[liberationtech] liberationtech Digest, Vol 149, Issue 2
Grace Cha
sadenshi at gmail.com
Sun Apr 7 09:48:06 PDT 2013
I believe,
for everyone's sake,
blind or not,
the simpler the message,
the better it is received.
grace cha / sadenshi at gmail.com
On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 10:59 AM,
<liberationtech-request at lists.stanford.edu>wrote:
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: SUBSCRIPTION (Eugen Leitl)
> 2. Re: SUBSCRIPTION (James S. Tyre)
> 3. Re: SUBSCRIPTION (Joseph Lorenzo Hall)
> 4. Re: SUBSCRIPTION (michael gurstein)
> 5. Why are we here? (Shava Nerad)
> 6. Syria Digital Security Monitor (Rafal Rohozinski)
> 7. suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows? (Katy P)
> 8. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb)
> 9. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows? (Katy P)
> 10. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Eugen Leitl)
> 11. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows? (Katy P)
> 12. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Griffin Boyce)
> 13. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Scott Elcomb)
> 14. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Seth David Schoen)
> 15. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb)
> 16. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Doug Chamberlin)
> 17. North Korea, the US, war rhetoric, Anonymous (Mitch Downey)
> 18. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Eugen Leitl)
> 19. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb)
> 20. State/DRL Internet freedom solicitations posted (Riley, Chris M)
> 21. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows? (Katy P)
> 22. Re: [CivicAccess-discuss] Secrecy for Sale: How ICIJ's
> Project Team Analyzed the Offshore Files (michael gurstein)
> 23. Re: how spammers work, was: You are awesome, Treat yourself
> to a love one (Rich Kulawiec)
> 24. Re: suggestions for a remote wipe software for Windows?
> (Rich Kulawiec)
> 25. Re: [CivicAccess-discuss] Secrecy for Sale: How ICIJ's
> Project Team Analyzed the Offshore Files
> (Andr?s Leopoldo Pacheco Sanfuentes)
> 26. Call for Papers: World Congress on Internet Security
> (WorldCIS-2013) (Dan Lin)
> 27. Re: Call for Papers: World Congress on Internet Security
> (WorldCIS-2013) (Rich Kulawiec)
> 28. Funding for DIY projects on online protest & performance
> (Yosem Companys)
> 29. Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to challenge National
> Security Letter (Nicholas Merrill)
> 30. OSI Program Manager job... (Joseph Lorenzo Hall)
> 31. Natalia Project: personal assault alarm for human rights
> defenders at risk (Enrique Piraces)
> 32. Re: Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to challenge
> National Security Letter (hellekin)
> 33. CPJ: Attacks on Knight Center sites reflect digital dangers
> (frank at journalistsecurity.net)
> 34. Re: Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to challenge
> National Security Letter (Shava Nerad)
> 35. Re: Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to challenge
> National Security Letter (Griffin Boyce)
> 36. Re: CPJ: Attacks on Knight Center sites reflect digital
> dangers (frank at journalistsecurity.net)
> 37. Why Bluecoat? (Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb)
> 38. Re: Why Bluecoat? (Fabio Pietrosanti (naif))
> 39. CfP: "Surveillance, Games & Play" in Surveillance & Society
> (September 15) (Yosem Companys)
> 40. Re: Why Bluecoat? (Jillian C. York)
> 41. Re: Why Bluecoat? (Kate Krauss)
> 42. Re: Why Bluecoat? (Ronald Deibert)
> 43. Re: Why Bluecoat? (Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 16:37:20 +0200
> From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] SUBSCRIPTION
> Message-ID: <20130403143720.GY6172 at leitl.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 10:33:17AM -0400, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
>
> > > Top-posting is definitely worse. Don't do it. >
>
> > A very minor point that isn't especially relevant to libtech, I suspect:
> I
> > work with a number of blind advocates and top-posting makes their lives
> much,
> > much easier (since "scrolling" for them can be quite difficult). So,
> this is
>
> How do they deal with context? Do they use threading MUAs?
> What kind of infrastructure they use? Way back it was a braille line
> and emacs, but I presume that's no longer true.
>
> > just to point out an exception to the tendency to always favor
> top-posting...
> > however I have seen indications thy we have libtech members who use
> screen
> > readers. best, Joe
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 08:35:29 -0700
> From: "James S. Tyre" <jstyre at eff.org>
> To: "'liberationtech'" <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] SUBSCRIPTION
> Message-ID: <00d801ce3080$df373f10$9da5bd30$@eff.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> Joe, how would you see? '-) (I do, unless I'm in front of my ginormous
> monitor.)
>
> --
> James S. Tyre
> Law Offices of James S. Tyre
> 10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512
> Culver City, CA 90230-4969
> 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax)
> jstyre at jstyre.com
> Policy Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation
> https://www.eff.org
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu [mailto:liberationtech-
> > bounces at lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Joseph Lorenzo Hall
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 7:37 AM
> > To: liberationtech
> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] SUBSCRIPTION
> >
> > err, I haven't seen any indications that we have libtech members that
> use screen
> > readers... sorry for the double post.
> >
> > best, Joe
> >
> > --
> > Joseph Lorenzo Hall
> > Senior Staff Technologist
> > Center for Democracy & Technology
> > https://www.cdt.org/
> >
> > On Apr 3, 2013, at 10:33, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe at cdt.org> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Apr 3, 2013, at 6:31, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> > >
> > >> On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 12:27:47PM +0200, Jillian C. York wrote:
> > >>> Which is worse:
> > >>
> > >> Top-posting is definitely worse. Don't do it.
> > >
> > > A very minor point that isn't especially relevant to libtech, I
> suspect: I work with
> > a number of blind advocates and top-posting makes their lives much, much
> easier (since
> > "scrolling" for them can be quite difficult). So, this is just to point
> out an
> > exception to the tendency to always favor top-posting... however I have
> seen
> > indications thy we have libtech members who use screen readers. best, Joe
> >
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing
> > moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2013 11:49:13 -0400
> From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe at cdt.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] SUBSCRIPTION
> Message-ID: <515C4F79.5000505 at cdt.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
>
>
> On 4/3/13 10:37 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 10:33:17AM -0400, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
> >
> >>> Top-posting is definitely worse. Don't do it. >
> >
> >> A very minor point that isn't especially relevant to libtech, I
> suspect: I
> >> work with a number of blind advocates and top-posting makes their lives
> much,
> >> much easier (since "scrolling" for them can be quite difficult). So,
> this is
> >
> > How do they deal with context? Do they use threading MUAs?
> > What kind of infrastructure they use? Way back it was a braille line
> > and emacs, but I presume that's no longer true.
>
> I can ask, if you'd like. I think it's pretty standard for blind users
> to use screenreaders like JAWS, and I know they can get frustrated by
> long indented stuff quoted before the "meat" of a post. But they're
> frustrated by so much of the abled world. ::)
>
> I just wanted to raise this so that if you send to a list/group that is
> more likely to have visually-impaired users, you might crop the quoted
> stuff and respond above... but it's mostly a kindness than a necessity.
>
> best, Joe
>
> --
> Joseph Lorenzo Hall
> Senior Staff Technologist
> Center for Democracy & Technology
> 1634 I ST NW STE 1100
> Washington DC 20006-4011
> (p) 202-407-8825
> (f) 202-637-0968
> joe at cdt.org
> PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 09:01:56 -0700
> From: "michael gurstein" <gurstein at gmail.com>
> To: "'liberationtech'" <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] SUBSCRIPTION
> Message-ID: <133801ce3084$9964cee0$cc2e6ca0$@gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> Ahh, the big enders vs. little enders discussion Pt. 212c
>
> IMHE, bottom posting is a techie thing for folks used to scrolling through
> long back and forths with siginficant details being added in a successive
> fashion...
>
> Top posting is a non-techie thing for folks who are looking to bring
> substantive content to a discussion where folks may (or may not) wish to
> search further to see what else has been said on the subject.
>
> (this list an interesting agglomeration of both...
>
> M
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu
> [mailto:liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Joseph
> Lorenzo Hall
> Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 8:49 AM
> To: liberationtech
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] SUBSCRIPTION
>
>
>
> On 4/3/13 10:37 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 10:33:17AM -0400, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
> >
> >>> Top-posting is definitely worse. Don't do it. >
> >
> >> A very minor point that isn't especially relevant to libtech, I
> >> suspect: I work with a number of blind advocates and top-posting
> >> makes their lives much, much easier (since "scrolling" for them can
> >> be quite difficult). So, this is
> >
> > How do they deal with context? Do they use threading MUAs?
> > What kind of infrastructure they use? Way back it was a braille line
> > and emacs, but I presume that's no longer true.
>
> I can ask, if you'd like. I think it's pretty standard for blind users to
> use screenreaders like JAWS, and I know they can get frustrated by long
> indented stuff quoted before the "meat" of a post. But they're frustrated
> by
> so much of the abled world. ::)
>
> I just wanted to raise this so that if you send to a list/group that is
> more
> likely to have visually-impaired users, you might crop the quoted stuff and
> respond above... but it's mostly a kindness than a necessity.
>
> best, Joe
>
> --
> Joseph Lorenzo Hall
> Senior Staff Technologist
> Center for Democracy & Technology
> 1634 I ST NW STE 1100
> Washington DC 20006-4011
> (p) 202-407-8825
> (f) 202-637-0968
> joe at cdt.org
> PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key
>
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 12:25:02 -0400
> From: Shava Nerad <shava23 at gmail.com>
> To: Liberation Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] Why are we here?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CAHzs-wJjMFQS18kbYnjVDwYKAXOj0GDi2WcJGu-s_iYPAOzROg at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Any texts that people see every day becomes invisible. Like footers. It's
> perceptual psych. Fixing the footer will not help, and fixing humans is
> arguably outside the scope of this list.
>
> Any texts that people see erupt repeatedly (over voting on mailing lists,
> checking Snopes first, or bike sheds) add to community fatigue.
>
> Community fatigue definitely diminishes our capacity for collaboration and
> information sharing, which are the purposes of the list.
>
> I suggest we refocus on the topical content rather than meta content, for
> the health of all involved.
>
> Please do not vote on this suggestion. Nothing to see here...;)
>
> Yrs,
>
> ----
>
> Shava Nerad
> shava23 at gmail.com
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 12:39:36 -0400
> From: Rafal Rohozinski <r.rohozinski at psiphon.ca>
> To: liberationtech Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] Syria Digital Security Monitor
> Message-ID: <7AAAAEC7-4A9B-47E0-846A-9483532C4183 at psiphon.ca>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
>
> The SecDev Foundation is pleased to announce the launch of the Syria
> Digital Security Monitor. This site maps and visualizes reports of
> disruption to critical infrastructure in Syria which includes internet,
> telecommunication, electricity and water, and reports on cyber threats. The
> project is based upon a crowd sourced effort that relies on reports by
> Syrians and extensive monitoring of Syrian social media. The data used for
> the monitor is captured in SecDev Foundation?s Ushahidi website.
> https://ushahidi.layer8.org/
>
> The timeline site can be accessed here:
> http://syriamonitor.layer8.org/index-ar.php
>
> The Syria Digital Security Monitor part of the SecDev Foundation's
> ongoing project to support digital safety and security for Syrian civil
> society. We provide access to a range resources in Arabic including
> access to secure communication tools as well as information on digital
> security and safety. Visit the website at: http://syria.secdev.com/
>
> We are always looking for new ideas, so if you have any constructive
> comments and suggestions, please feel free to respond on this list, or
> directly by email.
>
> Thanks!
>
> Rafal
>
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 7
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 10:08:05 -0700
> From: Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com>
> To: "liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu"
> <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software for
> Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CADBMUMH_yZ8KQ-wo0PbMHTwJi8ua5U-NkoPHGfAnQ5MwRqiqSA at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Thanks!
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 8
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 18:17:13 +0100
> From: Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <0F30C045-11D1-42DF-AE47-485A51E9B300 at ei8fdb.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Would you like to give some more context on what it is you are trying to
> do?
>
> "remote wipe software for windows".....
>
>
> On 3 Apr 2013, at 18:08, Katy P wrote:
>
> > Thanks!
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> - --------------------------------------
> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
>
> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
>
> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRXGQaAAoJENsz1IO7MIrrLBIH/2bsK9wu0gH5Qu7RtOQJO4P+
> ++VE+zAlgI7e62I3Dtypp2MI7P+m+CrHkKU6JJEvXNC2QTPGcEZjpQeLc89ulZ6B
> ud8IfMPCnL2gOk65K/VFNv86c9F1K2F1JyGuMUt4iCpC6FaRqMT492uEzg/J5PyO
> oI+fiLQonQMaHgJccXltxz9+xMWnaMMjFOXMQR0blhknzBBOzgzmZqHhkE1OFZ/2
> sq9oj6YbTwZ+fsBfx9TIi7FruRT8Qy1vj1RlmTr8EKkFkijTF9D3344gZFvmOSXS
> Nuu6QESNDBC3IFfAR78A41gwAHm6xd0oyAe+BATvD4tarkPK0Bb/sjZ5XsKoXSM=
> =b7AH
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 9
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 11:16:08 -0700
> From: Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CADBMUMFWygsqmdEnKH7NB9TAzq0WTsWp6bBytdME3WQ5+Cx1jQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> If my laptop was stolen, for example, some website or something that I (or
> someone else) could log into and delete the contents of the laptop's hard
> drive.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 10:17 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb
> <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>wrote:
>
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> > Would you like to give some more context on what it is you are trying to
> > do?
> >
> > "remote wipe software for windows".....
> >
> >
> > On 3 Apr 2013, at 18:08, Katy P wrote:
> >
> > > Thanks!
> > > --
> > > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
> > - --------------------------------------
> > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
> >
> > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> >
> > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRXGQaAAoJENsz1IO7MIrrLBIH/2bsK9wu0gH5Qu7RtOQJO4P+
> > ++VE+zAlgI7e62I3Dtypp2MI7P+m+CrHkKU6JJEvXNC2QTPGcEZjpQeLc89ulZ6B
> > ud8IfMPCnL2gOk65K/VFNv86c9F1K2F1JyGuMUt4iCpC6FaRqMT492uEzg/J5PyO
> > oI+fiLQonQMaHgJccXltxz9+xMWnaMMjFOXMQR0blhknzBBOzgzmZqHhkE1OFZ/2
> > sq9oj6YbTwZ+fsBfx9TIi7FruRT8Qy1vj1RlmTr8EKkFkijTF9D3344gZFvmOSXS
> > Nuu6QESNDBC3IFfAR78A41gwAHm6xd0oyAe+BATvD4tarkPK0Bb/sjZ5XsKoXSM=
> > =b7AH
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 10
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 20:43:37 +0200
> From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
> To: liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <20130403184337.GI6172 at leitl.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 11:16:08AM -0700, Katy P wrote:
> > If my laptop was stolen, for example, some website or something that I
> (or
> > someone else) could log into and delete the contents of the laptop's hard
> > drive.
>
> Or you could use an encrypting filesystem, which requires a password
> on boot, and whenever the notebook wakes up. That way, the thief would
> only be able to steal your hardware, not your data.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 11
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 11:51:11 -0700
> From: Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CADBMUME7kE2Ys1TyHw7xmxy5G5E82SC1P+qwVRibTte+AO52GQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> What is easier for a lay person and least susceptible to a "smart" thief?
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 11:43 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 11:16:08AM -0700, Katy P wrote:
> > > If my laptop was stolen, for example, some website or something that I
> > (or
> > > someone else) could log into and delete the contents of the laptop's
> hard
> > > drive.
> >
> > Or you could use an encrypting filesystem, which requires a password
> > on boot, and whenever the notebook wakes up. That way, the thief would
> > only be able to steal your hardware, not your data.
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 12
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 14:58:06 -0400
> From: Griffin Boyce <griffinboyce at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CAGKHomdjR9sduqRAcDcmW9jokvySyxq8hGSe_2w6sFDCNhp21Q at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Well, http://preyproject.com/ would be better for a layperson who
> doesn't
> have the time/interest to encrypt. But it's not impossible to disable or
> anything. And in the meantime the thief would have access to your data.
> Depends on whether you are more looking to get it back (no guarantees), or
> protect your info (all but guaranteed if encrypted).
>
> ~Griffin
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > What is easier for a lay person and least susceptible to a "smart" thief?
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 11:43 AM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> >
> >> On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 11:16:08AM -0700, Katy P wrote:
> >> > If my laptop was stolen, for example, some website or something that I
> >> (or
> >> > someone else) could log into and delete the contents of the laptop's
> >> hard
> >> > drive.
> >>
> >> Or you could use an encrypting filesystem, which requires a password
> >> on boot, and whenever the notebook wakes up. That way, the thief would
> >> only be able to steal your hardware, not your data.
> >> --
> >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> >> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings
> at
> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Please note that I do not have PGP access at this time.
> OTR: saint at jabber.ccc.de / fontaine at jabber.ccc.de
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 13
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 15:08:14 -0400
> From: Scott Elcomb <psema4 at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <CAEx-jsPHWxV+=nvKmHQyOyxFUm=
> H2CURy7-b0_O_xWcnJzQfnQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > What is easier for a lay person and least susceptible to a "smart" thief?
> >
>
> Despite what it says in my signature, I'm no thief. That said, were I to
> steal laptop, the first action I'd take is to remove the drive before
> powering it up and connecting it to any network - especially the internet:
>
> If I'm after the data, I'd want the drive sandboxed to prevent the original
> owner from doing exactly what you're looking to do.
>
> If I'm after the hardware, I don't care about the data and would format the
> drive on another machine to avoid the hassles of trying to crack my way in
> to do the same thing (format the drive).
>
> +1 for encryption from me.
>
> --
> Scott Elcomb
> @psema4 on Twitter / Identi.ca / Github & more
>
> Atomic OS: Self Contained Microsystems
> http://code.google.com/p/atomos/
>
> Member of the Pirate Party of Canada
> http://www.pirateparty.ca/
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 14
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 12:54:07 -0700
> From: Seth David Schoen <schoen at eff.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <20130403195354.GB2026 at sescenties.(null)>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> Griffin Boyce writes:
>
> > Well, http://preyproject.com/ would be better for a layperson who
> doesn't
> > have the time/interest to encrypt. But it's not impossible to disable or
> > anything. And in the meantime the thief would have access to your data.
> > Depends on whether you are more looking to get it back (no guarantees),
> or
> > protect your info (all but guaranteed if encrypted).
>
> I think Prey is a pretty compelling choice for a lot of cases, but looking
> briefly at the documentation it seems that their "remote wipe"
> functionality
> for laptops is currently quite limited. And that's confirmed by looking at
> the "secure" module in the Prey source code.
>
> https://github.com/prey/prey-bash-client-modules
>
>
> https://github.com/prey/prey-bash-client-modules/blob/master/secure/platform/windows/functions
>
> https://github.com/prey/prey-bash-client-modules/blob/master/secure/core/functions
>
> https://github.com/prey/prey-bash-client-modules/blob/master/secure/core/run
>
> I've suggested Prey to people before for tracking stolen devices in order
> to
> recover them, but I don't think I could recommend it for remote wipe. It
> seems
> to mainly use plain rm to delete the contents of a small number of
> directories,
> and to call an API to clear MSIE browser history data. For many users,
> this is
> a pretty incomplete notion of "wipe", and most of the content deleted this
> way
> will be recoverable by forensics.
>
> A further problem that comes to mind is that sending a signal to a phone
> (that
> uses 3G networks) to wipe itself is going to be easier in a lot of cases
> than
> to a laptop (that uses mainly wifi, and maybe not opportunistically). The
> laptop will likely be offline by default if someone removes it from its
> normal
> environment, so it won't hear the wipe signal. Solutions like Prey for
> laptops
> mainly work because thieves or downstream purchasers may voluntarily
> connect
> stolen laptops to networks to use them without reinstalling them (at least
> if
> the laptops don't require, or seem not to require, a login password!).
>
> Mike Cardwell actually uses a decoy operating system (with Prey) on his
> laptop
> in order to tempt thieves to use it:
>
>
> https://grepular.com/Protecting_a_Laptop_from_Simple_and_Sophisticated_Attacks
>
> I'm quite impressed with his setup, which took him a great deal of time and
> thought. He relies entirely on encryption to get the equivalent of remote
> wiping; his Prey install is there just to increase his chances of finding
> the
> laptop if it's taken by "common thieves".
>
> This is some ways away from the original poster's question about remote
> wiping
> a Windows installation. I guess I want to agree with Eugen Leitl (and
> Mike
> Cardwell) that disk encryption ultimately does that job better, mainly
> since a
> sophisticated or targeted attacker wouldn't connect the laptop to a network
> before making a copy of the hard drive. For Windows users who've been
> denied
> BitLocker by Microsoft's price discrimination, there's TrueCrypt.
>
> --
> Seth Schoen <schoen at eff.org>
> Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/
> Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join
> 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 +1 415 436 9333 x107
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 15
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 23:14:51 +0100
> From: Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <38BC9087-1CB8-45F1-AD7A-44DFC79DDC6E at ei8fdb.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> So the objective Kathy has mentioned is to:
>
> "log into and delete the contents of the laptop's hard drive"
>
> It would seem the contents of the hard disk is "more important" than the
> actual hardware.
>
> In that case I would go for the encryption option. Yes it is some
> configuration, and time to wait until the disk is fully encrypted, but last
> time I did this for a work computer it took all of 4-5 hours to encrypt and
> was very reliable - the machine was dropped, put to sleep, woken up
> multiple times, and used very heavily. I would prefer relying on that
> rather than some OS level tool.
>
> You have no guarantee any of these "track your device" tools will be
> successful, especially if they rely on the machine being powered up and
> connected to a network.
>
> Griffin, thanks for the link to Prey, it looks interesting.
>
> Bernard
>
> On 3 Apr 2013, at 20:08, Scott Elcomb wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com> wrote:
> > What is easier for a lay person and least susceptible to a "smart" thief?
> >
> > Despite what it says in my signature, I'm no thief. That said, were I
> to steal laptop, the first action I'd take is to remove the drive before
> powering it up and connecting it to any network - especially the internet:
> >
> > If I'm after the data, I'd want the drive sandboxed to prevent the
> original owner from doing exactly what you're looking to do.
> >
> > If I'm after the hardware, I don't care about the data and would format
> the drive on another machine to avoid the hassles of trying to crack my way
> in to do the same thing (format the drive).
> >
> > +1 for encryption from me.
> >
> > --
> > Scott Elcomb
> > @psema4 on Twitter / Identi.ca / Github & more
> >
> > Atomic OS: Self Contained Microsystems
> > http://code.google.com/p/atomos/
> >
> > Member of the Pirate Party of Canada
> > http://www.pirateparty.ca/
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> - --------------------------------------
> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
>
> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
>
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> =ujXj
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 16
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 14:59:21 -0400
> From: Doug Chamberlin <chamberlin.doug at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <CADnZ8FdiU3jboyqkq0qZFUa5JFihfuyx05j6V-rSQQfP=
> LJvcQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > What is easier for a lay person and least susceptible to a "smart" thief?
> >
>
> Remote wipe schemes are easy for dumb thieves to circumvent because they
> just have to not hook up the stolen hardware to the Internet to avoid them.
>
> Encryption, when done well (meaning strong pass phrases on top of strong
> encryption), requires a whole different level of smart thief. After setup
> the only inconvenience is entering the pass phrase. But since doing that
> reminds you that you are protecting your data, it should not become a major
> inconvenience. (Small price to pay.)
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 17
> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2013 20:12:18 -0500
> From: Mitch Downey <mitch at everyvote.org>
> To: Liberation Tech Listserv <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] North Korea, the US, war rhetoric, Anonymous
> Message-ID:
> <CAKDooOmQtJfK2otCdMMm9aR=
> 4Ek5ewau7+M6Hm5S8nmpxUVVkg at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hi Lib Tech,
>
> I think of Yahoo! as kind of our Minitrue, so the frequent war reports
> between US and North Korea is worrying me...Yahoo! reports that the
> Anonymous is hacking North Korea. What % of these hackers do you think are
> usual Anonymous hacktivists? Also, what do people expect to happen to South
> Korea if the US strikes North Korea first?
>
> Mitch <https://twitter.com/mdowney84>
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 18
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 08:58:59 +0200
> From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <20130404065859.GS6172 at leitl.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> On Wed, Apr 03, 2013 at 11:51:11AM -0700, Katy P wrote:
> > What is easier for a lay person and least susceptible to a "smart" thief?
>
> You didn't mention your operating system, but in terms of least
> pain I would go with http://www.truecrypt.org/downloads and
> encrypt the whole drive. Make sure your password has enough
> length and entropy so that it can't be brute-forced.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 19
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 08:32:08 +0100
> From: Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <36DEF758-866D-4649-9FFB-37A81D076C16 at ei8fdb.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> (Apologies if I am making an assumption on people's knowledge)
>
> Entropy in disk encryption is the "random information" collected by an
> computers OS or encryption application for use in encrypting a hard disk.
>
> Those with more knowledge in encryption: could you please give an
> explanation of how "a large amount" of entropy can be generated during disk
> encryption?
>
> I've only ever used/seen keyboard/mouse input as a way to generate it in
> encryption tools. I would guess for the "average smart thief" (What is an
> average smart thief?) that is sufficient?
>
> Something I've also looked for an answer for is: Using those
> mouse/keyboard inputs as entropy generators, whats the best approach to
> use? Is there one?
>
> thanks,
> Bernard
>
>
> On 4 Apr 2013, at 07:58, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
> > You didn't mention your operating system, but in terms of least
> > pain I would go with http://www.truecrypt.org/downloads and
> > encrypt the whole drive. Make sure your password has enough
> > length and entropy so that it can't be brute-forced.
>
> - --------------------------------------
> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
>
> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
>
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> =6jBg
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 20
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 15:38:02 +0000
> From: "Riley, Chris M" <RileyMC at state.gov>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Cc: "Bramon, Betsy" <BramonB at state.gov>, "Riley, Chris M"
> <RileyMC at state.gov>
> Subject: [liberationtech] State/DRL Internet freedom solicitations
> posted
> Message-ID:
>
> <DC88E7EF095FD4428532CDFDC1AA0D74700C548E at EEAPPSEREX01.appservices.state.sbu
> >
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hello LibTech community,
>
> I wanted to let you all know that the Internet freedom team at State/DRL
> has posted our annual open call for statements of interest (SOI) on global
> Internet freedom programming.
>
> This year, we've changed things up a little bit. We are running two
> separate proceedings: one an annual call for digital safety, advocacy, and
> research projects, and the other an 'annual program statement', or APS, for
> technology development projects. The APS means that SOIs for technology
> focused projects may be submitted at any time. We will have four quarterly
> review dates, listed in the notice, at which we will review the SOIs
> collected to date and invite proposals from those approved by the review
> committee.
>
> Here are the links to humanrights.gov; the solicitations are also
> available at grants.gov and grantsolutions.gov.
>
> Technology-focused projects: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/207061.htm
> Digital safety, advocacy, research:
> http://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/207063.htm
>
> Please feel welcome to ask Betsy Bramon or me any procedural questions you
> may have. We won't be able to discuss the merits or substance of any
> prospective proposals/SOIs, however.
>
> Thank you very much, and we are looking forward to your submissions!
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Internet Freedom Programs at State/DRL {Chris Riley, Betsy Bramon}
> -------------- next part --------------
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 21
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 09:57:21 -0700
> From: Katy P <katycarvt at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CADBMUMEniqMJ8ymMye5sLuyYaLXpFzkLX3ztV6CBxxjAPMZdxg at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Thanks all. This is helpful.
> On Apr 4, 2013 12:32 AM, "Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb" <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>
> wrote:
>
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> > (Apologies if I am making an assumption on people's knowledge)
> >
> > Entropy in disk encryption is the "random information" collected by an
> > computers OS or encryption application for use in encrypting a hard disk.
> >
> > Those with more knowledge in encryption: could you please give an
> > explanation of how "a large amount" of entropy can be generated during
> disk
> > encryption?
> >
> > I've only ever used/seen keyboard/mouse input as a way to generate it in
> > encryption tools. I would guess for the "average smart thief" (What is an
> > average smart thief?) that is sufficient?
> >
> > Something I've also looked for an answer for is: Using those
> > mouse/keyboard inputs as entropy generators, whats the best approach to
> > use? Is there one?
> >
> > thanks,
> > Bernard
> >
> >
> > On 4 Apr 2013, at 07:58, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> >
> > > You didn't mention your operating system, but in terms of least
> > > pain I would go with http://www.truecrypt.org/downloads and
> > > encrypt the whole drive. Make sure your password has enough
> > > length and entropy so that it can't be brute-forced.
> >
> > - --------------------------------------
> > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
> >
> > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> >
> > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRXSx4AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrT2AH+wVA0ItLXrWRHZRDNm8DQkO9
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> > =6jBg
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 22
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 11:24:51 -0700
> From: "michael gurstein" <gurstein at gmail.com>
> To: "liberationtech" <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] [CivicAccess-discuss] Secrecy for Sale:
> How ICIJ's Project Team Analyzed the Offshore Files
> Message-ID: <18b101ce3161$bb9b29e0$32d17da0$@gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> From: civicaccess-discuss-bounces at civicaccess.ca
> [mailto:civicaccess-discuss-bounces at civicaccess.ca] On Behalf Of Tracey P.
> Lauriault
> Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2013 11:02 AM
> To: civicaccess discuss
> Subject: [CivicAccess-discuss] Secrecy for Sale: How ICIJ's Project Team
> Analyzed the Offshore Files
>
>
>
> Data Journalism at it's best! This story is going crazy every where!
>
> http://www.icij.org/offshore/how-icijs-project-team-analyzed-offshore-files
>
> --
>
> Tracey P. Lauriault
>
> Post Doctoral Fellow
>
> Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre
>
> https://gcrc.carleton.ca/confluence/display/GCRCWEB/Lauriault
>
> http://datalibre.ca/
> 613-234-2805
>
>
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 23
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 15:07:16 -0400
> From: Rich Kulawiec <rsk at gsp.org>
> To: liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] how spammers work, was: You are awesome,
> Treat yourself to a love one
> Message-ID: <20130404190716.GA7149 at gsp.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> On Sun, Mar 31, 2013 at 11:47:31AM +0200, M. Fioretti wrote:
> > How could that happen? In the same, totally unsurprising ways in which
> > always happen to everybody who takes the same measures as you (no
> > offense meant, really, just a technical explanation!). It happened in
> > one of these two ways (there may be others, but these are by far the
> > easiest and most likely):
>
> Excellent explanation. Let me augment it by quoting part of something
> that I sent to the mailman-users list a few years ago, in which I pointed
> out that "obfuscating email addresses" is not going to work, e.g.,
> constructs like "rsk at gsp dot org" are a stupid and pointless waste
> of everyone's valuable time.
>
> ----- begin snippet -----
> Briefly: spammers have many methods of acquiring addresses, including but
> not limited to:
>
> subscribing to mailing lists
> acquiring Usenet news feeds
> querying mail servers
> acquiring corporate directories (sometimes from their web sites)
> insecure LDAP servers
> insecure AD servers
> use of backscatter/outscatter
> use of auto-responders
> use of mailing list mechanisms
> use of abusive "callback" mechanisms
> dictionary attacks
> purchase of addresses in bulk on the open market.
> purchase of addresses from vendors, web sites, etc.
> purchase of addresses from registrars, ISPs, web hosts, etc.
> domain registration (some registrars *are* spammers)
>
> and oh-by-the-way:
>
> harvesting of the mail, address books and any other files
> present on any of the hundreds of millions of compromised
> Windows systems
>
> It's therefore prudent to assume at this point that ANY email
> address that's actually been used is either (a) in the hands of
> spammers or (b) will be soon, and to plan defenses accordingly.
>
> Now, what's unknown and unknowable is:
>
> - how long it'll take
> - which spammers
> - whether they'll use it
> - how they'll use it
> - how often they'll use it
> - whether they'll sell or barter it
> - how competent they are at spamming
> - how competent the people they sell/barter it to are at spamming
> - whether the spamming technique(s) they use will be blocked
> by the anti-spam measures in place
> - whether the address will still be valid by the time they
> get around to spamming it
> - whether they might deliberately avoid it because they
> think it's a spamtrap
> - how long all this other stuff will take
>
> Therefore:
>
> "Trying to keep spammers from getting your email address"
> is not a solvable problem for the set of email addresses that are
> in routine use. (Yes, if you run your own mail server, if you know
> how to secure it, if you create one-off addresses that are never
> used, then you can do it. This is vastly beyond the technical
> capabilities of most people, and it's not worth unless you are
> attempting to customize a spamtrap.)
>
> ----- end snippet -----
>
> So unless you have the kind of specialized skills I referred to above,
> you should presume that spammers have (or will soon have) every email
> address you use -- and plan your defenses accordingly. [1]
>
> As to the example I gave above, "rsk at gsp dot org": the same
> people who run worldwide botnets with sophisticated command/control,
> who craft custom malware, etc., are quite capable of writing:
>
> perl -pe 's/[ ]+dot[ ]+/./g; s/[ ]+at[ ]*/@/g'
>
> and a hundred variants, if the need arises...and it probably won't.
>
> ---rsk
>
> [1] Basic anti-spam defense is quite easy. Any middling mail system
> admin using an open-source MTA such as sendmail, postfix, or exim should
> be able to deploy a system that blocks about 95-98% of incoming spam
> with a 1 in 10e5 to 10e6 false positive rate without exerting themselves
> too much. The trick is not so much "what to do" but "what NOT to do".
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 24
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 15:07:53 -0400
> From: Rich Kulawiec <rsk at gsp.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] suggestions for a remote wipe software
> for Windows?
> Message-ID: <20130404190753.GB7149 at gsp.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
>
> I think "remote wipe software" is a scam. There is no way to know that
> the system will ever be remotely accessible[1]; there is no way to know
> that
> it will be booted into the operating system that was installed; there is
> no way to know that the storage media will even be in the same system
> when it's accessed; there is no way to know that the wiping software
> will run before storage media are accessed; there is no way to know that
> the wiping software will finish running; there is no way (in general)
> to know that the wiping software will do a thorough enough job.
>
> Yes, you might accidentally defend against a common thief who doesn't
> know any of this and boots your laptop into your OS on their network
> without a sensibly-configured firewall in the data path. But most
> of them will learn, soon enough, not to do that -- it'll probably just
> take a few high-profile cases that attract enough media attention.
>
> Use encryption -- so that your storage media are functionally pre-wiped,
> so to speak, all the time.
>
> ---rsk
>
> [1] A Faraday cage should suffice to prevent wireless communication.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 25
> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 21:30:52 -0500
> From: Andr?s Leopoldo Pacheco Sanfuentes <alps6085 at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] [CivicAccess-discuss] Secrecy for Sale:
> How ICIJ's Project Team Analyzed the Offshore Files
> Message-ID:
> <
> CALz+F5u0T8hNa8xrjSSygQbe+8SiSSJAyQe3XfE9KgeBjStioQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
>
> Great work! Although the pataphysical corollary of modern physics'
> "observer effect" should apply!
>
> Made it to The Guardian today:
>
> Leaks reveal secrets of the rich who hide cash offshore
>
> http://gu.com/p/3eqg8
> On Apr 4, 2013 1:25 PM, "michael gurstein" <gurstein at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > *From:* civicaccess-discuss-bounces at civicaccess.ca [mailto:
> > civicaccess-discuss-bounces at civicaccess.ca] *On Behalf Of *Tracey P.
> > Lauriault
> > *Sent:* Thursday, April 04, 2013 11:02 AM
> > *To:* civicaccess discuss
> > *Subject:* [CivicAccess-discuss] Secrecy for Sale: How ICIJ?s Project
> > Team Analyzed the Offshore Files****
> >
> > ** **
> >
> > Data Journalism at it's best! This story is going crazy every where!
> >
> >
> http://www.icij.org/offshore/how-icijs-project-team-analyzed-offshore-files
> >
> > -- ****
> >
> > Tracey P. Lauriault****
> >
> > Post Doctoral Fellow****
> >
> > Geomatics and Cartographic Research Centre****
> >
> > https://gcrc.carleton.ca/confluence/display/GCRCWEB/Lauriault****
> >
> > http://datalibre.ca/
> > 613-234-2805
> > ****
> >
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 26
> Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 10:29:12 +0100
> From: Dan Lin <dan.lin777 at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: [liberationtech] Call for Papers: World Congress on Internet
> Security (WorldCIS-2013)
> Message-ID:
> <CAHR-2qNeoYrGWAUinciUcts=
> 0CXgMSRf5OuWonyT+8bUhb8cMA at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Apologies for cross-postings.
> Please send it to interested colleagues and students. Thanks!
>
> CALL FOR PAPERS
>
> ********************************************************
> World Congress on Internet Security (WorldCIS-2013)
> Technically Co-Sponsored by IEEE Tokyo Section
> August 5-7, 2013
> Venue: Tokyo University of Information Sciences, Japan
> www.worldcis.org
> ********************************************************
>
> The World Congress on Internet Security (WorldCIS-2013)
> is Technically Co-Sponsored by IEEE Tokyo Section.
> The WorldCIS-2013 is an international forum dedicated to the
> advancement of the theory and practical implementation of security
> on the Internet and Computer Networks. The inability to properly
> secure the Internet, computer networks, protecting the Internet
> against emerging threats and vulnerabilities, and sustaining privacy
> and trust has been a key focus of research. The WorldCIS aims to
> provide a highly professional and comparative academic research
> forum that promotes collaborative excellence between academia and
> industry.
>
> The objectives of the WorldCIS are to bridge the knowledge
> gap between academia and industry, promote research esteem
> and and to fostering discussions on information technologies,
> information systems and globa security applications.
> The WorldCIS-2013 invites speakers and researchers to submit
> papers that encompass conceptual analysis, design implementation
> and performance evaluation.
>
> Original papers are invited on recent advances in Internet,
> Computer Communications and Networking Security.
>
> The topics in WorldCIS-2013 include but are not confined
> to the following areas:
>
> *Internet Security
> *Security, trust and privacy
> *Self-organizing networks
> *Sensor nets and embedded systems
> *Service overlays
> *Switches and switching
> *Topology characterization and inference
> *Traffic measurement and analysis
> *Traffic engineering and control
> *Trust and Data Security
> *Virtual and overlay networks
> *Web services and performance
> *Wireless mesh networks and protocols
> *Ad hoc mobile networks Security
> *Addressing and location management
> *Broadband access technologies
> *Blended Internet Security Methods
> *Biometrics
> *Boundary Issues of Internet Security
> *Capacity planning
> *Cellular and broadband wireless nets
> *Congestion control
> *Content distribution
> *Cryptography
> *Cross layer design and optimization
> *Cyber-physical computing/networking
> *Geographic information systems
> *Privacy Protection and Forensic in Ubi-com
> *Quality of Service Issues
> *Regulations
> *Secured Database Systems
> *Security in Data Mining
> *Security and Access Control
> *Semantic Web and Ontology
> *Data management for U-commerce
> *Software Architectures
> *Defence Systems
> *Delay/disruption tolerant networks
> *End Users
> *Enabling technologies for the Internet
> *Implementation and experimental testbeds
> *Future Internet Design and Applications
> *Middleware support for networking
> *Mobility models and systems
> *Multicast and anycast
> *Multimedia protocols and networking
> *Network applications and services
> *Network architectures Network control
> *Network management
> *Network simulation and emulation
> *Novel network architectures
> *Network and Protocol Architectures
> *Peer-to-peer communications
> *Performance evaluation
> *Power control and management
> *Pricing and billing
> *Protocols and Standards
> *Resource allocation and management
> *RFID
> *Optical networks
> *Routing protocols
> *Scheduling and buffer management
> *Virtual Reality
>
>
> IMPORTANT DATES:
>
> Full Paper Submission Date: Extended May 15, 2013
> Extended Abstract (Work in Progress) Submission Date: Extended May 31, 2013
> Proposal for Workshops and Tutorials: Extended May 15, 2013
> Notification of Workshop and Tutorial Acceptance: Extended May 31, 2013
> Proposal for Industrial Presentation: February 25, 2013
> Notification of Extended Abstract Acceptance/Rejection: Extended June 15,
> 2013
> Notification of Industrial Presentation Acceptance: March 05, 2013
> Notification of Paper Acceptance/Rejection: Extended June 05, 2013
> Camera Ready Extended Abstract Due: Extended June 30, 2013
> Camera Ready Paper Due: Extended till June 30, 2013
> Early Registration Deadline: January 01 to June 20, 2013
> Late Registration Deadline (Authors only): June 21 to July 15, 2013
> Late Registration Deadline (Participants only): June 21 to August 5, 2013
> Conference Dates: August 5-7, 2013
>
>
> For further details, please visit conference website www.worldcis.org
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 27
> Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 07:22:14 -0400
> From: Rich Kulawiec <rsk at gsp.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Call for Papers: World Congress on
> Internet Security (WorldCIS-2013)
> Message-ID: <20130405112214.GA23928 at gsp.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> On Fri, Apr 05, 2013 at 10:29:12AM +0100, Dan Lin wrote:
> > World Congress on Internet Security (WorldCIS-2013)
> > Technically Co-Sponsored by IEEE Tokyo Section
> > August 5-7, 2013
> > Venue: Tokyo University of Information Sciences, Japan
> > www.worldcis.org
>
> I'm throwing the "bullshit" flag. I think this is another fake conference
> (as we've recently discussed) being promoted via spam.
>
> ---rsk
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 28
> Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 09:03:47 -0700 (PDT)
> From: Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu>
> To: Liberation Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] Funding for DIY projects on online protest &
> performance
> Message-ID:
> <CANhci9EfQOw=rpEk+1Gmfovujm3tHGq=
> 10VGqMRuOFjFYa-SkA at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
>
> http://platformlondon.org/2013/04/05/final-call-for-proposals-artist-led-funded-projects-with-platform-lada/
>
> This Monday is the dealine for DIY 10 proposals. Get yours in now!
>
> DIY is an opportunity for artists working in Live Art to conceive and run
> unusual training and professional development projects for other
> artists. Platform?s call is for ?Live Art, performance as protest and the
> online element.?
>
> Platform invites proposals that look at performance and protest via the
> internet. Many artists make work with an online element. Protest art often
> takes place via the internet. What approaches might artists want to explore
> for this kind of work? What questions does this raise for artists and
> groups making art interventions around where they situate their work, how
> they reach new audiences, the potential of the web to add a new layer to
> their performances, and the impact taking place online has on the work?
> We?re open to proposals from artists, activists, social media geeks, video
> editors?anyone who wants to propose a project that looks at live art and
> protest with an online element. Proposal-makers might want to refer to the
> live
> streaming of Marina<
> http://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/2010/03/15/live-streaming-marina-abramovic-crazy-or-brave/
> >
> Abramovic?s The Artists is Present<
> http://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/2010/03/15/live-streaming-marina-abramovic-crazy-or-brave/
> >
> , Tate Live/The Performance Room <
> http://www.youtube.com/user/tate/tatelive>
> , Liberate Tate and Link Up<
> http://www.youandifilms.com/category/environmental/liberate-tate/>
> Films <http://www.youandifilms.com/category/environmental/liberate-tate/>
> -
> whose films were online usually within two hours of Liberate Tate?s
> performances, and the live streaming of protest events e.g. Occupy Wall
> Street <http://www.livestream.com/occupywallstnyc>.
>
> More information on the other calls for DIY 10 and the application process
> at:
>
> http://www.thisisliveart.co.uk/prof_dev/diy/diy10_callforproposals.html
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 29
> Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 12:20:01 -0400
> From: Nicholas Merrill <lists at calyx.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to
> challenge National Security Letter
> Message-ID: <515EF9B1.9010605 at calyx.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>
> I am very happy to report to the list that apparently, Google is now
> challenging a National Security Letter issued by the FBI
>
> According to what I have read, "Google filed a petition to ?set aside
> the legal process,? citing a provision that enables judges to modify or
> deny NSLs that are ?unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.?
>
> That is a bit short of what I did ( with ACLU's and EFF's help ) in Doe
> v. Ashcroft ( 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ) which was to
> challenge the constitutionality of the statute itself. However it's
> still something and it keeps the issue in the forefront of the news and
> helps to keep it a current issue.
>
> I have always hoped that more companies would challenge warrantless
> seizure of telecommunications records which has repeatedly been ruled to
> be unconstitutional and in violation of the 4th amendment, and I hope
> that more of these types of challenges are to come in the near future.
>
> More coverage:
>
> 1.
>
> http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-04/google-fights-u-s-national-security-probe-data-demand.html
> 2.
>
> http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/04/google-defies-fbi-asks-federal-judge-to-challenge-national-security-letters/
> 3.
>
> http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/291871-google-fights-secret-fbi-subpoena
> 4. http://rt.com/usa/google-letters-national-unconstitutional-365/
> 5.
> http://mashable.com/2013/04/04/google-challenge-national-security-letter/
> 6. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/04/google-fights-nsl/
>
>
> In my humble opinion, Google deserves to be commended for taking this
> action which it did not have to take !
>
> -Nick
>
>
> --
> Nicholas Merrill
> Executive Director
> The Calyx Institute
> 287 Spring Street
> New York, NY 10013
>
> https://www.calyxinstitute.org
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 30
> Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 13:43:20 -0400
> From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe at cdt.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] OSI Program Manager job...
> Message-ID: <515F0D38.2030700 at cdt.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>
> I'm not sure if this is appropriate for libtech, but this seems like an
> exceedingly awesome opportunity for those of our collective ilk:
>
> http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/jobs/program-manager-0
>
> The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant
> societies whose governments are accountable and open to the
> participation of all people.
>
> We seek to strengthen the rule of law; respect for human rights,
> minorities, and a diversity of opinions; democratically elected
> governments; and a civil society that helps keep government power in check.
>
> We help to shape public policies that assure greater fairness in
> political, legal, and economic systems and safeguard fundamental rights.
>
> We implement initiatives to advance justice, education, public health,
> and independent media.
>
> We build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as
> corruption and freedom of information.
>
> Working in every part of the world, the Open Society Foundations place a
> high priority on protecting and improving the lives of people in
> marginalized communities.
>
> Protection of data privacy as well as unfettered expression and are
> critical open society issues. Threats and opportunities come from
> several directions: from state surveillance and censorship; from
> private-sector surveillance, harvesting and manipulation of personal
> data; from private litigation with chilling effects on our civil
> liberties; and from the development of new technologies and technical
> standards which threaten or enhance data-related rights and freedoms.
> The Information Program employs several strategies for addressing these
> challenges:
>
> Supporting expertise-building in digital security for NGOs and
> development of software tools and tactics to combat online censorship
> and surveillance;
> Empowering key NGOs to advocate for changes in law and governmental
> practice;
> Supporting advocacy for human rights compliant corporate behavior in
> the technology sector;
> Supporting legal challenges to egregious violations of civil liberties.
>
> The program manager will be based in an Open Society Foundations office
> in London, Washington, D.C., or New York. Geographically, this work will
> focus primarily on impact in developing and middle income countries.
>
> Purpose of Position
>
> The Information Program seeks a full-time program manager to help
> develop and expand the program?s work on the protection of civil
> liberties in the digital environment, with a particular focus on
> surveillance and privacy.
>
> Essential Duties & Responsibilities
>
> OSF may add, change, or remove essential and other duties at any time.
>
> Help to develop and implement the OSF Information Program?s civil
> liberties funding and policy advocacy strategy as well as annual work
> plans and budgets, in close collaboration with Senior Program Managers;
> strengthening the Program?s work on surveillance and privacy will be of
> particular importance;
> Develop a portfolio of grants, including the drafting of requests
> for proposals, evaluation of proposals, preparation of related
> documentation, and follow up and monitoring of grantee activities;
> Travel widely and conduct site visits to identify new grantees and
> partners and to monitor existing grants to ensure progress;
> Build and develop collaborative projects with OSF Programs and local
> Foundations as well as other funders;
> Represent the Information Program at various fora, including
> meetings, conferences, partnerships and special events;
> Engage in other projects as assigned.
>
> Education / Experience
>
> Bachelor?s degree and several years? relevant experience and/or
> training, or equivalent combination of education and experience.
> Advanced degree preferred.
>
> Skills Required
>
> Extensive experience, preferably international, in the field of
> civil liberties in the digital environment;
> An understanding of civil society approaches for conducting advocacy
> desirable;
> A demonstrated commitment to human rights protection online;
> Effectively manage to work efficiently in a fast-paced environment,
> troubleshoot and follow projects through to completion, with strict
> deadlines and without loss of attention to detail, budget and reporting;
> Excellent oral and written English;
> Excellent written, verbal, organizational, analytical and
> interpersonal skills;
> Excellent computer skills, proficient in Microsoft Office and
> experience with internet research and database management;
> Exercise good listening and communication skills with sensitivity to
> cultural communication differences;
> Effectively work as a team member and independently, with a
> high-level of self-motivation and ability to set and meet goals;
> Show discretion and ability to handle confidential issues;
> Knowledge of key organizations and networks active in the field;
> Pleasant, diplomatic manner and disposition in interacting with
> colleagues and the general public;
> Excellent analytical and organizational skills;
> Willingness to travel internationally on a frequent basis.
>
> Compensation
> Salary commensurate with qualifications and experience. Excellent
> benefits package.
> Application Instructions
>
> Please email a cover letter and CV to:
> recruitment-IP at opensocietyfoundations.org. Include in subject line your
> name, surname and job code PM-IP.
>
>
> --
> Joseph Lorenzo Hall
> Senior Staff Technologist
> Center for Democracy & Technology
> 1634 I ST NW STE 1100
> Washington DC 20006-4011
> (p) 202-407-8825
> (f) 202-637-0968
> joe at cdt.org
> PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 31
> Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 18:52:23 +0000
> From: Enrique Piraces <piracee at hrw.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] Natalia Project: personal assault alarm for
> human rights defenders at risk
> Message-ID:
> <44E87626E3405D4786B06E12D522184470D281A6 at exmbx8.local.hrw.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hola all,
>
> Does anyone know or have access to the specs of the device?
>
> http://natalia.civilrightsdefenders.org/
>
> Enrique Pirac?s
> Human Rights Watch
> https://www.hrw.org
> https://www.twitter.com/epiraces
> PGP key<
> http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x80951C31844CB395>
>
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 32
> Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 16:17:15 -0300
> From: hellekin <hellekin at cepheide.org>
> To: liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to
> challenge National Security Letter
> Message-ID: <515F233B.4020303 at cepheide.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> On 04/05/2013 01:20 PM, Nicholas Merrill wrote:
> >
> > In my humble opinion, Google deserves to be commended for taking
> > this action which it did not have to take !
> >
> *** Isn't the FBI is getting for free what they usually sell? Isn't
> that a good enough incentive? Sure they're doing the right thing, this
> time.
>
> But I smell a trend in the last few weeks of enthusiastic
> announcements for progress of this, and leaks of that. But there are
> *details* that really look suspicious to me:
>
> - - Google wants your information, it's their plan, and their business.
> That they don't want to share it with the FBI is probably a good
> thing, but it doesn't change their plan.
>
> - - The recent OffshoreLeaks sound great, and are important, but I'm
> (not) very surprised there's nobody really important there, just some
> adequate puppets, so far. The real beneficiaries of offshore banking
> are still hiding. Is that because the British Virgin Islands were
> deemed expandable, or because we don't have the whole picture yet?
>
> - - The shortlist of "State Enemies of the Internet" given by the
> Reporters Without Borders is the most suspicious of all: Bahrain,
> China, Iran, Syria, Vietnam. To everybody else, the actual enemies
> would be the ones sitting on the UN Security Council, and another for
> good measure: USA (ACTA? CISPA? NSL? NSA Bunker? StuxNet? Aaron
> Swartz?), Israel (Stuxnet?), Russia, UK, France (Amesys, wow!), the
> entire EU, Myanmar/Burma (hey, need to remember those racist buddhists
> oppressing poor Muslims sometimes, unless it's politically incorrect
> to do so?), etc. but no: instead they're pointing at the designated
> enemies of "U.S. interests". (http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/)
>
> It's become so difficult not to lose one's mind over paranoia, nor to
> abandon all hope of seeing the light. The media landscape looks more
> and more like a polarized lens to demonize "the enemy" (hint: you're
> part of it) and sneak war propaganda everywhere. If I were in London,
> I would bet on the declaration of war on Iran before Spring 2014.
>
> ==
> hk
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
>
> iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJRXyM6AAoJEDhjYTkcokoT+VUP/ROdEONjtNpEP9K8eojDDAL/
> A9VziO1xnGb2ZZih1dTuV4Ru11k0HCuWECclv84QWhKydbHKk6cI8olu6vfEwjz3
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> WhPzu8AdzumF4wRnr4JjeAGNGQgwE8J+rBtpJgVCwao/3lfJW/Z1jfqLKw09GIhy
> 9/N3H/fsSLyJO8yxDbb9UquYju1XRfJxZiw0XM7qOD+gorswPWEVC1zqeiGxEGOq
> G9XciUUb7dtZY4cB9xB9nUkunidXB7Xr0YkEQxh02R6FTMA+8hMpbJHt9paIfby1
> jyppunfLsqK9YyZwweNb2IjWpvkhhYVFwoLcwomnBkDtgRJLZ3O/CtomahD0p09/
> ENiIfnYOdu97RRHW+8npVAwVpuxUlC/byP8sFaTCm3pvrLV5u8Swvbsw2YShV0wV
> f8tz7ZIGMED7yCQvP8gSjR2zlGM/fsZNbQw019arRSuR0GPdq5TJP9pOdWfGk7zA
> q3XII6Dtj+AorxZBxgVbILQB2Gqox6IFuMwMHiFXdYXOWDLWp4XZ8ZhXJTEySvrT
> pDwCgGbh+Qinbv3ufUVWz+pd+BI4gpBKNU/kNicB2YJgukfRLhrwBrf3esiWW9Re
> KS5EjKVvp4qBbSbeMWS1
> =60aZ
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 33
> Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 12:57:33 -0700
> From: <frank at journalistsecurity.net>
> To: "liberationtech" <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] CPJ: Attacks on Knight Center sites reflect
> digital dangers
> Message-ID:
> <
> 20130405125733.1dfe975c9695ebf5a1af6ff0ac4840df.50cab3358f.wbe at email14.secureserver.net
> >
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
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> http://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/attachments/20130405/20e5cb7d/attachment-0001.html
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 34
> Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 17:12:21 -0400
> From: Shava Nerad <shava23 at gmail.com>
> To: Liberation Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to
> challenge National Security Letter
> Message-ID:
> <
> CAHzs-wJ0QxJrac3fUv9JCgZ5zCNWMoH+tpz-egq7fPrxdX6s+g at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 12:20 PM, Nicholas Merrill <lists at calyx.com> wrote:
> >
> > I am very happy to report to the list that apparently, Google is now
> > challenging a National Security Letter issued by the FBI
>
> This is stunning. I did not expect "the identity network" to take a move
> like this. I don't expect Google to do anything on this scale for purely
> altruistic reasons, although it's nice when they happen to serve those
> ends. (Just to prove I am not the anti-Evgeny...:)
>
> I wonder what motivated them? I am reluctant to look a gift horse in the
> mouth ungraciously, and Google is not exactly monolithic, but this is
> considerably larger than some Google lawyer's 20% project.
>
> Let's follow the money. Are they concerned with the level of government
> inquiry into their records with this mechanism? Is the government going
> after a favored client? (This is to say, they can't say who an NSL is
> going after but they can resist when the government goes after a major
> stream of revenue for them).
>
> I'll note that the privacy czar at Google just turned over to US hands. I
> wonder if that had anything to do with this. I should look more closely
> perhaps at Mr. You.
>
> Of course, to be really cynical, NSLs allow the government to arbitrarily
> shield inquiries that would later be revealed by FOIA requests to govt
> embarassment, and Google can't even charge them for the inconvenience. It
> has to rankle them. They should at least get paid and not just bullied for
> being informants. It's directly counter their business model.
>
> Curiouser and curiouser.
>
> yrs,
>
> --
>
> Shava Nerad
> shava23 at gmail.com
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 35
> Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 19:07:26 -0400
> From: Griffin Boyce <griffinboyce at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Google defies FBI, asks federal judge to
> challenge National Security Letter
> Message-ID:
> <CAGKHomebByssZd=
> MJEunCJFSmD7vENFXDzP7U+zHX03HdKzBpg at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> While I'm happy that Google has (after many years) decided to challenge a
> letter, it makes me sad that it took them this long to do so.
>
> As a marketing maneuver, it really doesn't get much better than "we care
> about your privacy so much that we'll fight anyone!" Except they're not
> fighting much, or particularly often. At this point, it's a softball
> fight. It's a fight they can win without much ado. And it makes them look
> good.
>
> They could have started fighting five years ago and changed the
> conversation entirely. But they didn't care to. NSLs have been fought to
> such an extent, by individuals and twitter and various ISPs, that it's
> brought awareness to the issues surrounding their use. I like the idea
> that Google's actions could be the final nail in the coffin for warrantless
> search, but it is just that - an idea.
>
> ironically using Gmail,
> Griffin Boyce
>
> --
> Please note that I do not have PGP access at this time.
> OTR: saint at jabber.ccc.de / fontaine at jabber.ccc.de
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 36
> Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 18:08:44 -0700
> From: <frank at journalistsecurity.net>
> To: "liberationtech" <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] CPJ: Attacks on Knight Center sites
> reflect digital dangers
> Message-ID:
> <
> 20130405180844.1dfe975c9695ebf5a1af6ff0ac4840df.a24d10e081.wbe at email14.secureserver.net
> >
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
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> http://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/attachments/20130405/41e1fead/attachment-0001.html
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 37
> Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2013 10:50:44 +0100
> From: Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>
> To: liberationtech Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
> Message-ID: <BDBA07A0-D0DB-48DA-BD6E-490D2E3AE15E at ei8fdb.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
>
> Hi,
>
> I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical
> reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough.
>
> I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this
> attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not nice"?
> Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same stories
> repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same
> oppressive regimes.
>
> As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while (thankfully
> no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" - network
> management, etc.
>
> However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's
> products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole market is
> those oppressive countries we talk about on this list.
>
> My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but there
> are nastier and uglier fish out there.
>
> Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine.
>
> thanks,
> Bernard
>
> - --------------------------------------
> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
>
> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
>
> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t
> SI0o9OOU+wn3Am5ERwDfXlcXy+V/28vbXxPvbhRtjIukF1X94fgJ95+ODn2dOY6g
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> =PYRZ
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 38
> Date: Sat, 06 Apr 2013 15:07:07 +0200
> From: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists at infosecurity.ch>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
> Message-ID: <51601DFB.3060307 at infosecurity.ch>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> On 4/6/13 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical
> reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough.
> >
> > I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this
> attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not
> nice"? Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the
> same stories repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in
> the same oppressive regimes.
> >
> > As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while
> (thankfully no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses"
> - network management, etc.
> That's activism, you need an enemy to fight even if they have no
> concrete liability!
>
> Do we want to speak about Cisco protecting North Korea infrastructure? :-)
>
> $ nc mail.silibank.com 25
> 220
>
> ******************************************************************************
> expn let-me-see-if-this-is-cisco-ASA-smtp-fixup
> 500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "XXXX
> let-me-see-if-this-is-cisco-ASA-smtp-fixup"
>
> * North Korean's Silibank: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sili_Bank
> * Cisco ASA/PIX: http://www.squiggle.org/2009/01/fixup-on-cisco-firewalls/
>
> Fabio
>
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 39
> Date: Sat, 06 Apr 2013 07:15:23 -0700 (PDT)
> From: Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu>
> To: Liberation Technologies <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Cc: David Murakami Wood <dmw at QUEENSU.CA>
> Subject: [liberationtech] CfP: "Surveillance, Games & Play" in
> Surveillance & Society (September 15)
> Message-ID:
> <
> CANhci9Fvams_EeCOQQW53LmpL1oesudKZRMiwRqUiHsXAc-qfw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> *From: *David Murakami Wood <dmw at QUEENSU.CA>
>
> Call for Papers: Surveillance, Games and Play
>
> Theme Issue of *Surveillance & Society*
>
> edited by: Jennifer R. Whitson and Bart Simon
> submission deadline: *September 15th 2013* for publication March 2014.
>
> *Introduction *
>
> The games we play on our computers, iPads, and video game consoles are
> watching us. They track our every online move and send data on who we are,
> how we play, and whom we play with back to game and virtual world
> publishers such as Sony and Microsoft. Two events in the summer of 2011
> exemplify the need to study surveillance in games: a hacker attack against
> Sony's Playstation Network compromised over 77 million user accounts
> including credit card numbers, while iPhone users discovered hidden code in
> their devices that tracked their movements and secretly sent this data back
> to Apple. This form of consumer surveillance that targets players has
> eluded critical appraisal in both the games studies and surveillance
> literature. The games we play are not only watching us, but are leveraging
> surveillance to mold us into better students, workers, and consumers, as
> evidenced by the growth of gamification applications that combine playful
> design and feedback mechanisms from games with users' social profiles (e.g.
> Facebook, twitter, and LinkedIn) in non-game applications explicitly geared
> to drive behavioural change. Accordingly, traditional surveillance
> activities are transformed through their combination with playful frames of
> reference and game-like elements.
>
> Yet, as argued by Anders Albrechtslund and Lynsey Dubbeld in Volume 3(2/3)
> of * Surveillance & Society*, surveillance is fun. It is an essential
> component of many games and virtual worlds. It enables family to find each
> other and play together online, such as when adult children who live
> thousands of miles away challenge their parents to a *Words with Friends
> *scrabble
> match over Facebook. Surveillance allows game companies to match strangers
> with similar skill sets and play-styles together in multiplayer games, thus
> increasing the flow of the game and players' mutual enjoyment. Surveillance
> facilitates coordinated teamwork and sophisticated game economies,
> exemplified by informational tools such as the damage mods and kill-point
> monitors created by players for massively-multiplayer online games.
> Surveillance also makes online games and virtual worlds safe for children
> and young adults, restricting both the use of inappropriate language and
> content, as well as prohibiting the entry of potentially dangerous adults.
> Moreover, surveillance is pleasurable. As game company Valve found when
> they forayed into biometrics (i.e. measuring galvanic skin response and
> arousal levels), players are more engaged when they can see how they affect
> their opponents' own physiological responses. We, as players, like to watch
> our opponents, anticipating what they will do next. We also use
> surveillance to improve our prowess and extend our moments of victory by
> using recording software and game replay functions
>
> This theme issue is dedicated to balancing two very different sides of
> surveillance: surveillance as a technology of corporate governance and
> surveillance as a technology of pleasure and play.
>
>
> *Possible research areas might include (but are not limited to):*
>
> - The role of surveillance in enabling play and games
> - The role of play and games in normalizing surveillance
> - Surveillance as gameplay or surveillance as a game mechanic
> - Playful surveillance applications
> - Playful representations of surveillance
> - Playful resistance to surveillance
> - Issues of identity, anonymity and pseudonymity in online games and
> virtual worlds
> - Online visibilities and the relationship between game publishers and
> user populations
> - The implications of using data gathered in-game for non-game
> applications
> - The use of surveillance and the representation of surveillance in
> online games, virtual worlds, and/or gamified applications, including
> topics such as:
> - Games that educate users about privacy and surveillance
> - End-User Licensing Agreements, Terms of Service, and awareness of
> surveillance
> - Applications of social networking services, locational data, and
> GPS devices in games and play
> - Uses of data gathering services, screen-capture tools, and recorded
> gameplay sessions
> - The surveillance of children and youth in virtual worlds and games
> - State and police use of in-game data for surveillance, tracking,
> behavioral profiling etc.
> - Surveillance and the competitive, professional e-sports gaming
> industry
> - Data mining, game metrics, and targeted advertising in the game
> industry
>
> This is not intended to be an exclusive listing of possibilities for this
> edition. Other possibilities are welcomed and encouraged and can be
> discussed in advance with the guest-editors: Jennifer R.Whitson<
> j.whitson at concordia.ca>
> <j.whitson at concordia.ca>and Bart Simon <bart.simon at concordia.ca>.
>
>
> *Submission Information: *
>
> We welcome full academic papers, opinion pieces, review pieces, poetry,
> artistic, and audio-visual submissions. Submissions will undergo a
> peer-review and revision process prior to publication. Submissions should
> be original work, neither previously published nor under consideration for
> publication elsewhere. All references to previous work by contributors
> should be masked in the text (e.g., ?Author, 2009?).
>
> All papers must be submitted through the online submission system no later
> than *September 15th 2013*, for publication in *March 2014.*
>
> Please submit the papers in a MSWord-compatible format. For further
> submission guidelines, please see:
>
> http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/about/submissions#authorGuidelines
>
>
> For all inquiries regarding the issue, please contact Jennifer R. Whitson<
> j.whitson at concordia.ca>
>
>
> David Murakami Wood | Editor-in-Chief
> Surveillance & Society | www.surveillance-and-society.org
> the international journal of surveillance studies
>
> dmw at queensu.ca
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 40
> Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2013 16:41:58 +0200
> From: "Jillian C. York" <jilliancyork at gmail.com>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
> Message-ID:
> <CAN=RHLnM6DzUT6ntFbzWhHtDS1HS+xA=+
> qxK3bG4HQ6L3CRGnw at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Honestly? Because there is ample evidence to support it at the moment. I
> would also suggest that it's only "singled out" in the US - in Europe, the
> focus right now is on Gamma (FinFisher) and Amesys, largely.
>
> Activists have been accused in the past of "singling out" Cisco as well.
> Attention has now turned to Bluecoat. When there is evidence of another
> company's misdeeds, attention will surely turn there.
>
> Is that sufficient logic for you?
>
> On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb
> <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>wrote:
>
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical
> > reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough.
> >
> > I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this
> > attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not
> nice"?
> > Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same
> stories
> > repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same
> > oppressive regimes.
> >
> > As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while (thankfully
> > no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" - network
> > management, etc.
> >
> > However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's
> > products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole market
> is
> > those oppressive countries we talk about on this list.
> >
> > My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but there
> > are nastier and uglier fish out there.
> >
> > Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine.
> >
> > thanks,
> > Bernard
> >
> > - --------------------------------------
> > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
> >
> > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> >
> > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t
> > SI0o9OOU+wn3Am5ERwDfXlcXy+V/28vbXxPvbhRtjIukF1X94fgJ95+ODn2dOY6g
> > B4wnOmLzvDT8HovPhf1zH4Dkot3N50Rkt4V4k29163EYVPgLkkuRrPgU6HGwB9IH
> > dVW54KNXnZX3sXFsYle0j8rayI1tgPWpesPpWCe/J5pI+ljLTFbLEJ+Ytz6rPbqu
> > y4c/Irjknh8NCVr1LLaGnTkeZQstv5oWZErRrv0bl9Qkm737PAkUCmhTjvBoJw7+
> > kJ9b7lFjJ2h9TRdw54RwTomRrhe4yYmPYlWnSyy4k6d6PK1B7bjKdUT89xjn4jY=
> > =PYRZ
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
>
>
>
> --
> US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> site: jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | *
> twitter: @jilliancyork* *
>
> "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the
> seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
> -------------- next part --------------
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 41
> Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2013 12:14:50 -0400
> From: Kate Krauss <katie at critpath.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
> Message-ID:
> <
> CAMJrQub5J1JMshjsuMEZguf6HBJ+AeUC3LKdz-x+C65nt1XhLA at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> To me, the real question is, *If* Bluecoat, why are things going so well
> for them when they are a 45 minute drive from activists in San Francisco?
> Happy to explain--off this list--what this means in terms of political
> strategy and offline, nonviolent direct action.
>
> This is definitely not an indictment of any group--there's amazing activism
> going on an a zillion fires to put out.
>
> But there are great opportunities to be explored.
>
> Kate Krauss
> (formerly of ACT UP Golden Gate, a group that successfully targeted major
> companies on the peninsula, from SF)
>
> On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Jillian C. York <jilliancyork at gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > Honestly? Because there is ample evidence to support it at the moment.
> I
> > would also suggest that it's only "singled out" in the US - in Europe,
> the
> > focus right now is on Gamma (FinFisher) and Amesys, largely.
> >
> > Activists have been accused in the past of "singling out" Cisco as well.
> > Attention has now turned to Bluecoat. When there is evidence of another
> > company's misdeeds, attention will surely turn there.
> >
> > Is that sufficient logic for you?
> >
> > On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <
> ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org
> > > wrote:
> >
> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >> Hash: SHA1
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical
> >> reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough.
> >>
> >> I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this
> >> attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not
> nice"?
> >> Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same
> stories
> >> repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same
> >> oppressive regimes.
> >>
> >> As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while
> (thankfully
> >> no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" - network
> >> management, etc.
> >>
> >> However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's
> >> products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole market
> is
> >> those oppressive countries we talk about on this list.
> >>
> >> My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but
> there
> >> are nastier and uglier fish out there.
> >>
> >> Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine.
> >>
> >> thanks,
> >> Bernard
> >>
> >> - --------------------------------------
> >> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
> >>
> >> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
> >>
> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> >> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> >>
> >> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t
> >> SI0o9OOU+wn3Am5ERwDfXlcXy+V/28vbXxPvbhRtjIukF1X94fgJ95+ODn2dOY6g
> >> B4wnOmLzvDT8HovPhf1zH4Dkot3N50Rkt4V4k29163EYVPgLkkuRrPgU6HGwB9IH
> >> dVW54KNXnZX3sXFsYle0j8rayI1tgPWpesPpWCe/J5pI+ljLTFbLEJ+Ytz6rPbqu
> >> y4c/Irjknh8NCVr1LLaGnTkeZQstv5oWZErRrv0bl9Qkm737PAkUCmhTjvBoJw7+
> >> kJ9b7lFjJ2h9TRdw54RwTomRrhe4yYmPYlWnSyy4k6d6PK1B7bjKdUT89xjn4jY=
> >> =PYRZ
> >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >> --
> >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> >> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings
> at
> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> > site: jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | *
> > twitter: @jilliancyork* *
> >
> > "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want
> the
> > seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
> >
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 42
> Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2013 13:53:59 -0400
> From: Ronald Deibert <r.deibert at utoronto.ca>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
> Message-ID: <56BB93E5-609D-402D-ACEF-033D6086AC47 at utoronto.ca>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hi LibTech
>
> Citizen Lab is undertaking research on the commercial market for
> censorship, surveillance, and computer network attack
> capabilities -- hence the interest in Blue Coat, but among many other
> reports we have done either alone or collaboratively
> with others on the topic. That would include reports going back to the
> mid 2000s on the use commercial filtering products,
> published under the auspices of the ONI, and including reports on Fortinet
> in Burma, Smart Filter in Iran, Websense in a variety
> of MENA / Gulf countries, and more recently Netsweeper. We have also
> published several reports on Gamma Group, and
> one on Hacking Team. Additionally, we are working collaboratively with
> Privacy International and Agentura.Ru on the commercial
> surveillance market in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
>
> Our interest is to document what's going on in the first instance,
> typically employing a mixed methods approach that we are refining -- and a
> lot
> of that can be opportunistic depending on the modalities of deployment. A
> second, growing concern of ours is around the question
> of what can be done about this market.
>
> Specifically on Blue Coat, readers of lib tech might be interested in an
> oped that Sarah McKune and I wrote that talks
> about the issue of shareholder pressure on Blue Coat as one approach short
> of regulation, after we determined that the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan
> is a majority
> owner of Blue Coat systems. You can read that oped here:
>
>
> http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2013/02/06/teachers_pension_plan_invests_in_internet_surveillance_firm.html
>
> I should mention that we posted questions directly to Blue Coat in our
> report here:
>
> https://citizenlab.org/2013/01/planet-blue-coat-mapping-global-censorship-and-surveillance-tools/
> ...and sent a letter directly to Blue Coat systems and the OTPP
> reiterating those questions.
> To date we have not received any reply.
>
> Our various publications on this topic can be found here:
> http://citizenlab.org/publications/
>
> Regards
> Ron
>
>
> On 2013-04-06, at 12:14 PM, Kate Krauss wrote:
>
> > To me, the real question is, *If* Bluecoat, why are things going so well
> > for them when they are a 45 minute drive from activists in San Francisco?
> > Happy to explain--off this list--what this means in terms of political
> > strategy and offline, nonviolent direct action.
> >
> > This is definitely not an indictment of any group--there's amazing
> activism
> > going on an a zillion fires to put out.
> >
> > But there are great opportunities to be explored.
> >
> > Kate Krauss
> > (formerly of ACT UP Golden Gate, a group that successfully targeted major
> > companies on the peninsula, from SF)
> >
> > On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Jillian C. York <jilliancyork at gmail.com
> >wrote:
> >
> >> Honestly? Because there is ample evidence to support it at the moment.
> I
> >> would also suggest that it's only "singled out" in the US - in Europe,
> the
> >> focus right now is on Gamma (FinFisher) and Amesys, largely.
> >>
> >> Activists have been accused in the past of "singling out" Cisco as well.
> >> Attention has now turned to Bluecoat. When there is evidence of another
> >> company's misdeeds, attention will surely turn there.
> >>
> >> Is that sufficient logic for you?
> >>
> >> On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <
> ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org
> >>> wrote:
> >>
> >>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >>> Hash: SHA1
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Hi,
> >>>
> >>> I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical
> >>> reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough.
> >>>
> >>> I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this
> >>> attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not
> nice"?
> >>> Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same
> stories
> >>> repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same
> >>> oppressive regimes.
> >>>
> >>> As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while
> (thankfully
> >>> no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" - network
> >>> management, etc.
> >>>
> >>> However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's
> >>> products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole
> market is
> >>> those oppressive countries we talk about on this list.
> >>>
> >>> My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but
> there
> >>> are nastier and uglier fish out there.
> >>>
> >>> Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine.
> >>>
> >>> thanks,
> >>> Bernard
> >>>
> >>> - --------------------------------------
> >>> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
> >>>
> >>> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
> >>>
> >>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >>> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> >>> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> >>>
> >>> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t
> >>> SI0o9OOU+wn3Am5ERwDfXlcXy+V/28vbXxPvbhRtjIukF1X94fgJ95+ODn2dOY6g
> >>> B4wnOmLzvDT8HovPhf1zH4Dkot3N50Rkt4V4k29163EYVPgLkkuRrPgU6HGwB9IH
> >>> dVW54KNXnZX3sXFsYle0j8rayI1tgPWpesPpWCe/J5pI+ljLTFbLEJ+Ytz6rPbqu
> >>> y4c/Irjknh8NCVr1LLaGnTkeZQstv5oWZErRrv0bl9Qkm737PAkUCmhTjvBoJw7+
> >>> kJ9b7lFjJ2h9TRdw54RwTomRrhe4yYmPYlWnSyy4k6d6PK1B7bjKdUT89xjn4jY=
> >>> =PYRZ
> >>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >>> --
> >>> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> >>> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings
> at
> >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> >> site: jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | *
> >> twitter: @jilliancyork* *
> >>
> >> "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want
> the
> >> seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
> >>
> >> --
> >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> >> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings
> at
> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> Ronald Deibert
> Director, the Citizen Lab
> and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies
> Munk School of Global Affairs
> University of Toronto
> (416) 946-8916
> PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt
> http://deibert.citizenlab.org/
> twitter.com/citizenlab
> r.deibert at utoronto.ca
>
>
>
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 43
> Date: Sat, 6 Apr 2013 18:59:27 +0100
> From: Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>
> To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
> Message-ID: <335D5FA9-CA82-42C9-818C-D6D34244C147 at ei8fdb.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> It was an honest question Jillian. No ulterior motive.
>
> I would argue there is ample evidence to support it for Cisco, Redback,
> Ericsson, Siemens, NSN, F5, Apache Squid....the list goes on.
>
> I have read stories from European media (I can't give you a list right
> now, but if you'd like I can find) which use the Bluecoat example.
>
> Maybe thats actually a good project - to track the media coverage of
> network hardware vendors in connection with surveillance and censorship
> stories through out the world.
>
> If this has brought up a previous thorny conversation that was not my
> intention. It was a question I had been thinking about.
>
> Is it sufficient logic? Personally, not really but I understand the point
> of view now.
>
> thanks,
> Bernard
>
> On 6 Apr 2013, at 15:41, Jillian C. York wrote:
>
> > Honestly? Because there is ample evidence to support it at the moment.
> I would also suggest that it's only "singled out" in the US - in Europe,
> the focus right now is on Gamma (FinFisher) and Amesys, largely.
> >
> > Activists have been accused in the past of "singling out" Cisco as well.
> Attention has now turned to Bluecoat. When there is evidence of another
> company's misdeeds, attention will surely turn there.
> >
> > Is that sufficient logic for you?
> >
> > On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <
> ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org> wrote:
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical
> reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough.
> >
> > I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this
> attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not nice"?
> Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same stories
> repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same
> oppressive regimes.
> >
> > As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while
> (thankfully no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" -
> network management, etc.
> >
> > However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's
> products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole market is
> those oppressive countries we talk about on this list.
> >
> > My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but
> there are nastier and uglier fish out there.
> >
> > Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine.
> >
> > thanks,
> > Bernard
> >
> > - --------------------------------------
> > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
> >
> > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
> >
> > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t
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> > =PYRZ
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088
> > site: jilliancyork.com | twitter: @jilliancyork
> >
> > "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want
> the seemingly impossible to become a reality" - Vaclav Havel
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> - --------------------------------------
> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
>
> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin)
> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
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> =auxl
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> --
> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
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>
> End of liberationtech Digest, Vol 149, Issue 2
> **********************************************
>
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