[liberationtech] Azerbaijan wants to register mobile phones

[planetary i/o]

this was in response to the last poster's uncertainty re: end to end
encryption in the US, several paragraphs into the last mail in thread. this
does not pertain to the original issue re burners. Clear?

On Monday, January 9, 2012, Katrin Verclas <katrin at mobileactive.org> wrote:
>
> On Jan 9, 2012, at 7:51 PM, planetary wrote:
>
>> In the US, CALEA requires that telecom service providers and equipment
vendors not interfere with the ability for an LEA to surveil communications
in real-time, and @ the time of implementation in '07 required them to
regressively update their products.  So, no true E2E encryption for a
publicly available service in the USA is strictly legal.
>
>
> But CALEA does not require SIM reg with ID.  Apples and oranges, albeit
related.
>
>>
>> The WP article is a fairly good intro to its provisions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act
>>
>> We are aware that vendors supplying equipment into the US and close
diplomatic allies tend to support CALEA requirements regardless of whether
it's actually in force in a given territory - in part because it's the same
units shipping globally that need to support the heterogenous LEA reqs, in
part because there is significant soft pressure for allies - particularly
those bordering the US - to comply with CALEA requests.
>>
>> Believe that some of the corporate policy-based prepaid identification
reqs are modeled around, if not required by, by the KYC provisions of
PATRIOT (Know Your Customer, referring to ID data collection reqs for
financial institutions.)
>
> ATT and T-Mobile require NO ID for pre-paid SIMS. Name given is not
verified, SIM and pre-paid airtime can be purchased with cash.
>
> This per spokespersons from both who I just called AND repeated purchases
from both without ID/cash purchase. Same with Sprint and Metro PCS though I
did not reach anyone official there.
>
> These are so-called burner phones - they can be surveiled per CALEA and
Patriot Act provisions etc BUT still are not linked to an individual's ID
for now here in the US.
>
> Not sure why you are arguing this?
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Jan 9, 12, at 3:47 PM, Pavol Luptak wrote:
>>
>>> Hi!
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 09, 2012 at 12:00:30PM -0500, Katrin Verclas wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Are there any emergency or national security laws that allow the
government to gain control of mobile network (e.g. suspend network, conduct
interception, etc)?
>>>
>>> Data retention law (at least in the EU):
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunications_data_retention
>>>
>>>> Article 16 entitles the government during times of martial law and
state of emergency "to preference in use of necessary telecommunication
nets, units and means and can stop, limit their use or apply special rules
for use of communication."  New rules require all operational mobile
devices (cell phones) in the territory of Azerbaijan to be registered at
Mobile Devices Registration System (MDRS). MDRS is not ready yet and is to
be set up by the Ministry of Communication and IT. All cell phone carriers
will have to connect their networks to MDRS. Information required for the
system will include cell phone's IMEI code, a number associated with that
phone and serial number of the SIM card. A cell phone will work only with a
number associated with it and registered at MDRS. Otherwise, cell phone
operators will have to block it.In practice, it means the government will
be able to switch off every phone in the country.
>>>
>>> This is also possible in Slovakia/EU if there is a "suspicion" (which
can be
>>> quite unclear what is the "suspicion") and consequently obtain court
order...
>>>
>>>> Are there any restrictions on encryption, including on VoIP? Is
encryption allowed or forbidden?
>>>
>>> I think it is illegal in the EU to provide _publicly_ end-to-end calls
>>> encryption (without possibility of interception for legal/secret
agencies).
>>> At least in Slovakia, if you decide to find out "ultra secure mobile
operator"
>>> and provide end-to-end encrypted calls without possibility to intercept
these
>>> calls by legal authorities, you will not receive an official license
for this
>>> business. What practically means that this kind of business is illegal.
>>>
>>> Of course you ca provide end-to-end encrypted calls for private
companies,
>>> organizations, etc., you can sell crypto phones and all other crypto
devices,
>>> but you cannot offer completely public end-to-end call encryption
services
>>> for all people...
>>>
>>> I guess the situation is similar even in the US - I don't know if it is
legal
>>> to provide encrypted voice calls services _publicly_ (for all people)
>>> without possibility of interception of legal/secret agencies.
>>>
>>>> The telecom law does not specify any restrictions on encryption.  VoIP
service is considered a form of communication and requires a license
(source: http://news.day.az/hitech/69561.html).
>>>
>>> That's also true in the EU. If you are VoIP service provider, you also
need
>>> to follow the data retention law...
>>>
>>> I believe the situation in Azerbaijan is really bad, but probably not
so worse
>>> than in the other developed countries :-(
>>>
>>> Pavol
>>> --
>>> _______________________________________________________________
>>> [wilder at trip.sk] [http://trip.sk/wilder/] [talker: ttt.sk 5678]
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>>> Should you need immediate assistanKatrin Verclas
> MobileActive.org
> katrin at mobileactive.org
>
> skype/twitter: katrinskaya
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