[liberationtech] New protocol sacrifices bandwidth for metadata privacy

[Aymeric Vitte]

Le 12/08/2014 22:12, Marc W. Abel a écrit :
> On 08/12/2014 05:19 AM, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
>> I don't know what is the state of the art regarding this but is there
>> not a way while parsing the slots to determine that this one might have
>> your key so you don't have to decrypt everything and just decrypt the
>> slots that might have it? (I have a similar issue with Peersm to check
>> the pieces)
>
>
> Hi Aymeric,
>
> By design, the answer is no.  I'd either be leaking key material 
> (directly or indirectly), or leaking metadata.

Not sure, the problematic is: you have some keys, you receive some 
encrypted packets, you MIGHT detect a pattern inside them that MIGHT 
indicate you that the packet knows one of your keys, the attacker can 
not do the same without knowing your keys, how to do this without 
spectacular computation, I don't know, that's why I am raising this here.

Maybe this does not exist at all, would be surprising...

Regards,

-- 
Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms