[liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES

[Nadim Kobeissi]

Good idea. I've added Bates's name as a recipient.


NK


On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:51 AM, Ryan Gallagher <ryan at rjgallagher.co.uk>wrote:

> Good work, more concise than the previous version and something about the
> general tone of the thing has been improved. Might it be worth also
> publicly CCing Tony Bates on the letter (he's pres of the Skype division at
> Microsoft)?
>
>
> On 18 January 2013 16:26, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:
>
>> Okay everyone,
>> the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious
>> collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to
>> keep your signature there (or add it!)
>>
>> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
>>
>> We'll be publishing next week.
>>
>>
>> NK
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <gregoire at rsf.org>wrote:
>>
>>>  We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters
>>> Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>>
>>> Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit :
>>>
>>> Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of
>>> reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you
>>> said into consideration.
>>>
>>>
>>> NK
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian <
>>> chris at soghoian.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government
>>>> surveillance section:
>>>>
>>>> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may
>>>> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered
>>>> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider,
>>>> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of
>>>> National Security Letters.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the
>>>> people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have
>>>> access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so,
>>>> say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it
>>>> doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an
>>>> interception,
>>>>
>>>>  Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance
>>>> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require
>>>> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I
>>>> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law
>>>> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons,
>>>> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without
>>>> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US
>>>> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702
>>>>
>>>>  Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as
>>>> 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of
>>>> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of
>>>> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a
>>>> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains
>>>> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not
>>>> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be
>>>> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney
>>>> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass
>>>> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint
>>>> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by
>>>> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for
>>>> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is
>>>> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United
>>>> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify
>>>> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized
>>>> probable cause determinations or supervise the program.
>>>> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to
>>>> sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>  Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists,
>>>>>
>>>>>  I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to
>>>>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories:
>>>>>
>>>>>  http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
>>>>>
>>>>>  The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome.
>>>>>
>>>>>  Thank you,
>>>>>  NK
>>>>>
>>>>>  --
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>>>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>> --
>>> Grégoire Pouget,
>>> New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias
>>> Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières
>>> @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr
>>> GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE
>>>
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