[liberationtech] TrueCrypt Alternatives?

[Huned Botee]

Eleanor, maybe you can help shed some light on this "lack of awareness."
How do you think developers should be analyzing risk here? Do you have
specific suggestions and/or can you point to sources where that information
can be found?

On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:

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> On 2014.09.30 18.01, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> > Hi Eleanor, I understand the logic of the argument, but are there
> > news stories about people being harmed in the field due
> > specifically (or mainly) to deniability of the software they are
> > using?  (Or research on the topic, though I'm not sure how it could
> > be a falsifiable or reproducible.)
>
> I don't have any field stories that I have permission to share, but
> yes, I've heard of specific incidents.  More generally, it represents
> an utter lack of awareness on the part of developers for the security
> risk analysis choices faced by individuals actually at risk.
>
> E.
>
> - --
> Ideas are my favorite toys.
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