[liberationtech] "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology

[coderman]

On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 10:04 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes at stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> ...
> There is a very big difference e.g. I (and a lot of other people too, I
> guess) will react to vendors whose debug interfaces where just hijacked
> by the NSA to install backdoors and where the vendors worked hand in
> hand with the NSA to do so deliberately.

agreed.  we've got some years to wait for a definitive full picture.
 http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm - 932 pages (~1.6%) of
reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.40% of that released)


> If such FUD is spread against vendors, which in my opinion, do actually have a
> valid interest in trying to stop those back doors, what do you think will a
> lot of members of this community do?

vendor responses are fairly self evident.

bad: RSA
less-bad: Cisco
good/proactive: SilentCircle
etc,...   we could get into details of what makes a good vendor
response vs. one that is clearly weasel worded accountability
deflection, don't think this list is the place however.



> Until now I saw no facts that I distrust the major hardware vendors.

then you're not paying attention :)




> I don't want to see what the PR persons on those accused companies' twitter
> feeds will have to go through now. I guess lots of overreaction is happening
> now, which is not helpful at all.

corporate media sucks to more or less degree; i feel bad for anyone
who touches it.

glad it's not my problem!



best regards,