[liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES

[Sarah A. Downey]

Looks good, Nadim. Abine will stay signed on (it's just "Abine," not "Abine
Software," though). And I'd like to sign as an individual (Sarah A. Downey,
Esq.).

Thanks!

-Sarah


On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:

> Okay everyone,
> the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration
> of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your
> signature there (or add it!)
>
> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
>
> We'll be publishing next week.
>
>
> NK
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <gregoire at rsf.org> wrote:
>
>>  We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters
>> Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>>
>> Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit :
>>
>> Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of
>> reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you
>> said into consideration.
>>
>>
>> NK
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian <chris at soghoian.net
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government
>>> surveillance section:
>>>
>>> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may
>>> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered
>>> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider,
>>> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of
>>> National Security Letters.
>>>
>>>
>>>  You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people
>>> signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to
>>> real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that,
>>> and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't
>>> specify under what situations the government can perform an interception,
>>>
>>>  Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance
>>> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require
>>> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I
>>> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law
>>> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons,
>>> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without
>>> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US
>>> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702
>>>
>>>  Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as 50
>>> U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of
>>> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of
>>> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a
>>> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains
>>> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not
>>> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be
>>> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney
>>> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass
>>> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint
>>> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by
>>> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for
>>> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is
>>> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United
>>> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify
>>> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized
>>> probable cause determinations or supervise the program.
>>> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/)
>>>
>>>
>>>  While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign
>>> on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc>wrote:
>>>
>>>>  Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists,
>>>>
>>>>  I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to
>>>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories:
>>>>
>>>>  http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
>>>>
>>>>  The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome.
>>>>
>>>>  Thank you,
>>>>  NK
>>>>
>>>>  --
>>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
>>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>> --
>> Grégoire Pouget,
>> New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias
>> Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières
>> @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr
>> GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE
>>
>>
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>>
>
>
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-- 
*Sarah A. Downey*
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starts here.
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