[liberationtech] Any project missing on the updated map of a "GNU Internet" ?

[realcr]

Hi Jonathan,
I went over my spam mail folder I found your email, which is obviously not
spam.
I use gmail. This is what gmail said about your email:

"""
*Why is this message in Spam?* It has a from address in yahoo.com but has
failed yahoo.com's required tests for authentication.
"""

Strange. I wonder what are yahoo's tests for authentication.

Regards,
real.

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 8:37 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Glad to see you finally removed Oneswarm. :)
>
> I personally find your chart difficult to read.  Nevertheless, I have a
> suggestion
> that I believe would improve its quality for a general audience:
>
> You really need a color that means "available and widely-used".
>
> You can probably just ask the respective devs whether their software is
> widely-used, and
> they'll give you an honest answer.  However as a shortcut just ask:
>
> 1) Do the devs of other projects use this software as a point of reference?
> For example, Joanna (Qubes) and Patrick (Whonix) have both written publicly
> about TAILS (as has pretty much every other serious security expert).  That
> doesn't mean one should necessarily use it, but it does mean the user has
> a better chance of understanding the benefits and costs of using that piece
> of software.
> 2) Is the software usable by non-technical people?  If not it's less likely
> to have a lot of users.
>
> As an example-- Gnunet filesharing may technically be "available", but I
> haven't
> used it successfully nor heard of a single person using it successfully.
> (I even
> asked on their irc and nobody there used it.)  TAILS, for better or worse,
> _is_
> anonymity on the web/net.  It's misleading to use the same color for those
> two
> pieces of software.
>
> -Jonathan
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 5, 2015 10:51 AM, carlo von lynX <
> lynX at time.to.get.psyced.org> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 04:17:05PM +0200, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote:
> > Well, we don't have build farms for ARM, so it is common for people to
> > build all there, for example. Following upstream means building more than
> > gentoo, because the dependencies are totally explicit at any point.
>
> Oh, good to know. On the other hand it should be safe to randomly use
> prebuilt binaries because all binaries are reproducible, so a malevolent
> provider cannot know in advance which packages will be checked for
> reproducibility... yes?
>
> > As for the rest of your advices, I'm quite aware about the uses of
> > leaked metadata, the problems of xmpp, etc. :) I quite follow the
> project.
> > I just wanted to help have more pieces in the map - I do not consider
> > them a final solution.
>
> Yes, none of the things on the map solve the entire puzzle. There's
> plenty of redundancy while at the same time there isn't a complete
> stack ready to go, let alone several.
>
> > Maybe you could mention also somewhere that modern PGP thing (which is
> pgp at
> > the end): keybase.io. It just came to mind.
>
> There are several stop-gap opportunistic approaches to key retrieval
> around.. pEp, LEAP. I think we should be leveraging the social graph
> for key acquisition instead, with a private distributed implementation
> like GNS for example. You use it like an address book and your social
> network guarantees that you picked the correct public key, without
> any state authority knowing anything.
>
>
> --
>   E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using encryption:
>         http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/
>           irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX
>         https://psyced.org:34443/LynX/
>
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