[liberationtech] Fwd: [peoplecount] Encryption no deterent to hackers of voting machines (fwd)

[Pranesh Prakash]

I don't conclude that the Indian EVMs are good.  I was supporting the 
idea of a *simple* EVM such as the Indian one, rather than the present 
Indian EVM.

* The software source should be open for inspection.  I am definitely 
not one to argue for security through obscurity.
* There should be a paper trail for verifiability.

The present Indian EVM can, or more pertinently: should, be improved. 
However, they have many advantages over paper ballots that are not 
always obvious to people who don't know about voting conditions in many 
developing world countries, and for those in countries with smaller 
populations.

My main point remains: Almost all DRE voting machines have problems. 
These should not automatically lead one to dismiss them, especially 
those designed like the Indian one.  Sometimes paper ballots have more 
problems.  It's a question of weighing the two, rather than one of 
pointing out flaws in DREs and that being it.

On Tuesday 01 February 2011 03:00 AM, James S. Tyre wrote:
>> And how would a well-designed DRE with a paper audit trail not accomplish this?
>
> Of course, the EVMs in India have no paper trail.
>
> In one of the notes on the silk thread you pointed to, you said that "I support an open audit of the software."
> http://www.mail-archive.com/silklist@lists.hserus.net/msg20187.html
>
> Of course, India doesn't have that either.  ECI is quite proud of the fact that not more than a handful of people have
> access to the software, they consider that to be a security feature.
>
> So how do you conclude that the India EVMs are good systems?

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