[liberationtech] Tor Exit Nodes Mapped and Located | HackerTarget.com

[Ali-Reza Anghaie]

Jacob also shared his map tool (updated every 5m):

http://freehaven.net/~ioerror/maps/v3-tormap.html

-Ali



On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 PM, <liberationtech at lewman.us> wrote:

> On Sun, 10 Mar 2013 11:32:20 -0700
> Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu> wrote:
>
> > http://hackertarget.com/tor-exit-node-visualization/
> >
> > Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped
>
> Tor includes a Network Map which also maps nodes across a Mercator
> projection of the globe. I don't understand this fetish with Google
> mapping everything (why not openstreetmap? why not doing lat/long
> coordinate mapping on your own map?). However, it apparently exists. Ok,
> moving on.
>
> The usage of blutmagie is an interesting choice, when
> https://metrics.torproject.org/ and https://compass.torproject.org/ and
> https://atlas.torproject.org/ all exist with gobs more data, including
> the raw source data on which all of those sites are built. Freegeoip.net
> uses the same MaxMind GeoList database we do. Google has it's own GeoIP
> database as well. I wonder which one is most accurate.
>
> What's more valuable to me is the list of exit relays by ISP.
> Intuitively, it makes sense. Cheap, well-connected server providers are
> going to be attractive to those running Tor relays (exits or not). I
> take this list to mean, "this is the list of ISPs who care about
> Internet freedom". It sure seems small.
>
> The other implication here is that Tor exits can be monitored. Yes, we
> know. We've been saying this for a decade. Here's one blog post about
> it, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/plaintext-over-tor-still-plaintext.
> It's part of the reason the EFF and Tor write HTTPS Everywhere for
> Chrome and Firefox, https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere.
>
> Your ISP can watch your traffic too, and inject ads or redirect DNS. In
> fact, there's a billion dollar market for traffic management at ISPs.
> I'm assuming this means the providers are looking to manage Tor traffic
> as well.
>
> For me, the visualization is a cool map, a product pitch for
> hackertarget llc, and just raises some implications for operational
> security.
>
> Larger questions it raises in my mind are about AS-aware routing,
> what does it mean to have a large concentration of exit relays in
> pro-freedom ISPs, and what about legal jurisdictions and MLATs?
>
> There is some on-going work on the AS-awareness question, see
> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09 and
> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#oakland2012-lastor and
> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#ndss13-lira
>
> As for some measurement of anonymity and risk modulo concentration of
> exit relays? Who knows. Sounds like a fine project.
>
> And I know of at least one group working on the MLAT and legal
> arbitrage question as it relates to tor circuits and relays.
>
> I look forward to more analysis and proposed research theories to
> improve the Tor network in the future.
>
> --
> Andrew
> http://tpo.is/contact
> pgp 0x6B4D6475
> --
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