[liberationtech] Why Metadata Matters

Kate Krauss katie at critpath.org
Thu Jun 6 16:15:03 PDT 2013


Hey Griffin,

Thanks for writing this. Can you quickly post this somewhere I can link to?
Or I can post it on the APP blog and link to that--

I think we should blast it all over. All over.

Katie (Krauss)

The AIDS Policy Project
www.AIDSPolicyProject.org


On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 5:45 PM, David Golumbia <dgolumbia at gmail.com> wrote:

> let's just presume that there are parallel arrangements with every other
> major provider of not just telephony but other forms of electronic
> communication. and a Google-like persistent shadow copy of whatever parts
> of the web can be reached. and some neat layers of indexing and
> categorization metadata of their own. that should bring the disks up to at
> least 5% full.
>
> which definitely leaves no room for a copy of the Bill of Rights (or, for
> that matter, the Constitution itself).
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 5:34 PM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb at ei8fdb.org>wrote:
>
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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>>
>> I'm glad someone brought up the NSA datacentre. I was thinking is there
>> any connection to this? How far is it to being finished? Is that public
>> knowledge/possible to find out?
>>
>> It wouldn't warrant this amount of data, which I would expect is pretty
>> small in comparison to the capabilities of this NSA datacentre?
>>
>> Probably too far fetched an idea...
>>
>> On 6 Jun 2013, at 22:27, Bruce Potter at IRF wrote:
>>
>> > The other point worth keeping in mind is that NSA can keep this data
>> forever (hence the humoungous cyber farm NSA is building in Utah) --
>> >
>> > So a decade from now they can check the metadata to see if it fits some
>> theory a paranoid analyst thinks might have happened half a lifetime ago.
>> >
>> > bp
>> >
>> >
>> > On Jun 6, 2013, at 1:44 PM, Griffin Boyce <griffinboyce at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >>  I see a lot of people wondering why metadata matters.  "But they
>> >> don't know *what* you're doing there!"  So I'll give a short example
>> >> to illustrate how metadata can be used to not only determine who
>> >> someone is talking to, but also to invade their privacy and uncover
>> >> the most intimate details of their life.
>> >>
>> >>  Jane is at 16th & L Street for an hour.
>> >>  Carla is at 16th & L Street for four hours. She's had a short visit
>> >> previously.
>> >>  James is at 16th & L Street for twenty minutes. He comes back at the
>> >> same time every week.
>> >>  Kris is at 16th & L Street for ten hours.
>> >>  Rick is at 16th & L Street for eight hours every night.
>> >>  Samantha has been there for three days and four hours.
>> >>
>> >> 16th & L Street is the address of a Planned Parenthood in Washington,
>> DC.
>> >>
>> >>  Jane is having a physical.
>> >>  Carla is having an abortion.
>> >>  James receives his medication there. By visit time, location, and
>> >> frequency, he is likely a trans guy. If his appointments were every
>> >> two weeks, the metadata would indicate that James is a trans woman.
>> >>  Kris is protesting there.
>> >>  Rick works in an office in the same building.
>> >>  Samantha dropped her phone in the Farragut West Metro Station and
>> >> has been looking for it ever since.
>> >>
>> >> And that's just location data. If one calls a physician every day,
>> >> perhaps they have a major medical problem. If a crime happens on the
>> >> other side of town, and you suddenly start calling attorneys... did
>> >> you do it?  There are numerous explanations for either of those
>> >> scenarios, but this kind of metadata in isolation can be used to tell
>> >> almost any story you want.
>> >>
>> >> Stay safe out there.
>> >>
>> >> best,
>> >> Griffin Boyce
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Technical Program Associate, Open Technology Institute
>> >> #Foucault / PGP: 0xAE792C97 / OTR: saint at jabber.ccc.de
>> >> --
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>> - --------------------------------------
>> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb
>>
>> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> David Golumbia
> dgolumbia at gmail.com
>
> --
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