[liberationtech] WSJ Op-Ed: No Quick Fixes for Internet Freedom
Walid Al-Saqaf
admin at alkasir.com
Mon Nov 22 07:20:32 PST 2010
I totally agree with Jilian on this point. I also find that research done on
Internet censorship outside China is very limited.
Sincerely,
Walid
-----------------
Walid Al-Saqaf
Founder & Administrator
alkasir for mapping and circumventing cyber censorship
https://alkasir.com <walid.al-saqaf at oru.se>
On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 4:17 PM, Jillian York
<jyork at cyber.law.harvard.edu>wrote:
> "I am not in favor of bringing such political considerations into the
> funding process for two reasons"
>
> If political considerations weren't a part of the funding process, then
> we'd see more funding targeting the other countries with pervasive filtering
> regimes (Syria, Tunisia, etc) and not just to China/Iran. And yet, the
> entire discourse remains primarily about China and Iran, even--to a
> degree--on this list.
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 9:32 AM, Hal Roberts <
> hroberts at cyber.law.harvard.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hi Mehdi,
>>
>>
>> On 11/22/10 8:43 AM, Mehdi Yahyanejad wrote:
>>
>>> China at least seems to block each tool in proportion to the
>>> degree to which the tool embarrasses the regime (*not* in proportion
>>> to the technical efficiency of the tool). The gifc tools hugely
>>> embarrass the Chinese government because they are both falun gong
>>> run and explicitly political.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is not a proven fact. More likely, Chinese government will put
>>> resources in blocking any successful tool regardless of the
>>> embarrassment factor. Also so far, GIFC has been successful in defeating
>>> the Chinese government's censorship and there is no reason to believe
>>> that they won't be able to do so in future.
>>>
>>
>> It is not proven (and can't be without access to the inner rooms of the
>> Chinese government where these decision are made). But the evidence I see
>> strongly suggests that this is the case. Last time I checked, the Chinese
>> government blocks tor nodes every few months (and not at all until about a
>> year ago). They block every gifc front end proxy within seconds (and have
>> blocked them aggressively for years). I know of at least two other China
>> focused tools that I won't disclose for obvious reasons that have similar or
>> greater usage as the gifc tools that have been completely unblocked for at
>> least the past couple of years.
>>
>> These differences have been one of the great mysteries of the GFW: Why is
>> it that with all of the technical resources China has poured into the gfw,
>> any of a half dozen people on this list could greatly improve the proxy
>> blocking of the gfw with a couple days of writing perl scripts? The best
>> possible answers are either that the folks running the filter are
>> incompetent or that the proxy blocking decisions are made by political
>> rather than technical folks. I think the latter is much, much more likely.
>>
>> The gifc tools, as a testament to the incredible smarts and dedication of
>> their volunteers, have remained mostly functional in the face of very
>> agressive blocking. But they have reported to me that their usage has
>> dropped dramatically at times as they respond to the blocking attempts.
>> Just this week I was told by someone in China that everyone he knows has
>> stopped using the gifc tools altogether because they are useless now (I
>> don't think that this is the case generally -- it's common to hear
>> conflicting reports of this sort because usage of the tools tends to be very
>> clumpy within local communities -- but it's evidence that the gifc tools are
>> not immune to the effects of blocking as your portray them).
>>
>> Of course, a tool with sufficient usage will eventually embarrass the
>> government, but current evidence suggests that the level of usage necessary
>> to encourage blocking by itself is higher than the usage of any of the
>> current tools.
>>
>>
>>
>>> I am not in favor of bringing such political considerations into the
>>> funding process for two reasons:
>>>
>>> 1) It is hard to agree on political considerations. For example, some
>>> people see the political background of GIFC as a negative factor, I
>>> don't. The success of GIFC's products is partly due to their
>>> understanding of the context which must have come from their political
>>> background. Considering that they have created the tools for a political
>>> goal, they are not getting distracted by having a design which would be
>>> admired in academic circles/. /They know that their primary job is
>>> getting as many people as possible to the blocked content.
>>>
>>
>> Well, insofar as you are talking about funding by the USG, it is
>> non-sensical to say that funding should not be guided by political
>> considerations. Politics is the whole point.
>>
>> I'll point out, though, that I have stayed entirely away from the
>> diplomatic or cultural politics involved with falun gong (which is to say
>> that some folks at state don't want to fund gifc because the funding will
>> upset diplomatic relations and other folks disagree with funding gifc
>> because they disagree with the culture of falun gong general). The only
>> point I'm making is that the evidence I see says that the gifc tools are and
>> will continue to be much more aggressively blocked in China than any other
>> tool and that bigger, more public chunks of USG money seems likely to
>> increase the aggression of that blocking.
>>
>>
>>
>>> 2) Such political considerations brings in lobbyists to the funding
>>> process. Groups that have not received funding due to such political
>>> considerations will use outside pressure to defeat the political
>>> considerations used against them. If it is true that gifc has used
>>> lobbyists, it is the direct result of such political considerations that
>>> prevented them from getting funding before.
>>>
>>
>> The answer then is that the USG should not be the major funder of these
>> tools. If the USG is funding these highly political tools, lobbying will be
>> involved. Even moreso at the higher levels of funding that the GIFC's
>> lobbyists are pushing.
>>
>> -hal
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -mehdi
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:13 PM, Hal Roberts
>>> <hroberts at cyber.law.harvard.edu <mailto:hroberts at cyber.law.harvard.edu>>
>>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I wrote a similar (though vastly less well written!) oped to
>>> Rebecca's this week for Radio Free Europe:
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.rferl.org/content/Breaking_Internet_Censorship_Will_Take_More_Than_Circumvention_Tools/2222401.html
>>>
>>> The careful argument I've been trying to make about circumvention
>>> funding is that there's plenty of reason to fund these tools for the
>>> absolute amount of good they do -- allowing hundreds of thousands or
>>> millions more people more freedom of expression on the Internet.
>>> There's real good in giving ultrasurf / tor / ultrasurf / psiphon /
>>> hotspotshield enough money to be able to provide more freedom of
>>> expression to a million more people.
>>>
>>> But the gifc tools at least are not being sold that way -- they are
>>> being sold as the way to make the internet (and even authoritarian
>>> societies!) free, which they clearly will not do by themselves.
>>> It's fine to spend money battling the low hanging fruit of network
>>> filtering simply because that's where the easy (if slight) leverage
>>> is, but we need to be clear that that's what we're doing.
>>>
>>> The other issue that I don't discuss in my oped (for space reasons)
>>> is that the gifc tools are easily the best in the world at evading
>>> blocking because they are easily the most aggressively blocked tool
>>> in the world. China at least seems to block each tool in proportion
>>> to the degree to which the tool embarrasses the regime (*not* in
>>> proportion to the technical efficiency of the tool). The gifc tools
>>> hugely embarrass the Chinese government because they are both falun
>>> gong run and explicitly political. One likely effect of the USG
>>> publicly granting a much bigger chunk of money to gifc will be to
>>> embarrass the Chinese government even more and encourage them to
>>> ramp up their blocking efforts. Again, this is not sufficient
>>> reason to not to fund these tools, but it is reason to carefully
>>> consider whether it's the best idea to publicly give them a much
>>> bigger chunk of money.
>>>
>>> -hal
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/19/10 6:44 PM, Mehdi Yahyanejad wrote:
>>>
>>> Most of the public justification for the Internet Freedom
>>> funding has
>>> been the specific cases of Iran and China (read congressional
>>> hearings
>>> on these issues). It makes sense to ask about the effectiveness
>>> of the
>>> funding in Iran and China. GIFC tools have been pretty successful
>>> in
>>> Iran so far. Since they were made for China, they must be doing
>>> better
>>> there. There has been much more funding for other projects with
>>> less
>>> impressive result. Why don't we hear about the funding spent on
>>> other
>>> projects? Criticizing the funding for one of the most successful
>>> circumvention tools to make an argument on why there should be
>>> different
>>> priorities for Internet Freedom is not helping the argument.
>>>
>>> Having a broader strategy for "Internet freedom" and listing
>>> priorities
>>> is needed but those other priorities are not as well-defined as
>>> the
>>> technical problems. A good thing about technical problems is
>>> that with a
>>> good mix of money and engineers, you can generate some results.
>>> That is
>>> not the case with the legal and regulatory issues. Until we do
>>> have that
>>> list of priorities, we better keep our eyes on the technical
>>> challenges
>>> and not get distracted.
>>>
>>> -mehdi
>>>
>>> On Nov 19, 2010, at 7:57 AM, Evgeny Morozov wrote:
>>>
>>> I'd like to chime in here and defend Rebecca's conclusions,
>>> which are
>>> very similar to my own. My impression is that none of this
>>> money is
>>> meant specifically for either a) circumvention or b) Iran.
>>> As such, I
>>> don't see how the facts that Mehdi cites - i.e. that GIFC
>>> tools are
>>> actively used in Iran or that other projects got more money -
>>> is
>>> relevant for our discussion here. That the US government may
>>> have
>>> overspent on other tools is no good reason to continue doing
>>> so in the
>>> future, even if the portfolio is diversified with GIFC.
>>>
>>> The government may not have a real strategy on how to
>>> address some of
>>> the other challenges/threats to "Internet freedom"
>>> highlighted in
>>> Rebecca's piece (and for the record, I don't think that
>>> "Internet
>>> freedom" is a useful way to describe the problems facing
>>> them), but
>>> this is certainly NOT a good excuse to continue funding
>>> projects
>>> without drawing up a list of both regional and topical
>>> priorities
>>> first. As I once already said on this list, while I
>>> appreciate Mehdi's
>>> concern about the accessibility of his web-site to users in
>>> Iran, this
>>> surely can't be the guiding principle of US foreign policy on
>>> "Internet freedom".
>>>
>>> Evgeny
>>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 3:50 AM, Mehdi Yahyanejad
>>> <yahyanejad at gmail.com <mailto:yahyanejad at gmail.com>
>>> <mailto:yahyanejad at gmail.com <mailto:yahyanejad at gmail.com>>>
>>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Since 2007, Congress has inserted a total of $50
>>> million of
>>> earmarks into the State Department's budget to fund
>>> organizations
>>> dedicated to fighting Internet censorship. One group
>>> that has
>>> been lobbying hard for the money is the Global
>>> Internet Freedom
>>> Consortium, run mainly by practitioners of the Falun
>>> Gong, a
>>> religious sect banned in China. The GIFC has
>>> produced a suite of
>>> circumvention tools that work well, as long as the
>>> user doesn't
>>> mind that GIFC engineers can see their unencrypted
>>> communications, or that the security of the tool has
>>> not been
>>> vetted by independent experts.
>>>
>>> The GIFC has found powerful allies in Mark Palmer,
>>> who was U.S.
>>> ambassador to Hungary when the Iron Curtain fell,
>>> and Michael
>>> Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official
>>> and longtime
>>> advocate for human rights and religious freedom.
>>> They argue that
>>> if the GIFC can get sufficient funding to scale up
>>> their tools,
>>> authoritarian regimes will be brought to their knees.
>>>
>>> The State Department has come under fire in the
>>> Journal, the
>>> Washington Post and the New York Times for failing
>>> to support
>>> GIFC. And it's true that of the $20 million already
>>> allocated,
>>> most went to other groups that are less radioactive
>>> as far as
>>> U.S.-China relations are concerned. Some of these
>>> groups work to
>>> help activists with training and security against
>>> surveillance,
>>> cyber-attacks and other threats, in addition to
>>> circumventing
>>> censorship.
>>>
>>> In August, $1.5 million out of $5 million available
>>> for 2009 was
>>> finally awarded by the State Department to the GIFC
>>> via the
>>> Broadcasting Board of Governors. The bidding process
>>> for a
>>> remaining $30 million is expected to start soon.
>>> With the
>>> mid-term elections now finished, we can look forward
>>> to a new
>>> surge in the war over who gets to be hero of the
>>> fairy tale
>>> "Toppling the Iron Curtain 2.0"
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The GIFC tools are the most adopted circumvention tools
>>> among the
>>> users in Iran. I am stating this fact based on what I
>>> see in the
>>> log files of Balatarin and what I was told by other
>>> people who run
>>> major Iranian websites. Also, I know that other
>>> circumvention tool
>>> projects have received much more funding than the $1.5
>>> million
>>> which GIFC is going to get. For that matter, it
>>> completely makes
>>> sense for the GIFC to ask for political support in the
>>> congress to
>>> pressure the State Department in spending the money on
>>> the project
>>> which has been delivering the numbers.
>>>
>>> -mehdi
>>>
>>>
>>> On Nov 18, 2010, at 8:14 PM, Rebecca MacKinnon wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704104104575622080860055498.html
>>>
>>> NOVEMBER 18, 2010, 10:21 A.M. ET
>>>
>>> No Quick Fixes for Internet Freedom
>>> The hard work to promote free speech online has
>>> barely begun.
>>>
>>> By REBECCA MACKINNON
>>>
>>> Just before U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
>>> arrived in
>>> Hanoi late last month, Vietnamese authorities
>>> redoubled their
>>> assault on Internet dissent. Two more bloggers were
>>> arrested and
>>> another due to be released had his sentence
>>> extended. Dissident
>>> websites came under cyber attack, taking them
>>> offline at a time
>>> when they most needed to be visible.
>>>
>>> Meanwhile in Washington, a battle is raging over
>>> funding for
>>> organizations and projects supporting "Internet
>>> freedom." Like
>>> many Washington fights, this one makes it harder for
>>> the U.S.
>>> government to help real people with real problems.
>>>
>>> I study how governments seek to stifle and control
>>> online
>>> dissent. Activists from the Middle East to Asia to
>>> the former
>>> Soviet states have all been telling me that they
>>> suffer from
>>> increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks. Such
>>> attacks disable
>>> activists' websites at politically crucial times.
>>> Email accounts
>>> are hacked and computer systems are breached,
>>> enabling intruders
>>> to install spyware and monitor every electronic
>>> move. They are
>>> desperate for training and technical help to fight
>>> increasingly
>>> sophisticated, well-funded adversaries.
>>>
>>> The cyber-attacks are one of several new and
>>> intractable problems
>>> faced by online activists, alongside the older and
>>> more clear-cut
>>> problem of Internet censorship. A number of repressive
>>> governments, including Vietnam, Iran and China,
>>> block local
>>> Internet users from accessing politically sensitive
>>> overseas
>>> websites, as well as commercial social networking
>>> services like
>>> Facebook and Twitter. Anybody can get around this
>>> blockage if
>>> they know how to use what is called "circumvention
>>> technology."
>>> Several U.S-based organizations have developed a
>>> range of
>>> circumvention tools.
>>>
>>> Tools for circumventing censorship are indeed
>>> important for
>>> activists. But they do nothing to protect against
>>> cyber-attacks,
>>> or to address a growing number of other ways that
>>> governments
>>> work to prevent activists from using the Internet to
>>> access
>>> information, get their message out, and organize.
>>> Still, many in
>>> Congress and the media have bought into the fantasy
>>> that all the
>>> U.S. needs to do is put enough money into these
>>> circumvention
>>> tools, and one in particular—and freedom will flood
>>> through the
>>> crumbling firewalls.
>>>
>>> Since 2007, Congress has inserted a total of $50
>>> million of
>>> earmarks into the State Department's budget to fund
>>> organizations
>>> dedicated to fighting Internet censorship. One group
>>> that has
>>> been lobbying hard for the money is the Global
>>> Internet Freedom
>>> Consortium, run mainly by practitioners of the Falun
>>> Gong, a
>>> religious sect banned in China. The GIFC has
>>> produced a suite of
>>> circumvention tools that work well, as long as the
>>> user doesn't
>>> mind that GIFC engineers can see their unencrypted
>>> communications, or that the security of the tool has
>>> not been
>>> vetted by independent experts.
>>>
>>> The GIFC has found powerful allies in Mark Palmer,
>>> who was U.S.
>>> ambassador to Hungary when the Iron Curtain fell,
>>> and Michael
>>> Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official
>>> and longtime
>>> advocate for human rights and religious freedom.
>>> They argue that
>>> if the GIFC can get sufficient funding to scale up
>>> their tools,
>>> authoritarian regimes will be brought to their knees.
>>>
>>> The State Department has come under fire in the
>>> Journal, the
>>> Washington Post and the New York Times for failing
>>> to support
>>> GIFC. And it's true that of the $20 million already
>>> allocated,
>>> most went to other groups that are less radioactive
>>> as far as
>>> U.S.-China relations are concerned. Some of these
>>> groups work to
>>> help activists with training and security against
>>> surveillance,
>>> cyber-attacks and other threats, in addition to
>>> circumventing
>>> censorship.
>>>
>>> In August, $1.5 million out of $5 million available
>>> for 2009 was
>>> finally awarded by the State Department to the GIFC
>>> via the
>>> Broadcasting Board of Governors. The bidding process
>>> for a
>>> remaining $30 million is expected to start soon.
>>> With the
>>> mid-term elections now finished, we can look forward
>>> to a new
>>> surge in the war over who gets to be hero of the
>>> fairy tale
>>> "Toppling the Iron Curtain 2.0"
>>>
>>> Meanwhile in real life, the human rights watchdog
>>> organization
>>> Freedom House warns of a "global freedom recession."
>>> They point
>>> to a decrease in online freedom even in many
>>> countries that
>>> engage in little or no website blocking.
>>>
>>> Take Russia, for example. In a new book published by
>>> the Open Net
>>> Initiative, "Access Controlled," University of
>>> Toronto scholars
>>> Rafal Rohozinski and Ronald Deibert point out that
>>> while the
>>> Russian government doesn't block many websites, it
>>> stifles online
>>> dissent in a range of other ways. Government critics
>>> in Russia
>>> face cyber-attacks, surveillance, and good
>>> old-fashioned
>>> intimidation.
>>>
>>> In a growing number of countries including China,
>>> domestic
>>> Internet companies are enlisted in this effort
>>> through regulatory
>>> pressures. Laws and mechanisms originally meant to
>>> enforce
>>> copyright, protect children and fight online crime
>>> are abused to
>>> silence or intimidate political critics.
>>>
>>> In real life, conceiving and implementing an
>>> effective set of
>>> policies, programs, and tools for promoting a free
>>> and open
>>> global Internet requires hard work by both the
>>> public and private
>>> sectors. This work has barely begun.
>>>
>>> A range of fast-evolving technical problems requires
>>> an array of
>>> solutions. Activists around the world need technical
>>> assistance
>>> and training in order to fight cyber-attacks more
>>> effectively. We
>>> need more coordination between human rights
>>> activists, technology
>>> companies and policy makers just to understand the
>>> problems, and
>>> how they can be expected to evolve in the next few
>>> years.
>>>
>>> What's more, existing research indicates that many
>>> of the
>>> problems aren't technical, but rather political,
>>> legal,
>>> regulatory and even social. Other obstacles to free
>>> expression
>>> are probably best addressed by the private sector:
>>> Social
>>> networking platforms like Facebook and Twitter
>>> should be urged to
>>> adhere to business practices that maximize the safety
>>> of
>>> activists using their platforms.
>>>
>>> Circumvention technology is one tactic to support
>>> access to
>>> information and online dissent. It makes sense to
>>> keep funding
>>> these tools, so long as activists are given choice.
>>> On their own,
>>> however, they are not the silver bullet that many
>>> claim. The
>>> State Department and Congress need to approach
>>> freedom of speech
>>> issues strategically, based on a clear understanding
>>> of purpose
>>> and effect.
>>>
>>> Ms. MacKinnon is a Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow
>>> at the New
>>> America Foundation.
>>>
>>> --
>>> Rebecca MacKinnon
>>> Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation
>>> Co-founder, GlobalVoicesOnline.org
>>> <http://GlobalVoicesOnline.org/>
>>>
>>> Cell: +1-617-939-3493
>>> E-mail: rebecca.mackinnon at gmail.com
>>> <mailto:rebecca.mackinnon at gmail.com>
>>> <mailto:rebecca.mackinnon at gmail.com
>>> <mailto:rebecca.mackinnon at gmail.com>>
>>>
>>> Blog: http://RConversation.blogs.com
>>> <http://RConversation.blogs.com/>
>>> Twitter: http://twitter.com/rmack
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> liberationtech mailing list
>>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Should you need to change your subscription options,
>>> please go to:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>
>>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click
>>> "yes" (once
>>> you click above) next to "would you like to receive
>>> list mail
>>> batched in a daily digest?"
>>>
>>> You will need the user name and password you receive
>>> from the
>>> list moderator in monthly reminders.
>>>
>>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact
>>> the list
>>> moderator.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> liberationtech mailing list
>>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Should you need to change your subscription options,
>>> please go to:
>>>
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>
>>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes"
>>> (once you
>>> click above) next to "would you like to receive list
>>> mail batched
>>> in a daily digest?"
>>>
>>> You will need the user name and password you receive
>>> from the list
>>> moderator in monthly reminders.
>>>
>>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the
>>> list
>>> moderator.
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> liberationtech mailing list
>>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Should you need to change your subscription options, please
>>> go to:
>>>
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>
>>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes"
>>> (once you
>>> click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail
>>> batched in a
>>> daily digest?"
>>>
>>> You will need the user name and password you receive from
>>> the list
>>> moderator in monthly reminders.
>>>
>>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the
>>> list moderator.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> liberationtech mailing list
>>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>> <mailto:liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
>>>
>>> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>>>
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>
>>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once
>>> you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail
>>> batched in a daily digest?"
>>>
>>> You will need the user name and password you receive from the
>>> list moderator in monthly reminders.
>>>
>>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list
>>> moderator.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> liberationtech mailing list
>>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>>
>>> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>>>
>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>
>>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click
>>> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily
>>> digest?"
>>>
>>> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list
>>> moderator in monthly reminders.
>>>
>>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> liberationtech mailing list
>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>>
>> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>>
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>
>> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click
>> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily
>> digest?"
>>
>> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list
>> moderator in monthly reminders.
>>
>> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Berkman Center for Internet and Society |
> https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/jyork
> jilliancyork.com | @jilliancyork | tel: +1-857-891-4244
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> liberationtech mailing list
> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>
> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click
> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily
> digest?"
>
> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list
> moderator in monthly reminders.
>
> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/attachments/20101122/c9d68e7e/attachment.html>
More information about the liberationtech
mailing list