[liberationtech] verifying SSL certs (was Re: In defense of client-side encryption)

[Ben Laurie]

On 14 August 2013 10:46, Guido Witmond <guido at witmond.nl> wrote:

> On 08/14/13 15:18, Ben Laurie wrote:
> > On 14 August 2013 08:54, Guido Witmond <guido at witmond.nl
> > <mailto:guido at witmond.nl>> wrote:
> >
> >     On 08/13/13 19:42, Andy Isaacson wrote:
> >     > On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:10:39AM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote:
> >     >> There is another problem. You rely on HTTPS. Here is the 64000
> >     >> dollar question:
> >     >>
> >     >> Q._"What is the CA-certificate for your banks' website?"_
> >     >>>
>
> [snip]
>
> >     I too have given up on expecting security from the global CA's.
> That's
> >     why I want to see DNSSEC succeed.
> >
> >
> > DNSSEC merely transfers the problem to registries and registrars, who
> > are no more reliable than CAs. You need to solve the problem of having
> > to trust third parties before DNSSEC will work (which is the same
> > problem you need to solve for CAs),
>
> Yes, there is trust involved, but there is a difference.
>
> With CA's anyone can sign a certificate for any site. It's a race to the
> bottom with no winners. Not even the CA's as they can't differentiate
> between themselves. The consequence is that no one trusts any of them.
> And who likes to do business with a party he doesn't trust but needs
> anyway?
>
> With DNSSEC, I have the choice of registrar. If there is a bad apple, I
> choose another who I find better worth my money.
>
>
> > And, sorry to bang on about it, but
> > the answer is Certificate Transparency. BTW, my team is about to start
> > looking at DNSSEC Transparency, too.
>
> Don't bang to hard: DNSSEC and CT solve the same problem.
>

This is not correct.


>
> The problem is that there is no registry that specifies which of the
> Global Certificate authorities is the one you should trust to validate a
> server-certificate. The mess we have right now is that each of the
> Global CA's can sign a server certificate. Hence my 64000 dollar question.
>
> Both DNSSEC and CT solve the problem. Albeit in different ways with
> different pros and cons.
>
> With DNSSEC and DANE, the site operator specifies *a priori* which CA he
> uses to sign the server certificates. It can be a self signed certificate.
>
> With CT, you register which CA has signed a certificate for a web site
> *after the fact*.
>

Not really. The registration occurs before the cert can be used.


>
> We need them both! To keep the CA's and registrars honest. I really
> appreciate your work on CT.
>

CT does not keep registrars honest. This is why you need DNSSEC
transparency.


>
> Guido.
>
>
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