<html><head></head><body>I don't know, that does not seem to me a reason to back off. It's not just how much data they have, but also how much of a control they extert on society. For example, it would be really sad to be forced in the future to wear these spying devices to get access to certain parts of health care, for example.<br><br>Fwiw, Covid SafePaths (partner of the MIT TACT) is having a webinar tomorrow at 10:00 PST. Maybe we can learn more about it.<br><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On April 24, 2020 11:42:00 AM PDT, Richard Brooks <rrb@g.clemson.edu> wrote:<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">
<pre class="k9mail">I had similar concerns. I also was immediately<br>nervous about big tech doing this.<br><br>I then realized that they have all the data<br>anyway. This is probably the least bad thing that<br>they are going to do with it.<br><br>"How I learned to stop worrying and ..."<br><br>On 4/24/20 2:29 PM, msunet wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 1ex 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid #729fcf; padding-left: 1ex;">There was some talk about this at the Flatten the Curve Summit. At<br>first, I thought this technology would be interesting, but now I have<br>doubts about it. It doesn't seem very useful to trace people if you<br>can't test them, first of all. I also wonder how the random numbers are<br>generated -- will they use your device or advertising ID? How can you<br>tell when they embed this technology in their proprietary, secret OSes<br>anyway? I also haven't seen what the authentication layer is -- will you<br>need a google account? -- or more generally, how they plan to protect<br>the system from attackers. It's also not clear to me who owns the data,<br>where it is stored, how much of it, or for how long. And when does the<br>tracing end? They also have not solved fundamental problems about this<br>tech, like signals going through walls.<br><br>Unless these and other questions are answered (maybe they have and I<br>haven't caught up), this just seems to me like an attempt by<br>corporations to use the situation as an excuse to creep in more into<br>people's lives. It never hurts to remember that they are powered by<br>profit, not good will.<br><br>On April 23, 2020 7:01:37 PM PDT, "Robert Mathews (OSIA)"<br><mathews@hawaii.edu> wrote:<br><br><br> On 4/23/20 5:26 AM, David Stodolsky wrote:<br><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 1ex 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid #ad7fa8; padding-left: 1ex;">This appears to be virtue signaling. France is asking that the<br>Apple/Google tracing security be relaxed.<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 1ex 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid #8ae234; padding-left: 1ex;"><a href="https://apple.slashdot.org/story/20/04/21/2019202/france-says-apple-bluetooth-policy-is-blocking-virus-tracker#comments">https://apple.slashdot.org/story/20/04/21/2019202/france-says-apple-bluetooth-policy-is-blocking-virus-tracker#comments</a><br><<a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__apple.slashdot.org_story_20_04_21_2019202_france-2Dsays-2Dapple-2Dbluetooth-2Dpolicy-2Dis-2Dblocking-2Dvirus-2Dtracker-23comments&d=DwMFaQ&c=Ngd-ta5yRYsqeUsEDgxhcqsYYY1Xs5ogLxWPA_2Wlc4&r=V-iMGiA8Z-z_leHLkLSzXQ&m=1UUH9eOltaAPSUdTtOKTK8wH6ws-MQUbG4Ac_auCdJ4&s=HA0muQHuHH31W1WZw0ZUdLoorMjmeoPDcTks1KDy4v8&e=">https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__apple.slashdot.org_story_20_04_21_2019202_france-2Dsays-2Dapple-2Dbluetooth-2Dpolicy-2Dis-2Dblocking-2Dvirus-2Dtracker-23comments&d=DwMFaQ&c=Ngd-ta5yRYsqeUsEDgxhcqsYYY1Xs5ogLxWPA_2Wlc4&r=V-iMGiA8Z-z_leHLkLSzXQ&m=1UUH9eOltaAPSUdTtOKTK8wH6ws-MQUbG4Ac_auCdJ4&s=HA0muQHuHH31W1WZw0ZUdLoorMjmeoPDcTks1KDy4v8&e=</a>><br></blockquote> It appears that France has developed a slightly less secure<br> tracing method than the coming Apple/Google API/OS built-in. The<br> current limitation is that Apple doesn’t allow Bluetooth to run on<br> the iPhone, if the app is in the background and the data leaves<br> the phone. This has crippled TraceTogether, etc., since it makes<br> tracing impractical with the iPhone.<br><br> dss<br><br> David Stodolsky, PhD Institute for Social<br> Informatics<br> Tornskadestien 2, st. th., DK-2400 Copenhagen NV, Denmark<br> dss@socialinformatics.org <mailto:dss@socialinformatics.org> <br> Tel./Signal: +45 3095 4070<br></blockquote> Notions of *'contact tracing'* must be considered in broader<br> 'technical' and 'technological' terms. For instance, consider this<br> following headline, which I have been discussing with my team since<br> its publication.<br><br> *"2 billion phones cannot use Google and Apple contact-tracing tech<br> System developed by Silicon Valley relies on technology missing from<br> older handsets."*<br> TIM BRADSHAW, FT.COM - 4/20/2020, 12:29 PM<br> *arsTECHNICA*<br> <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/04/2-billion-phones-cannot-use-google-and-apple-contract-tracing-tech/">https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/04/2-billion-phones-cannot-use-google-and-apple-contract-tracing-tech/</a><br> <br> MANY such subscriber-linked mobile handsets in-service are located<br> within *the Continent of Africa*, and the *Indian Sub-Continent.* <br> And, they are MOSTLY NOT - iPhone 10s.<br><br> Of this, I shared the following sentiment with my staff and extended<br> teams....<br><br> //This story SHOULD teach us that, no matter how LARGE any<br> "tech" company may be, if those human beings WITHIN are NOT<br> disposed to understanding "SYSTEMS" more wholistically (a widely<br> abused term), products born out of this lack of understanding<br> cannot be expected to meet basic aspects of<br> //////functional//ity////. ///It also goes without saying that<br> SYSTEMS so constructed can also 'not' be expected to<br> 'INTEROPERATE reliably' with OTHER systems of a LIKE, and/or<br> UNLIKE construction too./<br><br> In this respect at least, and more importantly, taking note of the<br> UNIVERSALITY of COVID-19, backward operational compatibility and<br> INCLUSIVITY should have been critical 'usability' considerations.<br><br><br>-- Sent from /e/ Mail.<br><br></blockquote><br></pre></blockquote></div><br>-- Sent from /e/ Mail.</body></html>