[liberationtech] TipWire revisited

[Uncle Zzzen]

I don't know where we are along the scale between "crypto works" (as
Snowden says<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/17/edward-snowden-nsa-files-whistleblower#block-51bf3588e4b082a2ed2f5fc5>)
and the "NSA can break everything" trend on the list and the net in
general, but I still believe cracking - say - a gpg key [>1024 bit :)] or
compromising the end point has a cost, uses limited resources, etc.

If their resources are limited, there's safety in
numbers<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YeTkxy-sid8>,
and everything that makes people encrypt more (even an SSL KITTEH
GALRY<https://swatwt.com/pix/kitteh>)
reduces the signal to noise ratio and increases privacy in the world (or am
I being naive?).

Which brings us [again] to TipWire <https://swatwt.com/tipwire/>.
Thanks for your
criticism<https://github.com/thedod/whatmail/wiki/tipwire#criticism-so-far>so
far. I [believe I] did the necessary coding and/or word-weaving to
address it. I think I'm ready for some more.

The most important question is - of course - whether there's a basic flaw
in the concept. If there is one - there's no point discussing the rest of
the questions, but just in case:

   - Are there problems in the implementation?
   - How can we make it easier [for an end user] to use? (gui, text)
   - How can we make it easier [for an admin] to install? (docs, packaging)
   - What else can it be used *for*?(*)
   - Would you [or people/orgs you know] install one? If not, is there
   something that could be changed in order to make you reconsider?
   - Anything else you have in mind

Thanks in advance,
The Dod

(*) Tip: if you give it a vanity url like
https://dubiousdod.org/give-nsa-the-finger it can be mightier than a bling
in some circles ;)
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