[liberationtech] Mailvelope: OpenPGP Encryption for Webmail

Ali-Reza Anghaie ali at packetknife.com
Sun Mar 10 12:58:22 PDT 2013


Looks like voices were heard - and other work was done -

http://www.mailvelope.com/blog/security-audit-and-v0.6-release

-Ali



On Mon, Dec 17, 2012 at 5:27 AM, Karel Bílek <kb at karelbilek.com> wrote:

> Because Thomas (the original developer of Mailvelope) wanted to let
> the extension work as it was, with the unsecure encryption inside DOM,
> I decided to fork his project and make a new one, which both encrypts
> and decrypts in a secure chrome pop-up.
>
> It's here, it's called ChromeGP.
> https://cryptoparty.cz/ChromeGP/
>
> Available on chrome web store here
>
> https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chromegp/pebhdbojdpjfidjbneklefmpojncdpmf
>
> and on github here
> https://github.com/runn1ng/ChromeGP
>
> There are two big issues with it - first is missing signing/signature
> control (which should be easy to implement, but we will see) and the
> second is OpenPGP's trouble with zip compression inside PGP (which,
> unfortunately, causes the default Thunderbird/Enigmail encryption fail
> to decrypt, I think).
>
> Feel free to share and/or criticize :)
>
> K
>
> On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 1:24 PM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> > ----- Forwarded message from StealthMonger <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>
> -----
> >
> > From: StealthMonger <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>
> > Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2012 23:22:28 +0000 (GMT)
> > To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Mailvelope: OpenPGP Encryption for Webmail
> > Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu>
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> > Uncle Zzzen <unclezzzen at gmail.com> writes:
> >
> >> [Weighty argument compelling closer study.]
> >
> > So unless and until the Mailvelope author(s) remedy this, support for
> > Mailvelope has to be muted.
> >
> > However, comparison with Cryptocat is still unfitting because
> > Cryptocat does not even pretend to do store-and-forward authenticated
> > email using public key cryptography.  In fact, its author asserts [1]
> >
> >    2. Cryptocat does not mean to compete with GPG, it means to replace *
> >    plaintext.*
> >
> > [1] Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2012 18:14:33 -0700 Message-ID:
> > <CAOZ60qDZfAdz35XJbWkad1vjtt3ZZKBp-tw2ipQ+sUEuZSkySA at mail.gmail.com>
> >
> > - --
> >
> >
> >  -- StealthMonger <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>
> >     Long, random latency is part of the price of Internet anonymity.
> >
> >    anonget: Is this anonymous browsing, or what?
> >
> http://groups.google.ws/group/alt.privacy.anon-server/msg/073f34abb668df33?dmode=source&output=gplain
> >
> >    stealthmail: Hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom.
> >    mailto:stealthsuite at nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20index.html
> >
> >
> > Key: mailto:stealthsuite at nym.mixmin.net?subject=send%20stealthmonger-key
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)
> > Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.9 <http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/
> >
> >
> > iEYEARECAAYFAlDI34wACgkQDkU5rhlDCl7RugCggOoq0oclCcZ/F2LPjUs3BIb5
> > AcUAnjeOtCVCLKzyqETqPvU1kFsgPnRk
> > =d7cd
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >
> > --
> > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
> > ----- End forwarded message -----
> > --
> > Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
> > ______________________________________________________________
> > ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
> > 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
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