[liberationtech] Comments on Internews new "information security guide"

[Eric S Johnson]

Alternatively, since (like OTR) no Skype communication is known to have ever
been successfully in-line-intercepted, the question might be one of
priorities: what cybersec weakness has most often resulted in compromise of
an activist?

     --hard drive isn't encrypted, computer's confiscated

     --software's not patched, user's hacked

     --user clicks on attachment, is infected by malware

. if our goal is mitigating dangers activists face, those are probably
worthwhile targets for our assistance.

 

I can't speak for Skype (or any other company), but if I were a
software/service provider, I too would be very circumspect about claims
about the level of security provided, else if/when a vulnerability's
discovered, issues of liability arise.

 

 <http://keyserver.pgp.com/vkd/DownloadKey.event?keyid=0xE0F58E0F1AF7E6F2>
PGP

 

From: liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu
[mailto:liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Fein
Sent: 13 November 2012 23.51
To: liberationtech
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Comments on Internews new "information
security guide"

 

The question about Skype's encryption has always seemed somewhat secondary
(though still important). The primary concern is who has the keys and who do
they share them with.

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