[liberationtech] BlackBerry and CALEA-II

[Jacob Appelbaum]

Griffin Boyce:
> Jacob Appelbaum <jacob at appelbaum.net> wrote:
> 
>> Griffin Boyce:
>>> I disagree.  Blackberry isn't openly selling your data or
>>> otherwise gifting it to third parties, but I don't think that's
>>> really enough.
>> 
>> That is exactly what they're doing. They have a key that is static
>> and from what I've heard, disclosed to LE and intel agencies,
>> specifically to retain or to enhance their marketshare.
>> 
> 
> Well, their market share is enhanced more by shiny packaging and 
> bullshitting their customers into thinking their phones are secure.
> 

That is exactly my point. They're selling out their end users because
their real "customers" are either carriers or governments.

> 
>>> Keep in mind that all PINs are 8-digit hex strings. Narrows the
>>> field a bit. ;P
>> The PIN is just the hardware identifier as I understand things -
>> that isn't my concern - my concern is the fixed key.
> 
> 
> Granted, but you need to determine the PIN (and then spoof it), for 
> PIN-to-PIN Blackberry messages.
> 

Neither of those things matters to me at all. That is - if I can decrypt
your messages, I can trivially recover your PIN if you ever send any
message with it, ever.

> You already know this, but for the benefit of the list:  There's a 
> difference between BBM messages and Pin-to-Pin messages.  With BBM,
> you have to request permission to be added to their list and then you
> both mutually approve each other.  With Pin-to-Pin, you can send
> anyone a message if you have their PIN.  A PIN message is similar to
> email, and displays red in your "messages" queue. BBM is threaded and
> closer to chat. As of Blackberry v10 (I believe), BBM no longer uses
> a PIN, but the BBID.
> 

Unless these are on a BES server - it's all insecure - if it is on a BES
server, it may still be insecure depending on a few factors.

> Also, while a PIN message can be encrypted, the default option on
> both a BES ~and~ PIN messages is to not be encrypted.

Solidly awful.

> 
> What REALLY scares me about this is how many medical providers use 
> Blackberry products in their practices.  A stolen PIN coupled with a
> poorly set-up BES could lead to a serious privacy breach.

Well, sure. It would be as bad as every other BlackBerry device
normally. A real joy, I tell you.

> 
> Andrés Leopoldo Pacheco Sanfuentes <alps6085 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Are there "truly secure" solutions? I don't think so.. especially
>> not when we add the qualifier "of mass consumption "
>> 
> That's probably the real question.  It probably doesn't exist with 
> off-the-shelf solutions.

Yes, it does. There have been off-the-shelf solutions for decades. Some
require a clearance or connections (eg: STU-III), others require money
(eg: cryptophone ), still others require some technical skill (eg:
Guardian apps on Android).

There are obviously degrees of secure.

> TextSecure is useful and secure, but the
> network effect applies there as everywhere else.  If I send you an
> encrypted text, and you don't use the same app, you can't reasonably
> decrypt it.

That isn't really a problem as far as I'm concerned.

> Cryptocat mobile would be a game-changer here, but it
> also doesn't allow for asynchronous communication since it's a chat
> program.  And both parties would still need to use it.
> 

GibberBot with OTR provides the same set of features without all of the
home rolled crypto problems, the web related problems or a third party
that you're not already using on a daily basis.

> I'm not sure there's a full solution right now.  Definitely a market 
> opportunity.
>

I suggest you check out Cryptophone:

 http://www.cryptophone.de/

I've been a reasonably happy user on and off since ~2003.

All the best,
Jacob