[liberationtech] Concerns with new Stanford University security mandate
Paul Ferguson
fergdawgster at mykolab.com
Sun Jan 26 08:07:27 PST 2014
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On 1/26/2014 2:36 AM, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 01:20:20AM -0800, Tomer Altman wrote:
>> To Liberation Tech:
>>
>> Stanford is implementing a new security policy detailed here:
>>
>> http://ucomm.stanford.edu/computersecurity/
>
> First, if they were serious about security, they wouldn't be using
> Microsoft products.
>
> Second, backdooring end-user systems en masse provides one-stop
> shopping to an attacker.
>
> Third, "locating PII on systems" is not a solved problem in
> computing, and for anyone to pretend otherwise is, at best,
> disengenuous. Not only that, but anyone who's been paying
> attention to the re-identification problem knows that non-PII is
> quite often just as sensitive.
>
> Fourth, the simultaneous requirement that systems be backdoored and
> searchable while their disks are encrypted strongly suggests that
> they intend to have a central repository of encryption keys.
>
> Fifth, the requirement for use of centralized backup also provides
> one-stop shopping to an attacker.
>
> Bottom line: this isn't about security, it's about control and
> monitoring.
>
> ---rsk
>
I've got to agree with Rich here -- this *is* about control & monitoring.
Having said that, saying that this policy is simply about "security"
is not quite correct -- it is about controlling *employee" access to,
and handling of, sensitive information in the Stanford University
computer network systems.
But let's remember that there are *different types* of security: Ones
which control & monitor, others which attempt to protect
organizational users from external threats, etc.
I don't believe this is pretty much /de rigueur/ and appropriate for
virtually any organization which wishes to protect sensitive
information, and provide some accountability.
Remember: Employee prescriptive measures are different that
non-employee measures.
- - ferg
- --
Paul Ferguson
PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2
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