[liberationtech] Many VPNs and Psiphon are currently blocked in Iran right now

Sat Feb 22 11:40:36 PST 2014

On 22 February 2014 19:17, Brian Conley <brianc at smallworldnews.tv> wrote:

> Amin,
>
> Do Iranians ever attempt checking the mobile versions of these sites? In
> my experience even in low bandwidth environments, if you are patient, the
> mobile sites work much better.
>
Unfortunately, TOR is famous as a slow tool in Iran! I haven't checked with
users inside the country about the mobile version. I'll hope it works
better than the desktop version.

> Perhaps this is a combination of lack of awareness and lack of patience. I
> understand Iranian youth and folks only concerned with general internet use
> may lack patience, but activists journalists and civil society members
> should be taught practical steps and be encouraged to recognize the
> internet is not magic, therefore sometimes patience is a necessity. There
> are such varying responses any the usability of tor and other products
> inside Iran it seems likely there is a dearth of practical knowledge and an
> excess of user error.
>
Based on my experience, journalists and activists don't care about their
security because there are lot of myths that the government can monitor
everything and they cannot do anything! Unfortunately, there is lack of
knowledge in Iran and cyber activists need to be trained. BTW, general
users don't care about security and the important thing for them is access.
I thing Nariman talked about general users.

Cheers,

A

> 
>
On Feb 22, 2014 11:04 AM, "Amin Sabeti" <aminsabeti at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> The important point that we must not forget is the first priority for
>> users in Iran is access. It means users would like to check their FB &
>> Twitter accounts. Therefore, TOR is not feasible solution for them because
>> they have not high speed internet connection.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> A
>>
>>
>> On 22 February 2014 03:21, Nathan of Guardian <
>> nathan at guardianproject.info> wrote:
>>
>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>> Hash: SHA1
>>>
>>> On 02/21/2014 09:54 PM, Nima Fatemi wrote:
>>> > Nariman Gharib:
>>> >>> so if anybody can help me to tell me which these tools in below
>>> >>> are safe it would be great.
>>> > I've double checked that Tor works just fine in Iran. This is for
>>> > both vanilla (normal Tor Browser Bundle) and Pluggable Transports
>>> > Bundle (including but not limited to obfsproxy).
>>> >
>>> > Android users can use Orbot to access Tor network.
>>> >
>>> > I believe we have the necessary tools, what we certainly need here
>>> > is to educate ppl on how to use it safely.
>>>
>>> Yes, my question is why Nariman didn't have Orbot on his list in the
>>> first place? Perhaps people don't consider Tor to be a VPN, or don't
>>> know it is available on Android?
>>>
>>> - From the Tor metrics site (and as Nima said), there seems to be about
>>> 25,000 active Tor sessions per day from Iran, via direct access (not
>>> using a bridge):
>>>
>>> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-relay-country&start=2013-11-24&end=2014-02-22&country=ir&events=off#userstats-relay-country
>>>
>>> We receive many emails each day from users in Iran, and it is
>>> definitely working for a good number of them. I know that with Google
>>> Play Store, Iranian users can search for Orbot, but when they try to
>>> download it, it is blocked with a 403 Forbidden error by a filter on
>>> the Iranian side. We do however offer direct downloads of our software
>>> (see the support link below)
>>>
>>> Maybe we need to create a version of this tutorial that can be
>>> published in Farsi on a site people visit?
>>>
>>> https://guardianproject.info/howto/browsefreely/
>>>
>>> We've also recently created a simple support message that could be
>>> sent out, to help people debug issues they might be having access
>>> downloads, configuring the software and so on:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://dev.guardianproject.info/projects/support/wiki/Orbot_Auto_Response
>>>
>>> As for the other solutions, the only one that looks trustworthy is
>>> Shadowsocks, though it is just a SOCK5 proxy system, which means it is
>>> limited to the amount of proxy server IPs you can setup and host.
>>>
>>> +n
>>>
>>>
>>>
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