[liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

[Albert López]

Ok, I understand what you mean. But why rely in a client-server approach when you can achieve your goal with a peer to peer solution? 

Btw, your questions are good and I'd like to know how they solve them.

> Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 05:11:19 -0700
> From: mmitar at gmail.com
> To: liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"
> 
> Hi!
> 
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Albert López
> <newlog at overflowedminds.net> wrote:
> > And who says so? If nobody is able to assure that, why should I use the app?
> > I mean that I wouldn't base the security of my communications in my guesses.
> > And if you do so because of usability, you are fucked, man.
> 
> You could still check the code of the client app. (If my hypothesis
> that client code will be open source, but server code will not be. And
> that crypto will be happening on the client.)
> 
> Additional note: I would like to see how they assure that what you
> have on the client is really the code which you checked. And how they
> will implement that the client code will also have payable addons.
> Maybe those addons will be sandboxed or something inside a trusted
> (open source) host (on the client). Or maybe the client will be
> completely open source, together with addons, and they will verify
> payment only on the server side. But then you have an issue of easier
> linking between user and its real identity. Hm hm hm.
> 
> Tricky issues. :-)
> 
> > It's not a matter of destroying an idea. It's a matter of giving your
> > opinion about the architectural bases of an idea...
> 
> So what architectural information about the system do we *know*?
> 
> 
> Mitar
> 
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