[liberationtech] Google Unveils Tools to Access Web From Repressive Countries | TIME.com

[Jillian C. York]

Since I already have more skepticism of Google Ideas and Jared Cohen than I
need, let me pose this question:

With the understanding that uProxy provides no anonymity protections, *is
it providing anything that other circumvention tools do not already?*
What's unique about it?


On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Dan Staples <
danstaples at opentechinstitute.org> wrote:

> And keep in mind, the uProxy project doesn't seem to be trying to
> provide anonymity, only uncensored internet access. There are many
> challenges to anonymity that a simple browser plugin can't solve.
> Browsers are extremely easy to fingerprint, which is why Tor is now
> being packaged as an entire browser bundle.
>
> What I'm most curious about is how much information about the users of
> uProxy will be collected and analyzed by Google and shared with its
> partners.
>
> Dan
>
> On 10/21/2013 06:09 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote:
> > On 21-10-13 22:49, Nick wrote:
> >> Despite the provenence of the story, I'm still suprised there was no
> >> mention of Google's cooperation with repressive elements of its own
> >> government through PRISM and the like. Or (though this is probably
> >> far too optimistic) a mention of whether surveillance as overarching
> >> paradigm is compatible with the sort of self-representation they
> >> offer here.
> >>
> > google is a many headed dragon, like the US government, with one head
> > canceling out some actions of others. It is a shame that those heads are
> > not all the same size (like DoD vs State). Still I would encourage the
> > small heads to go on and do their work.
> >
> >>
> >> I also wonder how anonymous it is for the relay side - whether it's
> >> really just an interface to Tor bridge nodes, and therefore the
> >> relay can't see everything their "friend" is up to, or if it's a
> >> straight proxy. I would guess the latter as their emphasis seems to
> >> be completely about helping people hop out of their country's
> >> repressive internet policies.
> >
> > Seeing the description and the involvement of brave new software I
> > assume it is related to or a rename of Lantern, lantern is a proxy
> > software that uses the google social graph to find access. Maybe someone
> > from BNS could elaborate
> >
> > In terms of threat model it would be reasonable to trust the 'friend' in
> > this scenario, I would be more concerned with adversary externaly
> > observing the connections, seeing that a group of people from within
> > country X are connecting to the same ip in country Y , thus relating
> > those people in that group as sharing a node in a social graph, so to
> > eachother, while they might not have seen them as related before..
> >
> >
> > Cheers, Sacha
> >
> >
> >
>
> --
> Dan Staples
>
> Open Technology Institute
> https://commotionwireless.net
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