[liberationtech] A modest proposal for protecting the work (and freedom) of activists.
Kate Krauss
katie at critpath.org
Mon Jan 20 11:29:20 PST 2014
Hi,
I think the idea is that there is a subset of activists and journalists who
are very motivated to encrypt who can't. Glen Greenwald comes to mind. I
come to mind, and a bunch of my activist friends from countries under
pressure. I don't see much easy to use instruction on how--and finding them
easily is important. I do see a lot of obsolete sites (and is the MIT key
server broken?) that come up first in searches.
Thanks for reading and commenting,
Katie
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 2:19 PM, Katy Pearce <katycarvt at gmail.com> wrote:
> My point is that, to my understanding, there already exists a lot of very
> digestible trainings. But until other issues are addressed, adoption is not
> likely. Decades of research tells us this. :)
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Nathan of Guardian <
> nathan at guardianproject.info> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Katy Pearce <katycarvt at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >Not to be a downer here, but until this is addressed:
>>
>> Your post specifically discussed building a training wizard and I was
>> simply showing you what we had done here to make a simple, friendly
>> experience using plain language.
>>
>> I would keep the discussion focused on that for now, because it is a
>> worthwhile topic and there are many existing super easy solutions out there
>> that definitely need help on the awareness building front.
>>
>> If you want to have the "I want unbreakable crypto that is simple, fast
>> and totally invisible" discussion we can, but is a different topic.
>>
>> With all respect,
>> Nathan
>>
>
>
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