[liberationtech] Help users in Iran reach the internet

[Walid AL-SAQAF <alkasir admin>]

Hi all,

Just thought I'd let you knwo that I got updates from Alkasir users in Iran
saying that SSL access has resumed and Tor, Alkasir and other circumvention
solutions are working. Please let me know if that is in fact not the case.

Sincerely,

Walid

-----------------

Walid Al-Saqaf
Founder & Administrator
alkasir for mapping and circumventing cyber censorship
https://alkasir.com <walid.al-saqaf at oru.se>


On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Jacob Appelbaum <jacob at appelbaum.net>wrote:

> Hi Libtech,
>
> I just wrote this email to the Tor-talk list and I think it's important
> for this list to see this ASAP:
>
> Here's my original email as a page:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-February/023070.html
>
> Here's the original email for discussion:
>
> In the last 48 hours a major campaign of filtering has started in Iran -
> it started slow and now appears to be that nearly all SSL/TLS traffic is
> blocked on a few major Iranian ISPs. Details are rather rough but we're
> working on some solutions - we've long had an ace up our sleeves for
> this exact moment in the arms race but it's perhaps come while the User
> Interface edges are a bit rough still.
>
> Here's the deal - we need people to run Tor bridges but a special kind
> of Tor bridge, one that does a kind of traffic camouflaging - we call it
> an obfuscated bridge. It's not easy to set up just yet because we were
> not ready to deploy this for everyone yet; it lacks a lot of analysis
> and it might even only last for a few days at the rate the arms race is
> progressing, if you could call it progress.
>
> There are highly technical instructions here:
> https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-instructions.html.en
>
> Currently if you run such a bridge, you'll either need to manually tell
> us (via email to tor-assistants at torproject.org ) about it or you'll need
> to share these bridges with people you want to help directly. It's a
> pain and we're working on it.
>
> Here's a bug report where we're working around the clock to get stuff
> going in a user friendly manner:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5009#comment:17
>
> This kind of help is not for the technically faint of heart but it's
> absolutely needed for people in Iran, right now. It's likely that more
> than ~50,000 - ~60,000 Tor users may drop offline.
>
> Watch this graph for an idea of the censorship impact of directly
> connecting Tor users:
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&start=2011-11-12&end=2012-05-10&country=ir&events=on&dpi=72#direct-users
>
> Here's the same graph but for Tor bridge users in Iran:
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-11-12&end=2012-05-10&country=ir&dpi=72#bridge-users
>
> We're working on easy to use client software and if you're in Iran or
> need one desperately, please email help at rt.torproject.org. We'll try to
> get you a working obfsproxy bridge address and working client software.
>
> All the best,
> Jacob
> _______________________________________________
> liberationtech mailing list
> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
>
> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to:
>
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click
> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily
> digest?"
>
> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list
> moderator in monthly reminders.
>
> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator.
>
> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/attachments/20120215/19727d71/attachment.html>