[liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat

[Ali-Reza Anghaie]

On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Jacob Appelbaum <jacob at appelbaum.net> wrote:
> Ali-Reza Anghaie:
>>
>> Except you're trying to solve a resource and environmental OPSEC
>> problem while effectively reducing the available exfiltration surface
>> (as it were) to a point where the adversary Nation-State (one use
>> case) can shut it down even easier. And you're still not addressing
>> the whole of the problem set an end-user in these hostile environments
>> will face.
>
> Huh?
>
> If your internet cafe has a key logging or a screen logging system,
> they're equal. If they can break SSL, you lose on the network.

Let me try this again - sorry.

If Cryptocat only works on fewer available systems because it's trying
to build in more technical resiliency then it also becomes easier to
shutdown in hostile environments (e.g. Iran). On top of that it also
reduces the number of people capable of using it at all.

I think I have to throw together a table w/ real-world use/region
examples from say Iran to communicate it better. -Ali