[liberationtech] Joint submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression

Andrés Leopoldo Pacheco Sanfuentes alps6085 at gmail.com
Tue Feb 10 17:04:51 PST 2015


Kool, but by now we know that "anonymity" is almost a joke, given the NSA++
revelations, so what does the UN (actually, isn't the UN composed of
"governments," the same that are the culprit for Human Rights and
'<privacy>' EN MINÚSCULAS, VIOLATIONS, EN MAYÚSCULAS?) will do about that?
short of Ayotzinapa parents going to Ginebra, that is, Geneva, in one of
the official languages of Switzerland, "the rest is literature!"

He Dicho.

Este mensaje se autodestruirá en cinco segundos después que lo lea,
estimado lector, gracias a la NSA etcétera, etcétera, como diría el tipo
ese de "Super Agent 86" and stuff!


Best Regards | Cordiales Saludos | Grato,

Andrés L. Pacheco Sanfuentes
<alps at acm.org>
+1 (347) 766-5008

On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Ronald Deibert <r.deibert at utoronto.ca>
wrote:

> Dear LibTech
>
>
> *Joint submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression*
> February 10, 2015
>
> In response to the call for submissions of the United Nations Special
> Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression regarding the use of
> encryption and anonymity in digital communications, the Citizen Lab
> and independent researcher Collin Anderson have submitted a joint analysis,
> entitled “The need for democratization of digital security solutions to
> ensure the right to freedom of expression.” The submission explores the
> essential role of digital security tools, particularly encryption and
> anonymity software, in protecting the rights to freedom of expression and
> privacy of civil society actors, many of which are subject to
> politically-motivated digital surveillance and censorship.
>
> As an Appendix to our analysis, we include a chart on the relationship
> between civil society requirements for effective and secure digital
> communications, and the use of encryption or anonymity tools. This table is
> not exhaustive and should be considered a first attempt at elaborating on
> the types of information security risks posed to freedom of expression and
> privacy. Properly implemented and non-backdoored encryption can reduce
> exposure to certain forms of mass surveillance and provide users the
> opportunity to remain in control of their information despite efforts to
> compromise it, including interception and hacking. However, this analysis
> also demonstrates that encryption is not a panacea for the diversity of
> physical and digital threats that at-risk individuals face on a daily basis.
>
> We look forward to further developing this resource and encourage members
> of the technical community, civil society, journalists, and others to
> critique the form and content of the Appendix.
>
> The full submission can be found at the following link:
> https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SR-FOE-submission.pdf
>  [PDF}
>
>
> Ronald Deibert
> Director, the Citizen Lab
> and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies
> Munk School of Global Affairs
> University of Toronto
> (416) 946-8916
> PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt
> http://deibert.citizenlab.org/
> twitter.com/citizenlab
> r.deibert at utoronto.ca
>
>
>
>
> --
> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
> of list guidelines will get you moderated:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech.
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
> companys at stanford.edu.
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/attachments/20150210/25ebcd50/attachment.html>


More information about the liberationtech mailing list