[liberationtech] OkayFreedom

[Nadim Kobeissi]

Hm. I'm frustrated by Eric's reply to the point where I'm going to do a
complete audit of OkayFreedom and post any vulnerabilities and exploits
I may find in public on my blog, including detailed instructions on how
to break everything.

Expect something within weeks.
NK

On 10/28/2012 9:46 PM, Eric S Johnson wrote:
>> misremember the entire discussion; it happens to all of us!
> 
> I imagine we each remember what best supports our own point of view. I'm
> sure it happens to all of us!
> 
>> open at the moment for those in the US is if we will have some kind of
>> justice for this spying on all of us. It sure seems bleak.
> 
> Yes, it does. I hope all the Amcits on this list have voted (or will do so)!
> 
>> to make their own choices, to show data and stories about lessons we've
>> learned the hard way, and when we are able, to offer solidarity where it
>> is possible and welcome. 
>> What matters is that users must be protected against serious
>> attackers.
> 
> Agreed.
> 
>> I personally feel like it is often suggested
>> that the burden to show something is unsafe is on us. 
> 
> You assume everything is unsafe. Saying "telephones are dangerous. VPNs are
> dangerous. Anything Microsoft is dangerous. Everything's dangerous"--well,
> okay, sure, so is walking across the street (let alone just breathing,
> especially for those of us who live in China). But if you have only ten
> minutes to get this journo in Gyanja, Gomel, or Gonder to do something
> different, even you (let alone the rest of us relative neophytes) aren't
> going to be able to get him using TAILS. So, we have to prioritise.
> 	One way to prioritise is to assign various levels of likelihood to
> the possible threats. And one way to do that, in turn, is to assess what we
> do know about the threats which have proven problematic in the past. Sure,
> we don't know what we don't know: epistemology and all that. But we can
> tally up what we have learned, and use that as a basis, however imperfect,
> for saying to the activist from Gweru: if we only have ten minutes, the goal
> is to move toward mitigating problem X (and we'll only be able to provide
> the simple solution which takes partial care of the problem--not a solution
> which would keep the NSA off Jake's back, but a solution which is likely to
> make this particular person safer). If we have an hour, we should be able to
> help mitigate X, Y, and Z. Ideally, we'll have three days, and then we can
> help mitigate all 15 top problems.
> 	To "there's no point in anything less than perfection"--well, yes,
> we'll have to agree to disagree on that. I think there's huge value in
> getting someone to use a solution which is "more secure" in their particular
> context (ideally we get that knowledge from on-the-ground research in
> addition to reports in Western media), even if it's not a perfect solution.
> 
> What I don't get is why you work so hard to discredit folks rather than
> educating them. All of us on this list know you're a God (despite your
> sarcastic "perhaps I'm just dense"). We all understand you know more about
> cybersecurity and cybersurveillance (never mind that you hate certain words)
> than the rest of us combined. Everyone loves gaining from your experience
> (e.g. (just to name the most recent examples) your teardown of OkayFreedom,
> the VPN security paper to which you referred a couple days ago, etc.).
> 
> Best,
> Eric
> 
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