[liberationtech] Android KeyStore Vulnerability: which tools are affected?

[Nathan of Guardian]

None of the Guardian Project apps or libraries rely on KeyStore. We use
our own CacheWord library for key management.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016, at 07:29 AM, carlo von lynX wrote:
> Which of the popular libtech tools are affected by this paper?
> 
> ///++---- 8< ----
> 
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/677/20160706:055348
> 
> 
> Breaking Into the KeyStore: A Practical Forgery Attack Against Android
> KeyStore
> 
> Mohamed Sabt and Jacques Traoré
> 
> Abstract: We analyze the security of Android KeyStore, a system service
> whose purpose is to shield users credentials and cryptographic keys. The
> KeyStore protects the integrity and the confidentiality of keys by using
> a particular encryption scheme. Our main results are twofold. First, we
> formally prove that the used encryption scheme does not provide
> integrity, which means that an attacker is able to undetectably modify
> the stored keys. Second, we exploit this flaw to define a forgery attack
> breaching the security guaranteed by the KeyStore. In particular, our
> attack allows a malicious application to make mobile apps to unwittingly
> perform secure protocols using weak keys. The threat is concrete: the
> attacker goes undetected while compromising the security of users. Our
> findings highlight an important fact: intuition often goes wrong when
> security is concerned. Unfortunately, system designers still tend to
> choose cryptographic schemes not for their proved security but for their
> apparent simplicity. We show, once again, that this is not a good choice,
> since it usually results in severe consequences for the whole underlying
> system.
> 
> Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Android KeyStore,
> authenticated encryption, integrity
> 
> Original Publication (with minor differences): ESORICS 2016
> 
> Date: received 5 Jul 2016
> 
> Contact author: sabt mohamed at gmail com
> 
> Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
> 
> Version: 20160706:055348 (All versions of this report)
> 
> Short URL: ia.cr/2016/677
> 
> 
> -- 
>   E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using encryption:
>          http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/
>           irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX
>          https://psyced.org:34443/LynX/
> -- 
> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
> of list guidelines will get you moderated:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech.
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator
> at companys at stanford.edu.


-- 
  Nathan of Guardian
  nathan at guardianproject.info