[liberationtech] secure download tool - doesn't exist?!?
Martin Uecker
uecker at eecs.berkeley.edu
Mon Jul 1 18:28:17 PDT 2013
Owen Barton <owen at civicactions.com> wrote:
> This is roughly what I was suggesting with the http header (fetching the
> hash with a TLS HEAD request even if the download itself is not TLS). I
> think this may be preferable to encoding the hash with the link, as it
> would work even with 3rd party links.
This has weaker security properties.
The user has to trust:
- everybody who has access to the server
- that the server has not been compromised
- a CA has not been compromised
- TLS is working correctly
- the source of the link
Compare this with self-certifying links: Having the hash in the
link guarantees that you got exactly the file the link specifies.
This secures an easy-to-understand and fundamental property of
a link. The user only has to trust the source of the link.
Martin
>
> Getting support in the browser or OS is critical, I agree - apart from the
> convenience factor, installing a secondary "secure download" tool is a
> catch 22 for the user.
>
> - O
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 4:22 PM, Martin Uecker <uecker at eecs.berkeley.edu>wrote:
>
> >
> > Jacob Appelbaum <jacob at appelbaum.net> wrote:
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > We need a secure downloading tool, we need it to be built into every OS
> > > by default and until then, we'll have to rely on tricks to hack it -
> > > preloading certs in browsers, having a website to download it from and
> > > so on.
> > >
> >
> > What we need are backwards compatible self-certifying URLs or hyperlinks,
> > e.g. something like this:
> >
> > <a href="./mysoftware.tgz"
> > hmac="sha1:da19d18ef86f4fb8fe8b61323806ec1764f9bf00">My software</a>
> > <a
> > href="./mysoftware.tgz#sha1:da19d18ef86f4fb8fe8b61323806ec1764f9bf00">My
> > software</a>
> >
> > And something similar to specify a public key.
> >
> > This would need to be standardized and supported by all major browsers.
> >
> > Martin
> >
> >
> > --
> > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by
> > emailing moderator at companys at stanford.edu or changing your settings at
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
>
>
>
More information about the liberationtech
mailing list