data (e.g. duration of interactions, port
> numbers, communications routing data), and data requests (e.g. web sites
> visited, IP address logs). Such data is accessed in the course of
> investigating safety incidents, and usually entails data “specific to the
> date of the occurrence, or the 72 hours leading up to the occurrence.” Like
> other organizations, the TSB does not have a formal process in place to
> notify individuals that their subscriber data has been accessed. Unlike
> other agencies, TSB *does not* provide any kind of compensation to
> telecommunications service providers to access the providers’ data.
> Urgent Need for Government Accountability
>
> A considerable amount of previously-undisclosed information is on the
> record as a result of MP Borg’s questions. She has done a considerable
> service to Parliament and Canadians more generally in extracting details
> concerning often-unaccountable governmental surveillance operations. In the
> process it has become evident that Canada’s premier federal law enforcement
> agency, the RCMP, cannot account for how often it collects Canadians’
> personal information without a warrant, the amount of money it spends on
> such warrantless access, or even the data fields that it routinely collects
> in the course of its investigations. This suggests that the Mounties are
> either unable to account for their own funds or are unable to  get their
> divisions to comply with reporting requirements. Alternately, it may
> indicate that the RCMP is *unwilling* to either account for their
> spending of public money or the numbers of times that they access
> Canadians’ personal information. Each of these conclusions speaks poorly
> about the state of affairs within this federal agency.
>
> In turning to CSIS, we see that the Service has a highly specific
> understanding of what laws compel it to disclose information about its
> practices and collection of Canadians’ personal information. The Service
> failed to provide a rationale to MP Borg as to why, specifically, questions
> placed on the Parliamentary Order Paper are insufficient to compel a
> meaningful response: to whom, specifically, would CSIS provide this
> information? And under what laws? If the Service is unaccountable to
> Parliamentarians then who, specifically, does it hold itself genuinely
> accountable to?
>
> While CBSA is attracting headlines from major presses<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/telecoms-routinely-give-customer-information-to-canada-border-service-agency/article17691103/> and
> by academics <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/7098/125/>, the
> federal agency is to be congratulated in its accountability. While
> Canadians can agree or disagree about the appropriateness of the Agency’s
> warrantless access to Canadians’ personal information it is clear that the
> Agency maintains an internal culture of accountability. It can provide
> information on how many times it requests subscriber data and other forms
> of telecommunications information, explain the kinds of data that are
> included as part of each of these requests, and provide granular analyses
> of how long data is retained and how long it takes for TSPs to provide it.
> Of all the agencies contacted that are involved in the collection of TSP
> information the CBSA stands out as both the most accountable to Parliament
> *and* capable of responding as asked. CBSA should not stand as the pariah
> amongst the federal agencies but as the model of what other agencies ought
> to be capable of reporting. Ideally CBSA would go further and publicly
> provide these statistics without first being prompted, and notify
> individuals when their subscriber information is accessed. Regardless, it
> is clear that CBSA took MP Borg’s questions seriously.
>
> What is apparent from reading all of these federal agencies’ responses is
> that many of them are massively accessing Canadians’ subscriber
> information. We still don’t understand what motivates these requests or
> where ‘seed identifiers’ come from: does CBSA, for example request
> subscriber information after seizing a person’s laptop or cellphone at the
> border and forensically analyzing call and contact logs? Or does it use
> other technical or human or open source intelligence methods to gauge who
> to target? In the case of the RCMP we know that historically they have been
> massively involved in accessing subscriber information and that,
> proportionally, they will inform very few individuals unless the subscriber
> data is used in court. Only Access to Information requests seem to pry
> detailed numbers from the RCMP; not even questions issued by a
> Parliamentarian are sufficient to elicit meaningful responses.
>
> When combined with data gained through previously completed Access to
> Information requests, MP Borg’s questions have significantly broadened our
> understanding of the unaccountability of federal agencies conducting
> surveillance on Canadians. We understand that CSEC will (continue to)
> refuse to clarify how it access telecommunications data when providing
> assistance to federal law enforcement. We also understand that CSIS does
> not regard a Parliamentarian’s questions as requiring the Service to
> respond to specific questions around its access to telecommunications
> information. And we understand that the RCMP will stonewall
> Parliamentarians just as they stonewall the public.
>
> These agencies’ unaccountability is absolutely unacceptable. And it’s made
> worse by the fact that the currently proposed lawful access legislation,
> C–13, would indemnify ISPs for sharing even more information with state
> authorities while not requiring these authorities to report on how often,
> and to what extent, they ‘request’ such information. It appears as though
> the federal government has engaged in little more than a legislative facade
> by dropping provisions for warrantless to subscriber data in the current
> lawful access legislation: such requests are already largely accommodated
>  by Canada’s telecommunication service providers.  By dropping the
> reporting features of C–30 from C-13, the government is ensuring that
> widespread access to subscriber data can continue apace without the risk of
> raising the ire of the Canadian public. The indemnification aspects of C-13
> must be dropped and the reporting features of C-30 must be expanded and
> amended into C-13. Doing anything else would merely feed the Canadian
> government’s appetite for surveillance without remedying its already
> deficient accountability mechanisms.
> ------------------------------
>
>    1. From page 000019 of this ATIP document (.pdf)<https://canleaks.org/files/2013/ATIP_CSEC_A-2012-00035.pdf>,
>    we see that in the past CSEC would, “under part (a) of its mandate, conduct
>    [REDACTED] in response to ‘requests for information’ from Government Canada
>    client agencies” whereas, today, “OPS–1–10 prohibits [REDACTED] in response
>    to a client request for information about Canadians. CSEC conducts metadata
>    analysis to obtain security or criminal intelligence in support of CSIS/LEA
>    investigations under part (c) of CSEC’s mandate.” ↩<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/1>
>    2. See page 000267 of ATIP A-2011-00220 (.pdf)<https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/2869620/SNS-Project/Literature/A-2011-00220.PDF>
>    .  ↩<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/2>
>    3. See the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic
>    Communications Act: Regulations Policy for more information (.pdf)<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_download/gid,103/>
>    . ↩<https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunications-surveillance/1/3>
>
>
> Ronald Deibert
> Director, the Citizen Lab
> and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies
> Munk School of Global Affairs
> University of Toronto
> (416) 946-8916
> PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt
> http://deibert.citizenlab.org/
> twitter.com/citizenlab
> r.deibert at utoronto.ca
>
>
>
>
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