[liberationtech] LUKS "Self-Destruct" feature introduced in Kali Linux

Amin Sabeti aminsabeti at gmail.com
Fri Jan 31 02:31:56 PST 2014


In the Iran case, I think using TrueCrypt would be better because hiding
files is more important than destroying it. For instance, it would be not
practical to destroy files when the authorities confiscate your laptop.


On 30 January 2014 20:54, Sean Lynch <seanl at literati.org> wrote:

>
> On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 1:00 AM, Maxim Kammerer <mk at dee.su> wrote:
>
>>
>> I can't think of a scenario where this functionality would be useful.
>> Reminds me of Greenwald using his boyfriend as a data mule  —
>> simultaneously trusting and mistrusting cryptography due to lack of
>> understanding of the concepts involved. If you want to move data
>> safely, encrypt it with an automatically-generated password of
>> sufficient entropy, and transmit the password separately — there is no
>> need to transmit the whole LUKS keyslot, which is large, and is just a
>> technical detail.
>>
>
> I don't think even this is useful. It'd be as easy or easier to go get the
> separately transmitted key than to get you to reveal it, and the same
> tactics that would get you to reveal the key could also get you to reveal
> its location or the identity of whoever has the key.
>
> In the more likely scenario, it's unlikely the bad guys are going to make
> any distinction between your refusing to reveal the key and your being
> unable to reveal the key. It's not like they're going to say "Damn, we've
> lost. Well, just let them go, then!"
>
> The only real protection from being compelled to reveal a key is for the
> bad guys not to know the encrypted data even exists.
>
> --
> Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations
> of list guidelines will get you moderated:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech.
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
> companys at stanford.edu.
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/attachments/20140131/0a59db56/attachment.html>


More information about the liberationtech mailing list