[liberationtech] Secrets, Lies, and Account Recovery: Lessons from the Use of Personal Knowledge Questions at Google

Yosem Companys ycompanys at gmail.com
Thu Jul 30 22:29:17 CEST 2020


We examine the first large real-world data set on personal knowledge
question’s security and memorability from their deployment at Google. Our
analysis confirms that secret questions generally offer a security level
that is far lower than user-chosen passwords. It turns out to be even lower
than proxies such as the real distribution of surnames in the population
would indicate. Surprisingly, we found that a significant cause of this
insecurity is that users often don’t answer truthfully. A user survey we
conducted revealed that a significant fraction of users (37%) who admitted
to providing fake answers did so in an attempt to make them "harder to
guess" although on aggregate this behavior had the opposite effect as
people "harden"their answers predictably. On the usability side, we show
that secret answers  have  surprisingly poor memorability despite the
assumption that reliability motivates their continued deployment. From
millions of account recovery attempts we observed a significant fraction of
users (e.g. 40%of our English-speaking US users) were unable to recall
their answers when needed. This is lower than the success rate of
alternative recovery mechanisms such as SMS reset codes (over 80%).
Comparing question strength and memorability reveals that the questions
that are potentially the most secure (e.g. what is your first phone number)
are also the ones with the worst memorability. We conclude that it appears
next to impossible to find secret questions that are both secure and
memorable. Secret questions continue to have some use when combined with
other signals, but they should not be used alone and best practice should
favor more reliable alternative.

https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en/us/pubs/archive/43783.pdf
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