[liberationtech] Snakeoil and suspicious encryption services

[coderman]

On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric at gmail.com> wrote:
> ... including your focus on elementary mitm
> issue, your arguments and judgement are so basic that I am wondering why I
> am answering it, you should do some reading, and if you can trivially defeat
> Peersm, then just show us how

problems with js crypto:
- side channels / non constant run time
- lack of access to robust entropy sources
- unless delivered over pinned HTTPS with CSP vulnerable to mitm attack
- unless an extension, vulnerable to code injection or malicious servers
- even as extension, keeps keys in address space of browser with rich
attack surface. (this is true for SSL/TLS as well)


contrast this with a configuration where key material is kept isolated
from the rich browser attack surface through low level protections,
e.g. Qubes throwaway browser app vm talking to hidden service.  A
separate Tor VM would contain keys for your client on the network and
accessing hidden sites, while the vulnerability rich browser speaks
over this transparent channel managed outside its purview.

for advanced threats, isolation and defense in depth are paramount.
peersm is inherently limited in this regard, not matter how many other
pitfalls it successfully avoids.

unfortunately strong isolation and defense in depth are even more
difficult to make easy to use, once again highlighting the
complexities of usability and security in privacy enhancing
technologies.

best regards,