[liberationtech] Deconstructing the security risks narrative of Haystack

[Daniel Colascione]

Hi Roger,

On 9/18/10 4:22 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> How's this?
> 
> <li>
> Tor tries to prevent attackers from learning what destinations you connect
> to. It doesn't prevent somebody watching your traffic from learning that
> you're using Tor. You can mitigate (but not fully resolve) the risk
> by using a <a href="<page bridges>">Tor bridge relay</a> rather than
> connecting directly to the public Tor network, but ultimately the best
> protection here is a social approach: the more Tor users there are near
> you and the more <a href="<page torusers>">diverse</a> their interests,
> the less dangerous it will be that you are one of them.
> </li>

That's excellent. Can we count it as the first good thing to come out of
this whole affair? :)

Regards,
Daniel Colascione

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